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Abstract 
 
This thesis examines acts of narrative appropriation, the telling of purportedly  
‘authentic’ life stories by those for whom the stories are not theirs to tell.  This 
misuse or subversion of genre - the discipline of historical writing and the category 
of autobiography - becomes a means for cultural, social and political dissimulation, 
and the analysis focuses both on the act:  the event, trespass, or ‘theft’ of another’s 
life story, and on the cultural meaning that this event reveals.  These narrative acts 
are approached theoretically through discussions of what it means to be an author, a 
reader, and through the consideration of literary and social genre, category and form.  
In exploring identities at particular risk of appropriation, this thesis shows how 
fraudulent appropriated narratives affect our reading of the world, and in turn 
influence our perception of already marginalized social groups.  My primary 
examples include prostitution ‘narratives’, Native North American ‘memoir,’ and 
fraudulent Holocaust survivor ‘testimony,’ with each text providing decoded 
evidence of ‘genre-bending’ exhibiting a social and political intent.  These works 
seek to be read as authentic personal narratives, as autobiography, and that is how 
they have been presented to the reader.  However, they are imposters – fictional tales 
desiring the elevated status of historical authenticity and willing to bend the rules 
and contracts of genre to achieve their end.   Here the appearance of authenticity is 
achieved through the use of cultural and social ‘myth,’ or perceptions of cultural 
identity, and as such its fraudulent construction is first and foremost a social act, 
with a social and economic motivation.  As this thesis concludes, these texts are 
most successful when their own political and social ideologies echo and confirm that 
of the readership; when their subjects, the fraudulent ‘I’ at the center of the text is 
also a performative elaboration of cultural belief.   
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Introduction:  ‘What difference does it make who is speaking?’ 
 
So the truth is this.  I read and recommend books based on my 
connection with the written word and its message… I rely on the 
publishers to define a category that a book falls within and also the 
authenticity of the work. So I’m just like everybody else.  I go to the 
bookstore.  I pick out a book I love.  If it says memoir, I know that – 
that maybe the names and dates and times have been compressed 
because that what’s a memoir is.1 
 
Is Oprah Winfrey right?  Is her perception of the memoir - as a genre defined and 
authenticated by publishers, where ‘names’ and ‘dates’ and ‘times’ have been 
acceptably blurred - truly what ‘a memoir is’?   
Certainly Winfrey’s perception is important.  In an article celebrating Winfrey as one 
of ‘the Hundred Most Important People of the Twentieth Century,’ Deborah Tannen, 
for Time Magazine, referred to Winfrey as: ‘a beacon, not only in the worlds of 
media and entertainment but also in the larger realm of public discourse.’2  As such, 
Winfrey’s views, whether or not she really is ‘just like everybody else,’ cannot be 
discounted.  If the belief, as put forward by Winfrey but presumably shared by many 
of the millions who make up her audience, is that the genre of memoir is regulated 
by a trustworthy publishing industry that supports and promotes ‘authenticity’ then 
we must look into this; just as we must consider, as well, the view that fictional 
literary tropes or the ease of narrative ‘compression’ can be used without incident in 
a work purporting to be non-fiction.  Why, though, did Winfrey not mention the 
matter of authorship?  Is it simply that the understanding of what ‘a memoir is’ is so 
implicitly dependent on the one main, invariable principle – namely, that the author 
is whoever he or she says that they are – that it needs not be mentioned?  Unspoken, 
but surely assumed, in Winfrey’s discussion of the genre is that if the ‘category’ is 
                                               
1
 Oprah Winfrey on Larry King Live, CNN, January 11, 2006, transcript available online 
<http://edition.cnn.com/TRANSCRIPTS/0601/11/lkl.01.html> [accessed March 14, 2009]. 
2
 Deborah Tannen, ‘Oprah Winfrey:  She didn’t create the talk show format. But the compassion and 
intimacy she has put into it created a new way for us to talk to one another,’ Time, June 08, 1998.  
Article available online < http://www.time.com/time/time100/artists/profile/winfrey.html> [accessed 
March 14, 2009]. 
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not supported by an authentic voice then the work is not a memoir and, therefore, 
‘the message’ is not ‘real,’ however loose or ‘compressed’ the form may be. 
How, though, might we categorize works of ‘memoir’ where this certainty of 
authorship is not the case and must we always then discount ‘the message’?  In this 
respect it is worth considering the context in which Winfrey’s remarks on the nature 
of memoir were given.  She was speaking in defense of a suspected fraud, amidst the 
scandal of James Frey’s A Million Little Pieces.3  Winfrey was forced to define the 
genre of memoir because a book she ‘loved’ suddenly proved incompatible with a 
version of the existing framework.  Other people took exception to James Frey’s 
‘compressed’ narrative, and to his blurring and obscuring of facts.  I return to A 
Million Little Pieces and Winfrey’s role within the events surrounding Frey in the 
final chapter, but suffice to say that in defending Frey’s text Winfrey inadvertently 
unleashed a media furor, and one of the focuses of this thesis is examining the wider 
phenomena of how this could have happened.  How it is that the definition of 
category came to be the responsibility of publishers, rather than readers; why it is 
that the historically suspect genre of life-writing continues to exist, by and large, 
unchallenged by a reading public, although not, certainly, by an invested critical 
community.  Finally, I use the notion of ‘compression’ or the uses of form to explore 
what we mean by literary ‘truth’ - can something be ‘truthful’ if it is also distorted? 
In this thesis I explore acts of narrative appropriation, the telling of purportedly 
‘authentic’ life stories by those for whom the stories are not authentic or not theirs to 
tell, as well as the misuse of genre - the discipline of historical writing and the 
categories of memoir and autobiography - as a means for cultural, social and 
political dissimulation.  I am interested both in the act, the event, trespass, or ‘theft’ 
of another’s narrative, and in the message that the event reveals.  Also, which 
identities are most at risk; whose stories are the most vulnerable or desired?  As 
pernicious the deed, it is first and foremost a social act, with a social and economic 
motivation.  How, then, do these fraudulent narratives affect our reading of the 
world?  How are these texts put to work? 
                                               
3
 James Frey, A Million Little Pieces (London:  John Murray, 2006). 
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I approach these narrative acts theoretically through discussions of what it means to 
be an author, a reader, and through the consideration of literary and social genre, 
category and form.  Through my primary examples, grouped in communities, 
including prostitution ‘narratives,’ Native North American ‘memoir,’ and fraudulent 
Holocaust survivor ‘testimony,’ I provide decoded evidence of ‘genre-bending’ with 
a social and political intent.  These texts want to be read as authentic personal 
narratives, as autobiography, and that is how they have been presented to the reader.  
However, they are imposters – fictional tales aspiring to the status of authenticity 
and willing to cynically bend the rules and contracts of genre to achieve their end.  I 
explore how they are able to do this through the use of cultural and social ‘myth,’ 
those collective beliefs, which may or may not be rooted in ‘truth,’ that resonate in 
every culture concerning specific groups or identities and which succeed to 
categorize and place communities within political hierarchies.  I reveal how it is that 
through a cultural command of these myths - which Freud refers to as ‘the wishful 
phantasies of whole nations, the secular dreams of youthful humanity’ - narrative 
misappropriations achieve their status of authenticity.4  That is to say that they tell us 
what we already ‘know,’ confirm our prejudices, ‘phantasies’ and presumptions and 
thus engage in a one-sided cultural conversation, more of an echo than a dialogue.  
Yet this conversation is, nevertheless, important.  These texts reveal much in their 
actions and in each instance should be read, as Anthony Grafton suggests in Forger 
and Critics:  Creativity and Duplicity in Western Scholarship, as ‘a document in its 
time.’5  These texts are exercises in cultural history, where, according to Grafton, 
‘the forger imposes personal values and period assumptions and idioms on his 
evocation of the past.’6  Although it is true, as Grafton argues, that literary fakes or 
‘forgeries,’ as these fraudulent autobiographies certainly are, provide ‘only one 
possible way of dealing with the past,’ surely he is right that ‘it is no more arbitrary’ 
than many other historical approaches or critical re-imaginings.7  In an extension of 
this argument by Grafton that sees the ‘forgery’ as historical ‘document,’ I propose 
                                               
4
 Sigmund Freud, ‘Creative Writers and Day-Dreaming,’ in The Penguin Freud Library, Vol. 14:  Art 
and Literature, (Harmondsworth:  Penguin, 1985), p. 140. 
5
 Anthony Grafton, Forgers and Critics: Creativity and Duplicity in Western Scholarship (London:  
Collins & Brown, 1990), p. 124. 
6
 Grafton, Forgers and Critics, p. 125. 
7
 Grafton, Forgers and Critics, p. 124. 
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that fraudulent autobiographies are a way of dealing with cultural and social 
perceptions of identity and persona, as well as the past, and that they are, indeed, ‘no 
more arbitrary’ than many other forms, including literary fictional portrayals, 
journalism articles, critical conjecture or cinematic representation. 
I use fraudulent prostitution memoirs as a way into this process because they prove 
such a rich resource for socio-political myth and ideological concern.  Although 
there is a rich eighteenth and early nineteenth century tradition of ‘authentic’, erudite 
and witty memoirs of notorious courtesans such as Mary Robinson and Harriette 
Wilson, as well as several playful late twentieth century ‘tell-alls’ such as Xaviera 
Hollander’s The Happy Hooker or the adult-film actress Jenna Jameson’s How To 
Make Love Like a Porn Star, the prostitute’s narrative voice has also been frequently 
appropriated or ‘ventriloquized’ throughout history.8  Usually this appropriation has 
been for a singular pornographic purpose, such as with John Cleland’s infamous 
Fanny Hill, where the male voice (by and large) commands a bawdy discourse of the 
female subject, suggesting to the reader that the prostitute’s voice is one of available 
and affable eroticism and demonstrating that both the prostitute’s body and her 
narrative are for the sexual fulfillment of others.9  This pornographic ploy is the most 
usual use of the prostitute’s identity as narrative subject and corporeal object, and 
there is little question that my first example shares in this motivation.   
Cora Pearl, a well-known courtesan of the demi-monde in nineteenth century Paris, 
published her own autobiography in the years before her death in 1886.10  Although 
certainly guilty of exploiting for financial gain her own notorious public identity, 
Pearl’s text was a chaste, if self-serving, memoir, which has since faded into 
oblivion.  It would appear that Cora Pearl’s working name, however, still 
commanded a certain cultural currency a century after her death, and, as such, was 
perceived to be a socially legitimate target for appropriation by a man named Derek 
Parker.  Parker, writing under an editorial pseudonym, William Blatchford, rewrote 
                                               
8
 Mary Robinson, Perdita:  The Memoirs of Mary Robinson, ed. M.J. Levy (London:  Peter Owen, 
1994); Harriette Wilson, Memoirs:  The Greatest Courtesan of Her Age, ed. Lesley Blanch (London:  
Phoenix, 2003); Xaviera Hollander, The Happy Hooker (New York:  Regan Books, 2002); Jenna 
Jameson, How to Make Love Like a Porn Star (New York:  Regan Books, 2004).  As such, there can 
be little doubt that the popularity of some appropriated memoirs is a direct result of this existing 
tradition of genuine texts. 
9
 John Cleland, Fanny Hill:  Memoirs of a Woman of Pleasure (London: Wordsworth Classics, 1991). 
10
 Cora Pearl, Memoires de Cora Pearl, trans. George Vickers (Paris:  Levy, 1886). 
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Pearl’s memoir in the early 1980’s as a pornographic project.11  Parker’s project, 
though tasteless, would not have been particularly nefarious if he had not insisted in 
presenting the text as a genuine historical document, rather than of a work of fiction.  
Through his cynical exploitation of the category of autobiography, Parker’s 
pornographic rewriting of Pearl’s life has since usurped Pearl’s authentic memoir as 
the primary narrative that defines her story.  In this instance it is not only a gross 
misappropriation of identity, but also, crucially, of narrative intent. 
The case of Cora Pearl confirms Paul de Man’s reading of autobiography as 
‘epitaph’ in his critical essay ‘Autobiography as De-facement.’12  Parker’s 
performance of Cora Pearl demonstrates the validity of de Man’s theory of 
prosopopeia, or the ‘putting on of a face’ or ‘mask.’13  Here a man was able to put 
on the prostitute’s face and write her body, not as a fictional construct but as a 
purportedly authentic telling of her life, privileging the erotic whilst eroding the 
genuine.   
Pornography, as Angela Carter suggested, is a genre that ‘has work to do,’ and so, 
certainly, does autobiography.14  As a ‘useful’ genre, autobiography is a public 
medium and a social act; an act with a strict regulating body in play, dictating who is 
allowed to participate in the process of narration.  As Edward Said wrote in Culture 
and Imperialism, the ‘constitution’ of a narrative subject is reliant on the ‘authority 
of history and society.’15  Such authority is often carefully and jealously guarded, as 
the second prostitution ‘memoir’ reveals.  That is to say, not everyone can simply 
make use of the category as a means of getting heard. 
The 1938 text To Beg I am Ashamed:  The Autobiography of a London Prostitute by 
‘Sheila Cousins’ was banned upon publication.16  It was not enough for the 
governing bodies of the Public Morality Council and the Director of the Public 
                                               
11
 Derek Parker (writing as William Blatchford), The Memoirs of Cora Pearl:  Secret Erotic 
Reminiscence of a Woman of Pleasure (London:  Granada, 1983). 
12
 Paul de Man, ‘Autobiography as De-facement,’ in Modern Language Notes, no. 94 (1979). 
13
 de Man, ‘De-facement,’ p. 204. 
14
 On pornography as a literary genre, Carter wrote:  ‘there is no question of an aesthetics of 
pornography.  It can never be art for art’s sake.  Honourably enough, it is always art with work to do.’ 
Angela Carter, The Sadeian Woman:  An Exercise in Cultural History (London:  Virago, 1979), p. 12.  
As I suggest in chapter 1, this might also be a useful way of thinking about autobiography.  
15
 Edward Said, Culture and Imperialism (London:  Chatto &Windus, 1993), p. 92. 
16
 Sheila Cousins, To Beg I am Ashamed (London:  Corgi, 1960). 
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Prosecution that Cousins’ tale was one of discreet misery:  the mere fact of her 
elevated discourse and middle class status as revealed by the text - the author was, 
after all, ‘born a lady’ - was enough to warrant the book’s silencing.17  Yet, the 
wretched narrative of To Beg I am Ashamed confirms the text to be a cautionary tale 
and, as such, it is clear the creation of the book was a moral and social project.  In 
this instance, the ‘true’ author of the book, or ‘voice’ of Sheila Cousins, Ronald de 
Couves Matthews, a close friend of Graham Greene’s, sought to use the prostitute’s 
story as a plaintive cry to awaken the social bodies, an eye-opening call to arms that 
failed miserably in its didactic intent.  I suggest here that the voice of Sheila Cousins 
was silenced because de Couves Matthews did not expertly negotiate his literary act 
or performance of genre and subject.  Either he misinterpreted his audience, or, 
under his lofty and erudite command, the early twentieth century myth of the 
prostitute as narrated by Sheila Cousins simply did not resonate. 
As Said argued, ‘the capacity to represent, portray, characterize and depict is not 
easily available to just any member of society.’18  An educated, middle class man 
such as de Couves Matthews may have been allowed to narrate the life of a wretched 
female prostitute fictionally, as Dumas or even Defoe had been able to do through 
the presentation of her as a tragic heroine, but he was not allowed to lend his 
discourse and field of reference to the successful autobiographical performance of 
one.  The example of To Beg I am Ashamed reveals the delicacy within the 
construction of the fraudulent memoir.  In these instances the author needs to pitch 
their performance to coincide directly with the accepted collective myth of the 
audience, that space of projection and conjecture, or risk it being rejected.   
After I explore the events surrounding the publication of To Beg I am Ashamed, 
Michel Foucault’s discussion of discourse in The Will to Knowledge helps to remind 
us how tenuous discursive acts can be, especially when the narrative subject pertains 
to the matter of sexuality; how delicate the transfer of knowledge truly is.19  
Foucault’s use of the Marquis de Sade to demonstrate the power of disclosure and 
the personal telling of detail is useful in my consideration of these texts.  Through de 
                                               
17
 Cousins, To Beg, p. 7. 
18
 Said, Culture and Imperialism, p. 95. 
19
 Michel Foucault, The Will to Knowledge:  The History of Sexuality, vol. 1, trans. Robert Hurley 
(Harmondsworth:  Penguin, 1998). 
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Sade, Foucault reveals how the telling of intimate details is an act of ownership – a 
controlling stake in the identity of another.  Whilst in ‘What is an Author?’ Foucault 
suggests that the ‘author’ is an ideological product derived from social and 
commercial industry; a created discursive function marked by exclusion, serving to 
preserve its market status as a commanding force.20  As such, it does not overly 
concern Foucault ‘who is speaking’ but rather he seeks to examine the means of the 
production and proliferation of discourse.  And yet, of course, it matters who is 
speaking when it means that someone else is not. 
The final prostitution narrative explored in this chapter came into existence online, 
as a highly popular ‘blog’ or internet narrative in the form of a personal diary.  
Remarkably, ‘Belle de Jour,’ the ‘Internet Call Girl,’ has managed to remain 
anonymous despite intense media speculation and conjecture surrounding and 
pertaining to her identity.  Now a published author whose life ‘story’ has even been 
produced as a successful series for television, Belle remains a nebulous character in 
the contemporary imagination.21  Of course facing Belle de Jour are the routine 
speculations that she is not a genuine prostitute, and more than that, maybe not even 
a woman.  However, genuine or not, as a contemporary ‘prostitute’ who uses her 
identity as a means for entertainment, Belle’s narration is entirely mythical.  Not 
only does she rely on the classic 1968 Luis Buñuel film starring Catherine Deneuve 
for reference, both cultural and visual, she also draws cynically from the modern 
fantasy of the highly cultured, educated, beautiful woman who chooses prostitution 
for its glamour, money and inverted cultural cachet.22    
Cora Pearl was defined by Derek Parker as pornographic object, whilst Sheila 
Cousins was written by de Couves Matthews as social wretch; Belle de Jour’s act, 
finally, defines the mythologized narrative of the prostitute as one of idealized 
cultural fantasy – she is presented as an independent woman who truly has it all.  
However forged or fraudulent, each of these mythical readings of the prostitute is 
part of her cultural and social identity as perceived by others, and because of this 
they are each important in our understanding of the subject as cultural object. 
                                               
20
 Michel Foucault, ‘What is an Author,’ in The Foucault Reader, ed. Paul Rabinow 
(Harmondsworth:  Penguin, 1984). 
21
 Belle de Jour, Intimate Adventures of a London Call Girl (Weidenfield and Nicolson, 2005). 
22
 Belle de Jour, dir. Luis Buñuel (Valoria Films, 1968). 
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If the prostitute has a certain mythical currency, then the Native North American 
retains an equally potent historical identity.  In the third chapter I explore three 
literary trespasses against this disparate community, and suggest that a deeper 
reading of fraudulent performances concerning the myth of the ‘Indian’ reveal a 
wider, metaphorical purpose in respect to a particularly North American or United 
States imagination.  Mary Evans, in her book Missing Persons, asks us to consider 
what she calls ‘icons of experience and reality’ – those mythical groups of 
‘fantastical identities beloved,’ as Evans writes, ‘by children and the dispossessed.’23  
Here I explore how fraudulent Native American narratives, often iconic in their own 
right, reveal a young country’s changing relationship to ‘the dispossessed.’ 
Since its publication in the mid 1970’s, The Education of Little Tree has emerged as 
a best loved children’s classic in the vein of Mark Twain’s The Adventures of 
Huckleberry Finn.24  Unlike Twain’s fictional Huckleberry, however, here the 
eponymous narrator, Little Tree, is presented as an authentic Native American boy, a 
legitimate autobiographical subject by the book’s author, Forrest Carter.  A work of 
‘sun-dappled idealism,’ Little Tree is a seemingly innocent coming of age story set 
in the Appalachian mountains detailing the depression era Cherokee experiences of 
Little Tree and his family.  However, although the author, Forrest Carter, was 
himself from the state of Alabama, bordering the Appalachians, he was never raised 
in the mountain idyll of Little Tree; the narrative voice of Little Tree is entirely 
fictional.   Born Asa Carter, ‘Forrest’ was an all-white man, a one-time member of 
the Ku Klux Klan and, as I discuss in this third chapter, a complicated figure in the 
epic United States battle for Civil Rights. 
Many have read Little Tree as a form of psychic ‘re-birth’ for Carter, and this is a 
possible interpretation.  My reading of the text is somewhat darker.  I see it as a 
fantasy of segregation and a nostalgic yearning for a mythical, libertarian North 
American past.  I read Carter’s performance of memoir, the cynical appropriation of 
the ethnic and historical status of Little Tree, as a way to voice a covert, and deeply 
unpopular, political agenda.   
                                               
23
 Mary Evans, Missing Persons:  The Impossibility of Auto/biography (London:  Routledge, 1999), p. 
118. 
24
 Forrest Carter, The Education of Little Tree (Albuquerque:  The University of New Mexico Press, 
1991); Mark Twain, The Adventures of Huckleberry Finn (Harmondsworth:  Penguin, 1986). 
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Laura Browder, in her excellent book, Slippery Characters:  Ethnic Impersonators 
and American Identity, published in 2000, wonders if the literary act of ‘ethnic 
impersonation’ is ‘a genre on the verge of extinction.’25  For Browder, the changing 
American perception of racial identity as a fixed notion, easily performed, is 
becoming less and less valid.  Whilst it is certainly true that ‘fixed’ racial identities 
are on the wane, my next two examples of fictive Native American memoir force us 
to consider if points of disjuncture are not, in many ways, easier to appropriate? 
The author of The Blood Runs Like a River Through My Dreams, the fraudulent 
impoverished Native American Nasdijj, is actively concerned with questioning 
cultural myths even as he upholds them; as such the initial site of his performance, 
the first ‘memoir’ of three, published in 2000, is self-consciously and deliberately 
fraught.26  Nasdijj relies on the refrain ‘you are your history’ to suggest to the reader 
that history, like identity, is far from fixed and entirely self-dependent.  A self-called 
‘mongrel,’ Nasdijj privileges his Navajo mother and her rich cultural heritage, while 
denigrating his white father and the history of violence brought forth by his 
European ancestors.  Another text, like Little Tree, with a clear political agenda, 
Nasdijj, who is really a white middle class man named Timothy Barrus, uses the 
voice of the destitute, diseased Native American to express anger and hatred at the 
cultural legacy of the United States. 
At the time of publication, Nasdijj’s anger was critically received as an indication of 
honesty.  But, read now, Barrus’ act is a bombastic performative diatribe of 
historical oppression, racism and indignation – an exploitation of emotion.  The 
intention may have been to illustrate the social deprivation of a marginalized 
community, but in locating the sites and events of his texts in conditions of such 
extreme circumstance, Barrus as Nasdijj serves only to promote the myth or 
perception that the contemporary Native American is broken, decrepit and diseased.  
If Forrest Carter infantilized the Cherokee voice, Nasdijj covered the Navajo with 
sores.  Nevertheless, Timothy Barrus was able to publish three books as Nasdijj 
before his ‘outing’ by a Los Angeles Times journalist, Matthew Fleischer, in an 
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article wittily entitled ‘Navahoax.’27  However, as I discuss in the chapter, 
Fleischer’s suspicions of Barrus were not based on his racial performances within 
the text, but rather on his bizarre sexual diatribes published online.  It was not that 
Barrus as Nasdijj ranted unbelievably about the Native American situation that 
alerted suspicion, but rather that he collected photos and stories of abused young 
men.  What ‘outed’ him was not his ethnic performance but his sexual one. 
Margaret B. Jones, the author of the final instance of fraudulent Native American 
memoir discussed in chapter 3, was revealed to be a performing purveyor of 
falsehoods not by a dogged journalist but by her own sister, after a profile ran in The 
New York Times, in advance of the publication of her first ‘memoir’ Love and 
Consequences.28  Jones’ book, published and withdrawn in 2008, is only peripherally 
concerned with presenting a mythical portrayal of the Native American.  Rather, 
Jones appropriates the minority status of a Native American identity to forge a way 
into the otherwise racially closed community of ‘gangland,’ Los Angeles. 
Writing as a half Native American foster child, with a history of sexual abuse, Jones 
is able to position herself within the black Californian community of South Central 
Los Angeles, a world of street gang allegiance and violent gang culture, and it is here 
that her story is set.  Jones’ narrative act is anthropological as much as literary, she 
goes to great lengths to explain to the reader the complicated gang codes, slang terms 
and hierarchical systems of her adopted home.  Her performative act even goes so far 
to replace the letter ‘c’ in her text with the letter ‘k,’ as her allegiance is to the 
‘Blood’ community, sworn enemies of the ‘Crips.’ 
Jones’ true identity, as revealed by her sister, is Margaret ‘Peggy’ Seltzer, an all 
white girl from a San Fernando Valley suburb of Los Angeles.  Although there exists 
less than a half hour of driving distance between them, the cosseted suburb of 
Seltzer’s birth and the realities of the South Central setting of Jones’ story are a 
world apart. Although hers may not be as overtly political as the performances of 
Forrest Carter or Timothy Barrus, Jones’ narrative appropriation of the Native 
American voice is still revealing.  For instance, in exploiting the myth of the foster 
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child with a violent background, Seltzer effectively sets the arbitrary allegiance to a 
local gang, who subsequently serve as a surrogate family, against parental abuse and 
government inaction.  Ultimately, Love and Consequences is a cynical narrative that 
reveals all ties to be arbitrary, and all allegiances, be they familial, racial or social, to 
be circumstantial.  In this way, it is a profound narrative of the United States, a tale 
that prioritizes the myth or ideal of the individual against all else. 
In The Culture of Narcissism:  American Life in an Age of Diminishing Expectations, 
Christopher Lasch suggested that North Americans are ‘fast losing the sense of 
historical continuity.’29  The three works of North American or US memoir 
discussed in this chapter reveal how this is, indeed, the case.  Each author writes as a 
member of the ‘dispossessed’:  Forrest Carter in The Education of Little Tree 
venerated an idealized past over the present; Timothy Barrus, as Nasdijj, usurped the 
events of the past so that only desolation remained, and, finally, Margaret Seltzer 
erased the past so as to escape, alone, into the future. 
Margaret Seltzer deployed the language of ‘the streets’ to convince her audience that 
her performance was authentic; Timothy Barrus used the strength of his own anger.  
Yet other forms of narrative require other markers of authenticity.  Holocaust 
narratives, for instance, are known for their very improbability – sadly, as one 
survivor has said, ‘if you didn’t have an amazing story, you didn’t survive.’30  In the 
genre of Holocaust testimony, then, implausibility is a sign of legitimacy.  In the 
fourth chapter I turn to performances of Holocaust memoir, fraudulent stories of 
incredible survival and escape, and examine the uses of the historical testimonials.   
Since very few cultural groups can compare to the Holocaust survivor for historical 
privilege and authority, and because Holocaust denial is an increasingly significant 
concern, works of false testimony pertaining to the Holocaust are deemed especially 
pernicious.  Compared to the prostitute, for example, the social status and historical 
documents of Holocaust survivors are, to use a word from Erving Goffman, ‘sacred.’  
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Norman Finkelstein controversially credits ‘the Holocaust Industry’ with the 
promotion of a ‘culture of victimization,’ and in the elevation of the status of the 
‘survivor’ to one of extreme and potentially dangerous privilege.31  Whether 
Finkelstein is correct in the assessment that such a deliberate and conspiratorial 
phenomenon or ‘industry’ exists is not relevant for this study, but we must accept, 
nevertheless, that the status of the survivor is one of privilege, and as such has 
become open to exploitation and appropriation.   
The author of my first example of fraudulent Holocaust memoir, Binjamin 
Wilkomirski has been called a ‘memory thief’ and a ‘parasite’ for his metafictional 
Holocaust narrative, Fragments, published in 1994.32  A complicated text, 
Fragments tells of Wilkomirski’s childhood memories in occupied Latvia, the 
children’s barracks of the Nazi death camp Majdanek and then in post-war 
Switzerland.  What is perhaps most troubling about the events of Fragments is that, 
although the public now know the events in the text to be fabricated, Wilkomirski 
himself appears to remain convinced of their truth and vehemently defends his 
literary project as authentic.    
In Fragments, Wilkomirski expertly uses the broken, opaque and inconsistent 
memory of childhood to offer a dramatic, highly emotional narrative of survival.  As 
a text, it is deeply signified by other Holocaust references, drawing on readers’ 
preconceived, readily imagined ‘icons’ of Holocaust images and events; as I discuss, 
Wilkomirski’s literary and cultural influences are as pronounced as they are varied.  
In this respect it becomes increasingly clear that his mythical language is lifted 
directly from pre-existing historical and cultural documents, and, as such, explains 
why his prose resonates so eerily. 
The events of Fragments and the strange circumstance of Binjamin Wilomirski have 
inspired much critical commentary, but by far the most comprehensive study is The 
Wilkomirski Affair, by the historian Stefan Maechler.33  Maechler’s study goes a long 
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way in examining the psychological implications of Wilkomirski’s act, uncovering 
genuine childhood trauma and discussing the uses and abuses of recovered memory 
therapy, a process which Wilkomirski underwent before the publication of 
Fragments. 
For Maechler, Fragments can be read as a metaphor for Wilkomirski’s own difficult 
life, a case not so much of identity theft as identity confusion.  Yet, in a deviation 
from Maechler’s more sympathetic interpretation, I see this as a suspect or dubious 
reading of the autobiographical genre.  To accept, however psychologically unsound 
the act, the use of historical event as allegorical – beyond, of course, the genre of 
fiction - is to offer a legitimacy to those who would usurp the past to fit into their 
own fraudulent, delusional or self-serving narratives. 
The author of the second text I explore in chapter 4, a Belgian woman writing as 
Mischa Defonseca, would certainly prefer her fraudulent Holocaust memoir, 
Surviving with Wolves, to be read metaphorically.34  Yet Defonseca’s narrative is 
potentially exploitative in a way that very few other works explored in this thesis are.  
An unlikely tale of survival, Surviving with Wolves was, in fact, written by the non-
Jewish Monique de Wael, purportedly documenting a trek across occupied Europe, 
undertaken by the Jewish child, Mischa, who is accompanied by a family of friendly 
wolves.  This text abuses the extraordinary position of the survivor to produce a tale 
marked by utter implausibility.  Perhaps most troubling about de Wael/Defonseca’s 
unbelievable performance is that it demands a readership that have unilaterally 
accepted the Holocaust as an event that lies, as Elie Wiesel has said, ‘outside, if not 
beyond history.’35  Surviving with Wolves is written for an audience for whom the 
Holocaust is historically sacrosanct, for those who equate any form of disbelief with 
denial.  As such, Defonseca’s narrative, in aping the authentic, unbelievable events 
of history, injures the reader, by demanding an impossible belief, far more than it 
does the genuine survivor.   
Fragments and Surviving with Wolves both use the Holocaust to promote a reading 
of history that is polarized and acritical.  In using the category of testament as 
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metaphor, these performances of genre exploit the faith of their audience.  They both 
rely on and manipulate the act of reference and the privileged, sacred status of 
historical document and testimony, but more than that they depend on a readership 
accepting the definitions and the products of category uncritically.   
My fifth and final chapter is concerned with the political and cultural events 
surrounding a single fraudulent text.  James Frey’s A Million Little Pieces has 
entered the cultural imagination in a way that no other recent work of memoir, 
including Fragments, has. Read by many as indicative of a larger cultural and 
political shift away from truth and towards ‘truthiness, ’ a term jokingly coined by 
the television comedian Stephen Colbert, A Million Little Pieces clearly captured the 
zeitgeist of the first decade of the twenty-first century.36 
In this chapter I explore why this should be, how it is that ‘truthiness,’ which is 
simply a spontaneous reading of events that relies on the ‘feeling heart’ rather than 
the ‘thinking head,’ a longtime legacy of all literary genres, has become such a cause 
for concern.  Certainly the cultural and political situation under the administration of 
George W. Bush, as well as the events of the Iraq War, have led to deep and 
widespread cynicism concerning the veracity of public life.  Critics of James Frey, 
however, in being so eager to equate his act with a certain political culture, have 
missed what it is that Frey’s narrative act truly reveals, not to mention the inherent 
limitations of an unstable genre. 
A tale of drug addiction and recovery, A Million Little Pieces relies on the myth of 
the ‘bad guy’ as its central performance.  The refrain:  ‘I am an Alcoholic and I am a 
Drug Addict and I am a Criminal’ is used by Frey to alert the reader that his is a 
narrative of tough criminality.  The reality is that James Frey was never a criminal, 
his time in prison was wholly fabricated and his criminal record was a device to gain 
cultural credibility and notoriety.  The myth of the criminal is paramount in Frey’s 
narrative, and in this chapter I examine how this myth is a far-reaching fantasy that 
has profound social, cultural and political implications.  I also explore how, in 
appropriating the language and identity of the underprivileged, in this case the 
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criminal drug addict, Frey’s actions reveal, again, like those of Margaret Seltzer and 
de Couves Matthews, how the narrative act, as Said has argued, is socially exclusive. 
Frey’s performance is puzzling.  Why would a well-educated, outwardly successful 
suburban man wish to be publicly seen as a criminal?  Yet instead it was the simple 
and fairly common event of his performance, his fraud, which has received such 
wide media coverage and intense speculation.  In many respects it is only now, after 
the truth of Frey’s act is revealed, that his story is at all interesting or important; to 
discount what his performance tells us is to read with our eyes closed. 
At the end of this final chapter I return to the subject of readership, and the ways of 
reading.  I explore the different approaches that many readers take when reading 
fiction versus works of non-fiction.  The scandal of A Million Little Pieces 
demonstrates, perhaps surprisingly so, how strongly committed many readers are to 
the categories of autobiography and memoir.  In refusing to take responsibility as 
readers, in missing the signs that may suggest a move towards fictionality or 
manipulation, readerships routinely blame the single trespass and not this category of 
literature, despite indications that the genre itself is woefully (or delightfully, 
depending on your view) unstable. 
In his ‘autobiography,’ Roland Barthes on Roland Barthes, Barthes alerts his readers 
as to how life-writing can be constructed as a form of spectacle, an exercise in 
theatricality, performance and impossibility.37  With this thesis, however, I seek to 
reveal the performance of genre, spectacle as it undoubtedly is, as one defined by 
historical continuity and precedent, an act, albeit cynical, of the ‘everyday.’   This 
puts my project within the field of what Ken K. Ruthven, the author of Faking 
Literature, refers to as ‘Spuriosity Studies,’ a discipline that looks at literary 
transgressions – fakes, forgeries, hoaxes and scandals - not as anomalies but as 
legitimate and important acts in their own right.  As Ruthven argues:  ‘Literary 
forgery is a sort of spurious literature, and so is literature.  Consequently, when we 
imagine the relationship between literature and literary forgeries, we should not be 
thinking of Dr. Jekyll and Mr. Hyde but rather Tweedledum and Tweedledee.’38  
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Like Ruthven, I, too, celebrate the reading of these ‘spurious’ texts not as a kind of 
dark ‘other’ but rather as a troublesome cousin who cannot be ignored.  
In many ways, autobiographical acts have become cultural metaphors.  As I discuss 
later, the ‘rescuing of lost voices’ critical project of the 1960’s and 70’s reflected the 
changing shift in the political and cultural arena of the West and it is not accidental 
that the emergence of the internet has been coupled with an emergence of online 
personal narratives.  After all, autobiography should be the most democratic of 
literary genres – everybody has a story to tell.  Most readers trust the veracity of 
these stories because it is wonderful to be part of a moment of revelation.  As such, it 
is easy to romanticize and mythologize this inherently human act of expression and 
response and to celebrate its inclusivity, all the while avoiding thinking too hard 
about its messy inconsistencies.  It is tempting to collapse into this genre as if it were 
a stable enterprise, rather than a mirage, but readers must resist the pull and continue 
to read with eyes open, despite the comforting claims of category.   
My conclusion then addresses the reader, both in recognition and in motivation.  I 
acknowledge the challenges that reading these texts pose - how when you begin from 
a place of deception you never quite know where you stand.  To embrace uncertainty 
is one option, and perhaps provides a better starting place than all-out cynicism.  
Mostly, however, I remain uneasy about the category of autobiography within the 
commercial market of publishing and what these texts ask of their readers, or the 
claims they make on their behalf.  I struggle with the role of the reader within this 
market, as well on the internet – where the boundaries are even fuzzier.  I discuss my 
own position as a reader and how it has changed.  In the end I pose more questions.    
I have used an eclectic critical and theoretical approach throughout this thesis - even 
using frameworks that could be perceived as incompatible - moving back and forth 
between positions of instability to ones of delineation.  This seems right to me.  If we 
reject the overly simple category of ‘fraud’ or ‘hoax’, then these texts do not even 
yet have a legitimate field in which to be placed - how can we approach their reading 
with anything other than span and flexibility?  
I open the thesis with a discussion of fiction, or ‘fictionality,’ and the historical 
moment, defined so lucidly by the literary historian Catherine Gallagher in her essay 
‘The Rise of Fictionality,’ when fiction, in the guise of the realist novel, became a 
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location for speculation, not just fantasy. 39  How, with the advent of the genre of 
realism in the eighteenth century, verisimilitude emerged, as Gallagher suggests, as 
‘a form of truth,’ rather than an exercise in willful deceit.40  Referentiality, the echo 
of ‘authentic life’ (or whatever it may be that the author perceives as ‘authentic’) 
onto the pages of literature, becomes a process of both subtle effect, as well as affect.  
Here the reader, for the first time, is given the space to explore the possibility of 
fiction and the freedom of fictionality – the freedom to experience other avenues and 
choices without committing to these choices themselves, the freedom to imagine life 
‘as it could be.’  Yet even then there were those unwilling to trust the effect, affect 
and space of fiction, those who sought the immediate authority of history, the 
legitimacy of non-fiction, authors such as Daniel Defoe who presented the text 
Robinson Crusoe as ‘a record’ of fact in its original preface, despite its clear 
fictionality.41  To carry on from Gallagher’s reading, I suggest in this first chapter 
that Defoe’s historical act serves as a way into the intentionality of such authors who 
see their work as moral or didactic endeavors, as Defoe himself did, as important 
social projects that trump the arbitrary confines of genre or category, ‘truth’ or 
fiction.  For these individuals it is easier to dictate category, assuring belief, than to 
trust the speculation of their readership.  
Eric Auerbach, in Mimesis, referred to the ‘Elohist’ (or ‘E strain’) narrator of the Old 
Testament as a ‘political liar’ and it is this idea that I seek to explore in reference to 
these transgressive texts and the authors who present them.42  From Auerbach I use 
the idea of the ‘political liar’ to suggest the author who appropriates the events of 
history and the circumstances of identity, over which he or she has no claim, and 
presents them as if they are genuine to serve a ‘political’ purpose.  These are 
motivated political acts as they confer upon the reader a false construct that is rooted 
in the ideology or socio-political agenda of its creator.43  The result is a construct 
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with far reaching social, cultural and political implications that seeks to ground the 
reader, through the genre or category of authentic autobiography or historical 
testament, to a state of belief.  As with the Elohist narrator, the autobiographer relies 
on the material world, with its delights and horrors, as well as its social and cultural 
‘beliefs’, legends and fantasies, to hook the reader into accepting a mythical 
consciousness, or fraudulently constructed idea of the subject.  I sometimes refer to 
this act, this cynical performance of memoir, as ‘autobiographical metafiction,’ 
inspired by the category of ‘historiographic metafiction’ as put forward by Linda 
Hutcheon in A Politics of Postmodernism.44  Here the act is ‘autobiographical’ 
inasmuch as it is clearly using all of the conventions and privileges of the genre, 
albeit falsely; whilst I define it as metafictional in the specific sense that the 
narrative constructed is confused, with the normal modes and alerts of both ‘truth’ 
and fiction subverted.  This is a departure from the common use of the term 
‘metafiction’ to mean ‘fiction about fiction’ or to refer to specific fictional texts that 
seek to challenge or upset novelistic narrative structure.  In my use of the term, 
metafiction is a reference not exclusively to the texts themselves but rather to the 
complicated nature of the narrative being presented.  These narratives work as 
mythmaking enactments of existing social and political myth, and of already 
problematic cultural frameworks – thus myth here includes readings gleaned from 
fantasy, supposition, projection and conjecture. 
Autobiographical metafiction is both a subversion of genre and a genre in its own 
right.  It is a departure from the ‘non-fiction’ categories of historical document and 
life-writing, and yet it is part of the wider category of literary fakes, or, as Grafton 
calls them, ‘forgeries.’  This genre has been known historically as pseudepigraphia, 
and more recently perhaps as literary ‘scandals,’ although many readers would 
simply refer to these texts as fakes and the writers who falsely present them as 
frauds.45  Yet this is an altogether too easy or obvious category in which to place 
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these texts - from their histories we know they are falsehoods - and in this critical 
exploration I am more interested in examining how they fit or don’t fit into the 
existing category of autobiographical literature. 
As a literary genre, autobiography has opened itself up to abuse and critical 
questioning through its own historical disciplinary ‘impossibilities’.  If the historian 
is to be marked by absence, like the photographer, despite the stylized construct of 
his or her project, then the autobiographer is doubly marked.  Never absent, to be 
sure, the autobiographer must nevertheless structure messy events into a work 
without open wounds, a work interesting enough to justify its existence and yet 
believable and recognizable enough to be accepted as part of the historical genre of 
non-fiction.  In complying with these demands the autobiographer turns to artifice, 
that anathema to truth.   
This is why autobiography is indeed an ‘impossible’ genre as argued by several 
critics, including James Olney in his landmark work Metaphors of Self.46  Which is 
to say that the category of autobiography in literature is an inherently flawed 
construct that can never fulfill the weight of its categorical expectations.  Even the 
‘autobiographical pact,’ which I discuss in chapter 1, so carefully constructed by 
Phillipe Lejeune around the idea of the authorial ‘name,’ and used as both a critical 
and commercial marker of genre, reveals itself to be increasingly fragile.47  In 
considering this idea of ‘contractual’ form, I explore in chapter 1 the project of a 
number of late twentieth century feminist critics who sought to expand the reading of 
autobiography, treating the genre as a loose and wily form/no form.  In many 
respects the project and intentions of the feminist critics mirror my own, however I 
do draw express attention to limitations of this critical model, one that would expand 
genre almost to the point of breaking.  For the effects of this exercise, so potentially 
liberating for critics, with the expansion of form or the eradication of seemingly 
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arbitrary boundaries, can and does complicate the reader’s understanding in respect 
to truth-claim and ambiguity, and this must be acknowledged.  Nevertheless, the 
argument remains that autobiography, a genre heavily and often covertly indebted to 
commercial industry and the rules of market production, is a dubious act - both in 
theory and in practice - that somehow confers authority despite its instability. 
Autobiographical metafiction preys on the limitations of non-fiction as a literary 
genre and its perceived disparity to fiction, with the need for artifice to color the 
events of history, to rescue it from dry scholarship and the messy plains of memory.  
Yet as indebted as autobiographical metafictions are to the genre of autobiography, 
we will see in this first chapter that they are even more indebted to its readership, 
those who sustain the market demand for ‘true-life’ texts and champion the cause of 
memoir as a means of education and entertainment.   
In ‘The Death of the Author,’ Roland Barthes sought to replace the primacy of the 
authorial act - and its critical cousin - with that of the reader.48  Autobiographical 
metafictions rely on the reader exactly as Barthes suggests in his essay, as ‘referents’ 
- the object of the text - ‘the space in which all the quotations that make up writing is 
subscribed.’49  The danger with this reading, however, is in the reader itself.  Too 
often unable or unwilling to recognize the performative natures of these texts, the 
reader allows for them to flourish as truths, unfettered and unchecked.  This is true as 
well with the model presented by Therese-Marie Meyer, in her useful study on 
literary frauds and scandals, Where Fiction Ends.  In her work, Meyer refers to the 
reader as possessing an ‘Author Identity Model’ or AIM, which relates to the author 
as corporeal body.  As such, according to Meyer, ‘readers reconstruct the AIM 
inscribed into the text as being (1) real and (2) human, and as (3) belonging to a 
certain group (like me/us/them).’50  However AIM, as Meyer acknowledges, can be 
easily performed, provided the author adopts a relevant discourse to his or her 
constructed subject.  Indeed, as I suggest, authors of autobiographical metafictions or 
cynical performers of memoir are most successful when their own political and 
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social ideologies echo and confirm that of the readership, when their subjects, the 
fraudulent ‘I’ at the center of the text, is, in fact, an idealized performance of cultural 
myth or perceptions of social identity.  This performance allows for an ease of 
credibility; put simply, these texts ‘sound true.’ 
I conclude my central critical exploration with Erving Goffman’s sociological study 
The Presentation of Self in Everyday Life and a general discussion of social 
performance.51  That these metafictional acts are literary is important and yet, as we 
will see, they share much with the social performance acts of the ‘everyday,’ or the 
general activity of shared human experience.  Goffman is especially useful in 
considering the role of audience collaborations in ‘cynical performances,’ acts that 
need the audience to accept the means of dissimulation, or, potentially even more 
illuminating, acts in which the audience itself insists upon it.52  It is as ‘cynical 
performances,’ taken from Goffman, that acts of autobiographical metafiction are 
best read. 
As well as my eclectic critical choices, it is clear that I have chosen specific, albeit 
diverse, bodies and works of metafictional texts and, in doing so, privilege some acts 
of appropriation whilst ignoring others.  Within these chapters are the narratives that 
I deem to be particularly important examples of this murky genre and the ones that 
best represent an assorted collection of subjects that I feel are especially vulnerable.  
It is no coincidence that the texts explored are either twentieth or early twenty-first 
century documents; as a scholar it is this last long century in which I am most 
interested.53 Yet this act of appropriation is not a new phenomenon.  There are 
several historical examples of social groups or communities who have suffered 
narrative appropriations; untold acts of ‘identity theft’ that I do not cover, and many 
other fine and fascinating metafictional texts.  There is, for instance, the wide 
nineteenth century genre of metafictional slavery memoir, made especially 
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compelling by the development of the Equiano debate.54  Then there are the many 
modern and contemporary texts, each offering their own perceptions of identity and 
cultural life within the twentieth century, which I have had to leave out.  Such texts 
include, to name but a few:  In My Own Sweet Time, a fraudulent coming of age 
story of an Aboriginal girl written by a white Australian man; The Hand that Signed 
the Paper, the purported narrative of Ukraine soldiers working as Nazi guards 
written by an Australian woman journalist; Danny Santiago’s Famous All Over 
Town, a prominent work of ‘Chicano’ literature in America which was actually 
penned by a Jewish American screenwriter; Down the Road, Worlds Away, the 
memoir of a Muslim woman, Rahila Khan, constructed by a British vicar; Doubled 
Flowering, a notebook of Japanese poetry and self-reflections written by Araki 
Yasusauda, a supposed survivor of Hiroshima, that was revealed to be created by 
two American academics; the list goes on.55   
Each of the above narratives reveals mythical social and political cultures as wide 
and fascinating as the ones I have covered in this thesis.  Yet I have chosen my 
subjects:  the fraudulent prostitutes, mythical ‘Indians’, fake Holocaust Survivors, 
and a middle class drug addict, over and above these others not only because I 
perceive their specific cultural infractions as being exceptionally relevant and 
because they are, as groups of texts, useful markers of the most common types of 
narrative appropriation – men writing as women, white men and women 
appropriating other identities and those who present false claims towards victimhood 
– but also because they interest me, an American woman of Jewish European origin, 
especially.  The fact that metafictional appropriations so often seem to be 
perpetuated by those in positions of power against marginalized social groups is, and 
always has been, significant and shows no sign of abating.  Those who are in power 
have more to gain in defining the narratives of those who are not. 
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Or, it could be that these are the communities who, in their otherness, trouble and 
fascinate those dictating the terms of industry.  As the cartoon above reminds us, the 
act of theft is usually only fulfilling if there is something worth appropriating in the 
first place. 
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Chapter 1.  Autobiographical metafiction, or the trouble with categories 
 
I.  ‘Troubling this contentment’:  Coming to terms with fiction1 
 
Is it true, as Catherine Gallagher has suggested, that we all know fiction when we see 
it?  In an important essay entitled ‘The Rise of Fictionality,’ Gallagher, a literary 
historian, draws express attention to the absence of critical faculty when it comes to 
discussions of fiction; of what she sees as the failure of many academics to examine 
exactly what fiction really means as a literary act and, more crucially, what it 
provides or offers the reader.  She ponders the position of so many critics, ‘content 
simply to know fiction when we see it,’ who blithely accept the genre as an 
institution without challenging its hermeneutical place. 2  
There is, though, something inconceivable about the literary act of fiction.  Not 
necessarily in respect to the author, who must function precariously from both within 
and without the material world (Freud’s ‘dreamer in broad daylight’), although I will 
come to her or him later, but rather in the very process itself.  For as an agent of 
influence it is puzzling as to where its strength truly lies and there is even something 
a little suspect as to how it has achieved its totemic and privileged status as the 
arbiter and influencer of literature as art, when few are able to actually articulate 
what it does or, even, what it truly is.  Indeed, even the most ambitious academic or 
critical study of fiction often descends into a study of form, becoming instead 
another treatise on the novel or the short story.  It is as if the only way to come to 
terms with the esotericism presented by the fictional act is to wrestle it down into a 
series of set literary rules or limitations.3  Of these rules, perhaps the most widely 
accepted is one of disparity – fiction is fiction because it is not non-fiction.  Or, as 
Barbara Foley writes, in her own study on form, Telling the Truth:  The Theory and 
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Practice of Documentary Fiction, fiction ‘is intrinsically part of a binary opposition; 
it is what it is by virtue of what it is not.’4  Which is to say that even though the 
boundary between fiction and its perceived other, non-fiction, are, as Bakhtin 
suggests ‘constantly changing,’ the border must always exist – if only, perhaps, for 
the sake of category.5   
Gallagher’s own thesis, however, that ‘the novel discovered fiction,’ is an argument 
that is not so much tethered to form as entirely indebted to it, a fact for which she is 
unapologetic.  Her ideas in the essay are supported through a general historizing of 
the marked and much studied literary shift that occurred in the mid-eighteenth 
century, with the advent of ‘realism’ in popular works of literature – roughly 
between the publication of Robinson Crusoe (1719) and that of Fielding’s Joseph 
Andrews (1742).6  I use Gallagher’s piece, which is lucidly written and 
comprehensive, to open up and begin to problematize the conversation of ‘disparity.’  
To present the idea, perhaps contentiously, that we can’t understand non-fiction until 
we come to terms with the act of fiction and explore to an extent how it is perceived, 
read and approached critically.  I have chosen Gallagher’s reading of this period 
because I find it a more general and less polemical approach than many other critical 
works, including Nancy Armstrong’s excellent Desire and Domestic Fiction and Ian 
Watt’s The Rise of the Novel, and I undoubtedly credit her with insights and 
historical readings that many others have also come upon.7   However, what is so 
crucial about this moment is that prior to this historical shift, stories, and the people 
who both created and were responsible for their proliferation, used fiction only 
through the use of extreme or impossible fantasy, overtly coded, otherwise they 
made themselves open to charges of malevolent or even criminal deceit.  As 
Gallagher writes, without ‘talking animals, flying carpets, or human characters who 
are much better or much worse than the norm, narratives seemed referential in their 
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particulars and were hence routinely accused of either fraud or slander.’8  The move 
away from this fantasy mode with clear ‘fictional’ signifiers, such as ‘talking 
animals’ or ‘magic carpets,’ towards a referential fictionality that relies on 
verisimilitude, not, Gallagher maintains, as a method of deceit but, rather, as ‘a form 
of truth,’ is the central theme of her essay and a critical starting block for my 
discussion - how believability, not fantasy, in the guise of the eighteenth century 
realist novel, gave rise to modern fictionality.  
When Gallagher writes in her essay that the novel discovered fiction, she means 
modern fiction as we know it today, and the realist novel in particular.  The realist 
novel is a genre most clearly marked by its very possibility, where the ‘referentiality’ 
can be both located and ignored, because it is, much like life, everything and nothing 
to the reader at once.  That is, we know the inherent truth of memento mori but most 
of us do not live our lives as preparation for our eventual death, just as the reader of 
the realist novel knows that it is a fictional work before them but nevertheless is able 
to identify sufficiently with the referential process and thus engage emotionally with 
the text, more so than they would if the work had been rooted in pure fantasy or 
impossibility. 
In a departure from many critics, such as Ian Watt, who have tracked the rise of the 
novel through the concurrent rise of the middle classes, Gallagher positions the early 
novel instead as a psychological or transitory device allowing the reader to 
experience the developing world in an entirely new way, much as Freud suggests in 
his essay ‘Creative Writers and Day-Dreaming.’9  She writes:  ‘Modernity is fiction-
friendly because it encourages disbelief, speculation and credit.  The early novel’s 
thematic emphases on gullibility, innocence deceived, rash promises extracted, and 
impetuous emotional and financial investments of all kinds point to the habit of mind 
it discourages:  faith.’10 
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Certainly earlier stories and tales had existed that nobody really believed to be true 
and yet their tellers were not subject to libel.  Often, however, these were fostered 
through superstitions.  Yet even stories that might have been inspired by actual, if 
exaggerated, real (that is, for Gallagher, referential) events were so heavily imbibed 
with fantastical elements that they were still, as Gallagher argues, ‘fictions.’  Albeit 
they were not fictions in the unifying sense of form but rather they garnered 
cohesion through their shared ‘imaginary investment.’  That is, as folk tales, myths 
and fables, usually motivated by a strong social or moral purpose.  Hence she refers 
to them as ‘anachronistically’ (her own italics) fictional.    Unlike the early tales that 
relied on glaring signifiers to exert their fictionality, those magic carpets or talking 
animals that Gallagher writes of, with this new form readers trusted themselves to 
see or to know the difference between imagination and deceit.  It is through this 
demand of discernment or wise judgment and the discouragement of blind faith that 
the novel serves to prepare the reader, in a safe yet highly effective fashion, for a 
world that is no longer as simple or secure as it once was.  In allowing the reader to 
recognize inherent, plausible dangers, novels become enabling tools, not mirrors to 
the world as much as shadows upon it - life not as it exactly is, but as it could, so 
easily, be.           
As a literary historian, Gallagher tracks the development of the novel to locate the 
change in the concept of fictionality, the shift in the English definition of ‘fiction’ 
from the pre-seventeenth century usage:  ‘that which is fashioned or framed; a 
device, a fabric…whether for the purpose of deception or other’ or ‘something that is 
imaginatively invested,’ to the new usage from the advent of the seventeenth 
century:  ‘the species of literature which is concerned with narration of imaginary 
events and the portraiture of imaginary characters; fictitious composition.’11 As the 
new usage commanded a greater cultural hold, Gallagher argues that the ‘earlier 
frequent meaning of deceit, dissimulation, pretense became obsolete.’12  The 
emerging popular acceptance that acts of fiction were capable of being socially 
benign, or at the very least non-fraudulent, removed the political unease that had 
previously surrounded the cloudy concept of referential literature, and with it the 
damaging threats of libel or defamation against their authors. 
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Gallagher’s (and others) exploration of this period is important not only because it 
seeks to bring to widespread attention and provide greater clarity to a pivotal 
relationship, that of fiction and the form of the early novel, as well as both the 
resulting social and cultural effect and affect of this relationship, but also because an 
historical reading of fiction, its early etymology and place in culture, has much to 
offer literary study across several fields.  Here it is worth reflecting on Gallagher’s 
clear debt to the work of Michel Foucault, who was also concerned with this central 
literary moment of the eighteenth century and whose work on the nature of 
‘discourse’ and ‘the author-function’ I will be returning to in the following chapter.   
For in rejecting some of the apparent ease of disparity, in which current readings of 
‘fiction’ and ‘non-fiction’ are distinguished, rather than blurred, Gallagher’s essay 
attempts to track the place of fiction in western culture, using the novel (that ‘long, 
fictional prose narrative’) not as the apotheosis of the fictional form as we see it, but 
rather as the commanding force, bending fiction to fit its rules and in having done so, 
changing it beyond recognition.  She writes:  ‘the novel, in short, is said both to have 
discovered and to have obscured fiction.  Mutually contradictory as they may seem, 
both assertions are valid, and I hope to show that revealing and concealing fiction in 
the novel are one and the same process.’13 
The interest in the rise of fictionality, fiction as a form and the effects on the early 
reader, displayed by Gallagher and others, is matched by the critical concern 
regarding the demands placed on the tribe of the emerging modern authors, writers 
such as Henry Fielding, Samuel Richardson and Daniel Defoe. Paradoxically, it was 
often these early novelists who struggled to fulfill their obligation to the nascent 
genre, refusing to comply with the rules so recently set, still bent on dissimulation.    
For instance, we know that Daniel Defoe successfully presented his early novel, 
Robinson Crusoe, as a record of ‘fact,’ a true-life story, in 1719.  In the ‘Author’s 
Preface,’ Defoe wrote that ‘the story is told with modesty, with seriousness, and with 
a religious application of events, viz. to the instruction of others by this 
example…the editor believes the thing to be a just history of fact; neither is there any 
appearance of fiction in it…’14 As Gallagher notes, it was only with the publication 
of the sequel that Defoe succumbed to the critics who had long questioned the 
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validity of the tale.  Yet Defoe, writes Gallagher, ‘under pressure to admit that he 
had lied, still insisted on the historical accuracy of his tale but then, inconsistently 
alleged that each incident in the ‘imaginary’ story alluded to an episode in a “real 
story.” ‘15 She thus charges Defoe with resorting to a ‘particularity of reference, even 
as he shifted the grounds of his claim from literal truth to allegorical allusion.’16  
Of course, to a contemporary readership at least, Defoe’s initial claim as to the truth 
or legitimacy of the Crusoe story seems preposterous.  Even without a flying carpet, 
the events within the novel belie belief, as Crusoe’s life is marked so acutely by the 
forces of providence and serendipity that it is impossible to imagine the story could 
ever be real.  The critical question now, though, is what Defoe, as an author, sought 
to gain from his placement of the Crusoe story as fact rather than fiction.  It is true, 
as Gallagher’s piece reminds us, that realist fiction, as Defoe knew it, had no easy 
place of reference in a work such as Robinson Crusoe, a text that would have 
struggled within the boundaries of available literatures of the time, and would have 
thus proved impossible to categorize as a literary work.  Perhaps, then, it is little 
wonder that Defoe sought a simple classifying solution and chose to market the work 
as an historical document or record of fact.  However, ease of category can only be a 
partial explanation.  For, in a departure from Gallagher, I maintain that Defoe also 
sought the immediate authority of history, refusing to trust the subtle psychological 
affect of the novel and that this was an ideological act.  As Kate Loveman argues in 
her work on early fiction, Reading Fictions, 1660-1740, Defoe was especially 
morally guided and believed deeply that ‘what was held to be ‘Dissimulation’ could 
be laudable if it was done to benefit the deceived.’ 17          
We do not have to contextualize Defoe as a product of the eighteenth century or 
even, indeed, read him as anything particularly historically unique to examine this 
phenomenon, this propensity towards genre-bending, where the author moves both 
towards and against fiction.  For the deliberate misuse of literary genre in this way, 
namely the presentation of fictional novels as works of history or autobiography, is 
persistent throughout literature; as indeed is its opposite – the presentation of 
unpalatable or scandalous truth as fiction - thus distancing the author from any 
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possible libel action or repercussion.  Within these works it is not a question simply 
of exaggeration or a spread of untruths, as would be the case in an authentic 
autobiography, which bends the facts and invents episodes in an otherwise legitimate 
life.  No, rather, these are texts that, like Robinson Crusoe is today, would be read as 
works of fiction if they did not falsely claim authentic or ‘true’ historical status as 
works of autobiography.  In respect to genre or form these texts are counterfeit, yet 
that is not to say that they are without merit as historical or, as Anthony Grafton 
suggests, ‘cultural documents’ or as products of commercial industry, of publishing 
and marketing.18  Like the realist novel, these texts owe everything to life as it could 
be; they want to be read as possible and legitimate in their ideological portrayal of 
the narrative subject.  Gallagher’s ‘particularity of reference’ is important here, as it 
provides an insight into the author’s motivations. 
It is not necessary to go too far down the ideological debate, here.  When I use the 
term ideology in this thesis I refer to an active political or social agenda or set of 
beliefs that seeks to further its own cause.  I take the view that Foucault was right to 
reject the concept of pure Marxian ideology out of hand, when he argued in 
Power/Knowledge that any one ideology ‘always stands in virtual opposition to 
something else which is supposed to count as truth,’ and that it is far preferable to 
examine ‘how effects of truth are produced within discourses which in themselves 
are neither true nor false.’19  I maintain that the works discussed are ultimately 
discursive projects and that Foucault helps our understanding of their cultural effects 
far better than Marx.  However there nevertheless remains a compelling argument in 
support of the Marxist claim that an ideological process exists within the production 
of literature; that literature, however carefully constructed, cannot help but to be 
riddled with interests and obscured or ‘refracted’ ideological motivation.  As Marx 
wrote in The German Ideology, ‘the production of ideas, of conceptions, of 
consciousness, is at first directly interwoven with the material activity and the 
material intercourse of men, the language of real life.’20  Yet, whilst the agents of 
this process, the authors themselves, are not always acting with the same degree of 
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self-awareness that, say, Defoe might have had when he chose to present Robinson 
Crusoe as fact, rather than as fiction, it is the authors like Defoe who are deliberate 
in their motivations that are truly interesting, revealing in their actions a far more 
complicated, if inevitably flawed, relationship with fictionality, ideology and 
discourse than an otherwise straightforward prose novelist.21  The ideological 
motivation for these authors is at once obvious, coming as it does from a common 
sense understanding of social and political agenda and discourse – Defoe’s belief 
that ‘Dissimulation’ could be ‘laudable’ - and on the other hand more covert.  In 
using the industry of commercial publishing to benefit economically from fraudulent 
appropriations of identity, they have an economic interest in upholding its status.  In 
this way they actively need the system they are subverting, which is why, as we will 
see in the coming chapters, the discourses presented by these authors are so often 
conservative.  Although they are speaking fraudulently, they are also speaking 
carefully.   
The idea of ideology is thus used two ways in this thesis:  I use it in reference to a 
political and discursive project, known and specific to each text and expertly 
constructed by each author, and also I refer to a wider phenomenon that maintains 
the interest of a publishing industry and in each instance seeks to re-confirm the 
authority and legitimacy of authorship upon a given named author and upon the 
categories of non-fiction.  
By and large, Gallagher does not account for an ideological basis in the shift of 
fiction and the rise of the novel, although other critics like Ian Watt (whose landmark 
book The Rise of the Novel provides an obvious reference point for Gallagher’s 
study) are far more concerned with and motivated by this as a concept, as it serves to 
reinforce their reading of the historical development of the novel in tandem to that of 
the English middle classes.  However, in her essay, Gallagher stresses the emotional 
hold that the realist novel has over the reader, using fictionality to foster ‘disbelief’ 
and thus creating an open space for the reader to explore potential ideas, or, indeed, 
to accept occluded ideologies, or covert social agenda.  Thus, if we accept this, the 
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pleasurable ‘disbelief’ of the novel is a potentially far more dangerous or insidious 
place for the reader than the scholastic belief of history.       
If this seems obvious to modern critics and to sophisticated modern readers, it still 
remains a difficult concept for many authors.  As the modern novel so often relies on 
verisimilitude for literary effect, as Gallagher writes, ‘as a form of truth, rather than a 
form of lying,’ there is bound to be confusion in the role of the author as to what the 
reader expects.22 The modern author has been asked to put aside an ideological 
project (consciously or otherwise), the construction of what they believe to be a true 
representation of the human condition, the universal, and comply within a set of 
boundaries or, perhaps more fairly, frameworks.  (That there can be no universal is 
neither here nor there, we already know from Foucault that there is bound to be a 
measure of both truth and lies in every discourse that will vary depending on the 
audience.)  The fact that there is still much scope within the discursive framework of 
the novel is unquestionable, and the obvious irony for a reader of an author such as 
Defoe is that realist novels, despite their fictionality, or, as Gallagher and many other 
critics, as well, might argue, because of it, hold immense power.  Robinson Crusoe 
does not need to be a true-life history to be a legitimate adventure; Robinson’s feats 
are still impressive, his survival still miraculous and the reader feels all of this deeply 
- as deeply as if it were real or true.   
The force and therefore threat of art on the human condition, either as an ideological 
process or merely by providing a place for imaginative space, is hardly a new 
concept.  Indeed the effectiveness of fiction or ‘dissimulation,’ and the danger posed 
by this effectiveness, as well as the threat of mimesis, was seen with some 
prescience by Plato, who warned in The Republic of the confusion and disharmony 
that poets and poetry could unbridle: 
And as for lust and anger and all the other affections, of desire and 
pain and pleasure, which are held to be inseparable from every action 
– in all of them poetry feeds and waters the passions instead of 
drying them up; she lets them rule, although they ought to be 
controlled, if mankind are ever to increase in happiness and virtue.23 
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Aristotle, however, later countered this rigid view in The Poetics, with the argument 
that true art was recognizable as such, and thus is in no danger of deceiving its 
audience; that the specific and defining qualities exhibited by works of art were 
sufficiently important to the cause of the development of humanity to justify the 
poets’ existence:  
… It is clear that the poet’s job is not to tell what has happened but 
the kind of things that can happen, i.e., the kind of events that are 
possible according to probability or necessity.  For the difference 
between the historian and the poet is not in their presenting accounts 
that are versified or not versified… rather, the difference is this:  the 
one tells what has happened, the other the kind of things that can 
happen.  And in fact that is why the writing of poetry is a more 
philosophical activity, and one to be taken more seriously, than the 
writing of history.  For poetry tells us rather the universals, history 
the particulars.  “Universal” means what kinds of thing a certain kind 
of person will say or do in accordance with probability or necessity, 
which is what poetic composition aims at, tacking on names 
afterwards.24      
 
It is little wonder that, as Gallagher suggests, early practitioners of the novel, such as 
Fielding, used this very argument from Aristotle to champion the emerging genre. 
What is more surprising is that others, like Defoe, continued to publicly play the 
historian even though the role of ‘poet’ or ‘philosopher’ was now, with the 
advancement of the novel, clearly available.25  Yet the tensions between the 
poet/philosopher and the historian have never been resolved, especially in literature, 
and in each remain limitations.  Indeed, it is never clear how Aristotle justifies the 
sagacity of the poet and in this, he reveals that the ‘universal’ is no more than the 
prevailing discourse or ideology of the day.  
If we take the Marxist argument as put forth in The German Ideology, that ‘life is not 
determined by consciousness, but consciousness by life,’ then we can see how 
unsatisfying the ‘universal’ without a ‘particular’ must be for an ideological 
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project.26  Without a legitimate or authentic life, the poet/philosopher has no 
representative, no ‘proof.’  The historian, on the other hand, has access to many lives 
and can use these lives as evidence, rather than abstractions.  Better even than the 
historian for this purpose is the autobiographer, who, although limited to a single 
example, is still the ultimate or über historian with an unprecedented access to the 
historical subject and event.  Thus the genre of autobiography can become the most 
attractive and best serving of all potential ideological or didactic endeavors, as the 
‘evidence’ provided by the narrator comes not from research but from authentic 
experience.  If we think back to Defoe and his ‘Author’s Preface,’ with its express 
desire for the events in the book to lead through didactic example, is it any wonder 
that some authors, uncomfortable with the ambiguous affects or effects of 
fictionality and unwilling to accept or trust the fragile place of the poet/philosopher, 
are often temped to play the historian, to claim or subvert this genre?     
For Gallagher’s thesis on the realist novel as a place of speculation to succeed the 
author must trust their reader and the subtle space of fictionality, as well as accepting 
as genuine the power of disbelief.  It is far easier, however, to supersede this, reject 
the leap of faith and rely instead on the obvious authority of historical or 
biographical truth.  For it is undeniable that a fiction that has been presented not as a 
novel but rather as a historical document or work of autobiography is granted an 
immediate institutional or commercial authenticity.  Here, also, fiction truly is 
fulfilling its own early obligation as a means of dissimulation.  And so, these texts, 
and their authors, present us with the problem of ‘pure,’ or unfettered, fiction 
without genre or form.  That is, in refusing to engage in the fictionality of the novel 
or the community of form, and lacking the empirical evidence of authentic historical 
event, these other works exist in a place where, to borrow from the OED, as 
Gallagher herself does, ‘for the purpose of deception’ untruths and ‘imaginary 
events’ are presented as authentic.27  In these works, fiction means deceit. 
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However, perhaps it is possible to read such texts in a different light.  Rather than 
struggle to define transgressive texts, works that are neither history nor fiction, 
neither art nor truth, and as such dismiss them outright as false, we might find a way 
of reading them that celebrates the act of transgression as an illuminating force in its 
own right, relying neither on category nor epistemological system.  As to why we 
should read them in this way - perhaps it is simply, as K.K. Ruthven suggests in the 
excellent book, Faking Literature, that these texts, which Ruthven, amongst others, 
refers to as ‘literary forgeries,’ are worth studying because they serve as ‘a serious 
embarrassment to people who see it as their duty to protect the institution of 
literature from critiques of it by literary theorists who question received ideas about 
authorship, originality and authenticity.’28  Which is to say that the act of scholarship 
should be a worthwhile transgression in itself. 
 
II.  ‘The activity of reference’:  Through the lens of postmodernism; reading 
Linda Hutcheon and ‘historiographic metafiction’ 
 
In her book A Poetics of Postmodernism, Linda Hutcheon writes of the postmodern 
‘challenge’ in respect to the perceived schism between historical writing and fiction.  
She cites the critical project of the late 1970’s and early 1980’s concerned with the 
breaking down of the perception of historical discipline and the reading of fiction as 
distinct or isolated from the historical event, and refers to the work of such critics as 
Barbara Foley and Roger Seamon that has led to different, less rigid readings of 
category and a widened focus on ‘what the two modes of writing share,’ rather than 
ways in which they differ.29  A postmodern reading, argues Hutcheon, finds both 
historical writing and fiction having derived ‘their force more from verisimilitude 
than from any objective truth; they are both identified as linguistic constructs, highly 
conventionalized in their narrative forms and not at all transparent either in terms of 
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language or structure; and they appear to be equally intertextual, deploying the texts 
of the past within their own complex textuality.’30  Hutcheon also asserts that history 
and fiction are both ‘cultural sign systems, ideological constructions whose ideology 
includes their appearance of being autonomous and self-contained.’31  
Is it then ‘postmodernism’ that best supplies us with a language and aesthetics (or 
‘poetics,’ in respect to Hutcheon) in which to view and discuss works of 
autobiographical metafiction?  If we accept Hutcheon’s argument that a ‘poetics of 
postmodernism’ would be concerned with the ‘move from the desire and expectation 
of sure and single meaning to a recognition of the value of differences and even 
contradictions’ as well as desire to accept the ‘responsibility for art and theory as 
signifying processes’ [Hutcheon’s own italics] then it becomes clear that this is 
exactly the lens through which I seek to view the act of autobiographical 
metafiction.32  Hutcheon supports Derrida’s championing of texts that can be read as 
‘breaches or infractions,’ and, at risk of trying to place or distinguish category where 
there need not be any (the postmodernism paradox), it is as part of this community 
that autobiographical metafictions should be located.33  However my placing of these 
texts within this postmodern framework as presented by Hutcheon is not meant to 
suggest that I am reading them in either a rigidly ‘postmodernist’ or neo-Derridean 
way.  I maintain, perhaps incompatibly with other postmodern thinkers who derive 
their theories from works of linguistics, that there also exists the quality that the text 
itself signifies as ‘referent,’ which, in the instance of autobiographical metafiction, 
translates to the perception of cultural and social identity and persona – a discursive, 
mythical perception, certainly, but also one rooted in historicism and event.   Thus, 
in a departure from Barthes’ reading of Saussure, for instance, I would say that there 
is something beyond ‘the enunciation.’34 
Whatever else postmodernist argument suggests, however, its commitment to sights 
of ‘breaches,’ ‘infractions,’ ‘differences’ and ‘contradictions’ is worth celebrating.  
To be clear, though, I am not seeking to ‘rescue’ works of autobiographical 
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metafiction through the act of positioning them under the umbrella of 
postmodernism.  Few of these texts are actively postmodern in the way in which, for 
instance, works of historiographic metafiction are, as we will see.  That is to say that, 
by and large, they themselves do not celebrate their acts of contradiction or 
infraction; they do not delight in their own category of difficult difference.  No, these 
works wish to be read conservatively, not as ‘breaches’ but as normative.  However, 
this does not take away from their use, as Hutcheon refers to it, as ‘signifying 
processes’ of culture and markers of social activity.  Which is to say that these 
works, through their existence and through their acts, alert or signal us to the social 
and cultural processes of writing and reading identity and historical event.  
Here it is worth examining how Hutcheon herself uses the theoretical structure of the 
‘poetics’ of postmodernism to explore the field of historiographic metafiction, a 
genre which she describes as ‘those well known and popular novels which are both 
intensely self-reflexive and yet paradoxically also lay claim to historical events and 
personages.’35    This category of historiographic metaficition is a departure from 
Barbara Foley’s idea of the ‘documentary novel,’ which itself lies on ‘the border 
between factual discourse and fictive discourse’ in its own acts of historical and 
personal representation.36   For Hutcheon, the examples revealed as being best 
representative of this genre:  ‘The French Lieutenant’s Woman, Midnight’s Children, 
Ragtime, Legs, G., Famous Last Words’ are indeed marked both by an historical 
irreverence and, at the same time, a palpable sense of historical project.37  She is thus 
examining an atypical, yet well established and respected, subgenre, whose authors, 
by and large, are working with her to both, as she says, ‘make’ and ‘make sense’ of 
culture.38  Our projects, then, are similar, even if our texts are not.  For I am also 
seeking, firstly, to establish a way of reading metafictional autobiographical works - 
works that are fictional in everything, including their truth claim – as signifiers, as 
                                               
35
 Hutcheon, Postmodernism, p. 5. 
36
 Foley’s texts are not, however, like Hutcheon’s ‘postmodern.’  Rather Foley looks at literary texts 
across history, from Nashe to Pynchon, and reads their unique relationship between ‘documentary’ 
and ‘fiction’ to form one blurry but inclusive category.   
37
 Hutcheon, Postmodernism, p. 5.  We could add to this list, of course, J.M. Coetzee’s Foe, written in 
1986, with its re-telling of the Crusoe story in a broken and re-imagined way, writing Daniel Defoe as 
a character as loose and fictitious as the mysterious ‘Mrs. Crusoe’ figure, Susan Barton.  It is through 
Barton that Coetzee converses with Defoe, asking him:  ‘Would Crusoe have come to you of his own 
accord?  Could you have made up Crusoe and Friday and the island?  I think not.  Many strengths you 
have but invention is not one them.’  J.M. Coetzee, Foe (London:  Penguin, 1987), p. 72. 
38
 Hutcheon, Postmodernism, p. 21. 
 43
important signs of cultural events and sites of potential illumination.  Crucially, 
however, I cannot read these as murky works of autobiographical fiction or 
‘autofiction,’ as the French call it – works which actively seek to obliterate the line 
between life and fantasy, to question what is truly real and that which is perceived as 
false.  Examples of these texts, too numerous to list but which encompass everything 
from A la Recherche du Temps Perdu to On the Road, have far more in common 
with historiographic metafiction, as defined by Hutcheon, than they do with the 
nascent and difficult category of autobiographical metafiction, in that they celebrate 
their own breaches, their own playful moments of contradiction.  
To read works of autobiographical metafiction as ‘signifiers’ requires then a move 
away from genre – they are not autobiography or fiction in the form of the novel or 
short story – and towards a system of understanding the means of ‘factual’ or 
historical reference (Gallagher’s ‘referentiality’ again) as, potentially, cultural 
project, as well as the discursive or ideological structure of historical writing and 
historiographic study as a whole.  Of these two primary concerns, the latter is a far 
wider reaching and better-established epistemological conversation and as such is 
almost easier to confront, especially in respect to postmodernism.  The second 
question above, that of reference or, more appropriately perhaps, representation, is 
somewhat more difficult as there exists within these works a specific mode of 
reference, pre-existing, between the subject, who is, and can only be, false, and the 
unknowing or unsuspecting reader, yet the wide referential scope includes history, 
sociology, gender, politics and psychology.  (Here the writings of Roland Barthes, 
especially ‘The Death of the Author,’ Mythologies and his own lyrical 
‘autobiography,’ Barthes on Barthes; Michel Foucault in his discussions of 
‘discourse’ and Edward Said’s lucid arguments on the nature of narrative are 
especially useful in clarifying the social role of ‘reader’ and the many uses of 
knowledge or reference.39)   
Hutcheon suggests that for historiographic metafiction, ‘the activity of reference’ is 
problematized ‘by refusing either to bracket the referent (as surfiction might) or to 
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revel in it (as non-fictional narratives might).’40  Here, ‘surfiction’ is the self-
conscious use of narrative form to draw specific attention to the text, as Italo Calvino 
might have supplied in one of his remarkable books or in the works of Roberto 
Bolaño, another more technical term for the common understanding of ‘metaficiton’ 
as discussed in the introduction in reference to instances where fiction is ‘hyper 
layered’.41  For Hutcheon, however, ‘the text still communicates.’  Historiographic 
metafiction does indeed communicate, even (I would say especially), as Hutcheon 
writes, ‘didactically,’ and, crucially, it does so from a relatively acceptable arena.  
An important and often political or ideological genre, historiographic metafiction 
does subvert both the fictional and historical process, but from within the 
comfortable and institutionally protected space of the novel.  Whereas, as we have 
seen, works of autobiographical metafiction - our false autobiographies which never 
the less must be conferred with metafictional status as they represent and actively 
reference both prevailing social and political fictions, as well as engaging in the 
literary (fictional) act of imagination and, finally, narrative subversion - cannot 
collapse so easily, at least not initially, into the genre or form of the novel.    
And so it is clear that authors of historiographic metafiction are working within the 
novel as a form of fiction, whilst authors of autobiographical metafiction are 
working outside of it – refusing to accept fictional status.  As such, Gallagher’s 
reading of the novel as the place that provides not only the space but also the 
freedom of fictionality is especially apposite within the realm of historiographic 
metafiction, but not so with works of autobiographical metafiction.  For instance, the 
realist novel of the late eighteenth century, from Fielding or Richardson, using for its 
reference contemporary life and society, is not so very different, other than 
stylistically (and not even that if we think of Sterne), from the pieces of 
historiographic metafiction presented by E.L. Doctorow or Anne Enright or of those 
found in the novels and historical writings by the historian Peter Ackroyd.42  In both 
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instances known, culturally accepted discursive qualities or events are used to 
provide a literary or even philosophical basis of what could happen or might have 
happened.  However, despite their obvious importance, the specific points of 
reference are in many respects secondary to the imaginary or fictional form of the 
novel.  Otherwise these texts would simply be works of history or journalism, 
records rather than art.  Although Hutcheon writes that:  ‘the eighteenth century 
concern for lies and falsity becomes a postmodern concern for the multiplicity and 
dispersion of truth(s), truth(s) relative to the specificity of place and culture,’ this 
search for truth(s) becomes far less of a concern, as Gallagher tells us, within the 
genus of the novel.43  Art, though it may use reference and point to truth, need not 
rely on it as system.  Hence postmodernism has not done away with the realist or 
‘referential’ novel; however subverted the process, it is still the dominant form of 
literature and easiest place of fictionality.   
And so, where does this leave works that are unable, even within the loose 
boundaries of postmodernism, that celebratory site of Derridian ‘infraction,’ to cover 
themselves under the protective cloak of the novel; literary forms that do not have 
the recourse to fictionality, despite profound struggles with the alternative?  Within 
these forms, it is the construction of historical document and detail, testimony, 
biography and autobiography where, as we have seen, the deepest struggles against 
non-fictional status seem to exist, despite the greatest claim towards it.   
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III.  ‘The facts of history do not exist for any historian until he creates them’:  
Creating narrative – historically, dogmatically, fictionally44   
 
There are, however, other literary forms that cannot claim easy fictionality.  In the 
first chapter of Mimesis, ‘Odysseus’ Scar,’ Erich Auerbach, examines the acute 
difference in the realist literary styles of Homer and ‘the Elohist narrator,’ or the ‘E 
strain’ narrative voice of the Old Testament, drawing especial attention to the 
demands placed upon the Biblical narration:  
 
… their religious intent involves an absolute claim to historical truth.  
The story of Abraham and Isaac is not better established than the 
story of Odysseus, Penelope, and Euryclea; both are legendary.  But 
the Biblical narrator, the Elohist, had to believe in the objective truth 
of the story of Abraham’s sacrifice – the existence of the sacred 
ordinances of life rested upon the truth of this and similar stories.  He 
had to believe in it passionately; or else (as many rationalistic 
interpretations believed and perhaps still believe) he had to be a 
conscious liar – no harmless liar like Homer, who lied to give 
pleasure, but a political liar with a definite end in view, lying in the 
interest of a claim to absolute authority.45 
 
We know from hermeneutics that the Bible, along with other religious documents, 
provides one of the most compelling inter-genre interpretative challenges.  
Notwithstanding the common ‘Bible as Literature’ courses offered within the 
English departments of some universities, historically the Bible has existed beyond 
the realm of classification or category.  Like the fraudulent or fictional 
autobiographies, we can only really place the Bible and other religious texts 
canonically through definitions of what they are not.  Including, crucially and 
fundamentally, the novel.   
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The shift from political ideology or social discourse to Biblical dogma is, of course, 
an extreme leap, but Auerbach’s notion of the ‘political liar with a definite end in 
view’ is perhaps not so very removed from the didactic literary motivations of a 
devout protestant such as Daniel Defoe.   Gallagher is right that the novel ‘obscures’ 
fiction – certainly, but fiction exists far beyond the confines of the novel.      
The Bible has both more and less claim on referentiality and history than a standard 
realist novel.  What separates the two so acutely is not authentic historical document 
or any claim towards such evidence, but rather, of course, the matter of faith.  Not 
here as a method of disbelief, as Gallagher offers, but rather the very face of belief.  
Faith, as we will see later, is crucial in shaping reader response to works of ‘non-
fiction,’ they need not just to believe but also categorically refuse to disbelieve.  
Then there is what Auerbach refers to as ‘legend,’ the moments where the text 
ventures away from what is possible and moves towards a scene of mythic-heroic 
adventure, such as the battle between David and Goliath.  The realist novel serves to 
bring both the material and the spiritual worlds into question, whilst a literal 
interpretation of the Bible obfuscates any such question, despite frequent and 
unaccountable lapses into legend.  For some believers, the Bible is to be read as the 
ultimate record of truth and fact, this in the face of inconsistencies, factual errors and 
seemingly gross impossibilities, otherwise the reader is forced to confront the 
rationalist dilemma presented by Auerbach. 
This is not to say that cultural historical readings don’t exist, they do.  However, 
despite our secular society we are not meant to desire this kind of trespassing 
commentary.  The theist world presented by the Old Testament is dogma, not 
entertainment or history.  As Auerbach argued, the ‘pleasure’ that a novel provides 
for a reader cannot be accepted as a motivation for the Elohist narrator, here the ‘aim 
is not to bewitch the senses, and if nevertheless they provide lively sensory effects, it 
is only because the moral, religious and psychological phenomena which are their 
sole concern are made concrete in the sensible matter of life.’46 This is certainly a 
rousing defense of historical materialism – that ‘consciousness’ is determined 
through material, everyday circumstances, or as Auerbach writes, ‘the sensible 
matter of life.’   As such Auerbach surely cannot expect that the beauty, excitement, 
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sensuality and horror depicted within the words of the Old Testament happened by 
chance, by accident.  No, everywhere the aesthetic choices of the Elohist narrator are 
revealed, just as they are in Homer or in Defoe or in Fielding, choices in language, 
choices in scene and choices in event.   
Hutcheon quotes, problematically, the historian Carl Becker:  ‘the facts of history do 
not exist for any historian until he creates them,’ and from this she extrapolates the 
significance between historical ‘facts’ and historical ‘events,’ arguing that ‘it is this 
very difference between events (which have no meaning in themselves) and facts 
(which are given meaning) that postmodernism obsessively foregrounds.’47  Perhaps 
more convincingly, Hutcheon argues in general terms that within postmodernism 
‘history is not made obsolete; it is, however, being rethought – as a human 
construct,’ and that ‘we cannot know the past except through its texts:  its 
documents, its evidence, even its eye-witness accounts are texts’ [Hutcheon’s own 
italics].48  The text as human construct is not so very difficult to accept, and yet there 
is still a reluctance to read the ‘event,’ if we separate it from historical fact, as such.  
Why? 
Through her reading and definition of postmodernism, Hutcheon’s ‘poetics’ provides 
the best interpretive lens in which to view works that are in constant conflict with 
themselves, as ‘breaches’; not satisfied with their respective categories, they seek to 
transcend the critical classifications, break the rules and be read on their own terms.  
This is perhaps easier when their terms as texts and one’s terms as critic are roughly 
the same, as with Hutcheon and historiographic metafiction, but, nevertheless, a role 
of the academic (postmodernist or otherwise) is to impose, or at the very least 
articulate, order somehow and demand that difficult texts show themselves for what 
they are - misfits, perhaps, but misfits with work to do.  Although I cannot read 
autobiographical metafiction as autobiography, which is what the authors would 
prefer, I refuse to read them simply as fiction, either.  These texts are more than their 
fraudulent truth claims.  They are events in their own right - literary, social, political, 
ideological - and full of meaning.   
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IV.  ‘Autobiography is not a guessing game’:  The ‘impossible’ genre49 
 
If we think of Hutcheon’s use of Carl Becker and his somewhat contentious reading 
of historical facts – events carefully constructed if not exactly created – which rely 
on the historian as a galvanizing force, to choose, to show, to imbue with meaning, 
then we can think of much written history as a photographic print and the historian 
as an expert studio photographer.  Like the photographer, the historian develops 
crude material to form a coherent, yet deeply subjective scene, focusing the lens, 
adjusting the light, so that the subject is fashioned exactly as the 
historian/photographer envisions.  The result is a ‘real’ or empirical imprint, in as 
much as it is taken from a genuine life model or scene, but it is also a deliberate 
construct.  In her landmark work On Photography, the critic and writer Susan Sontag 
argued that: 
While a painting or prose description can never be other than a 
narrowly selective interpretation, a photograph can be treated as a 
narrowly selective transparency.  But despite the presumption of 
veracity that gives all photographs authority, interest, seductiveness, 
the work that photographers do is no generic exception to the usually 
shady commerce between art and truth.  Even when photographs are 
most concerned with mirroring reality, they are still haunted by tacit 
imperatives of taste and conscience… In deciding how a picture 
should look, in preferring one exposure to the other, photographers 
are always imposing standards on their subjects.  Although there is a 
sense in which the camera does indeed capture reality, not just 
interpret it, photographs are just as much an interpretation of the 
world as paintings and drawings are.50 
 
Sontag’s argument introduces, perhaps, the postmodern reading of the historian 
presented a decade later by Hutcheon and provides a useful metaphor for 
history/photography as possible acts of metafiction.  In both history and photography 
the pivotal role, that of agent – historian/photographer – is one marked by absence.  
The subject may be ‘transparent,’ locatable, but the narrative voice is usually 
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missing from the frame; like children at a puppet theatre we are most often urged to 
forget about the man pulling the strings.  By necessity, historiographic metafiction 
does away with this façade, for here the author/historian is allowed to claim her or 
his rightful status as a commanding, or, rather, ‘bewitching,’ force – one who 
imagines as well as reports.  However, it is with the historical genre of 
autobiography, or the photographic genre of the self-portrait, that the narrative voice 
is truly realized, transparent like the subject, because the voice and the subject are, of 
course, one and the same.  
Yet, as photography shows us, the self-portrait is still very much a construct, perhaps 
even a greater construct – metafiction idealized.  Even in fine art the gaze that views 
the self-portrait is revealing.  Where we accept abstraction in painting or sculpture, 
the moment a work is revealed to be rooted not only in the referential, in respect to 
the subjective resemblance of a subject, but also in the real, or the actual – the object 
taken from life – most viewers search for truth, likeness, familiarity; often beauty 
becomes secondary to sincerity, whilst aesthetics can be forgotten in the paean to the 
authentic.  Hence the challenge of placing artistic value judgment on an 
autobiographical work, as we see not the work but the life behind it. 
Here then the narrative voice, the mechanics of representation, is the crucial point of 
reference, as the face or body is in photography.  We look to the voice to fulfill our 
expectations regarding the subject, just as we look to the material world to confirm 
and locate the art of the representational.  If the narrative voice does not succeed in 
convincing the reader of the personal as well as the historical authenticity of the 
prose then the autobiographical work has failed.  For there are fundamental 
conditions with which a work of autobiography must comply – at the most basic it is 
what Philippe Lejeune called the ‘autobiographical pact,’ in his work On 
Autobiography, where the author’s name serves as her or his signature and carries 
with it the contractual weight of obligation towards the reader.  Autobiography, for 
Lejeune, ‘supposes that there is identity of name between the author (such as he 
figures, by his name, on the cover), the narrator of the story, and the character who is 
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being talked about.’51 ‘Autobiography is not a guessing game,’ Lejeune continues, it 
can only be what it says it is – authentic and fully owned. 
Lejeune is instrumental in defining some of the more oblique terms within the genre 
and useful in his absolute refusal to grant true autobiographical status to works 
which do not act in accordance to the autobiographical pact; for Lejeune, the proper, 
authentic name is everything, he does, however, accept the use and validity of the 
pseudonym as a direct replacement, most simply ‘a second name.’   Thus, according 
to Lejeune, the author working under a pseudonym has not violated the pact.  Again, 
the emphasis here is on the authentic author, whether the name on the jacket cover 
reads, to offer Lejeune’s own example, Collette or Gabrielle-Sidonie Collette, the 
author has not discernibly changed and the reader may confidently trust that My 
Apprenticeships is indeed a true story from the woman who called herself Collette.  
However, the system of the autobiographical pseudonym, unarguably an essential 
and ingrained aspect of the genre, can set a highly dangerous precedent.52  Of course 
Lejeune is right, nothing has changed only a simple substitution, and yet the name, 
so important in signifying to the reader that the life the author presents is one in 
which she or he has avowed, has been rendered inauthentic or fictional, that 
antithetical place where history loses itself and becomes vulnerable.  First, names are 
changed, then, often, dates - all done, to use the familiar contemporary phrase in the 
interest of ‘protection’ - but in doing so, the work begins, in increments, to lose its 
‘contractual’ or clearly regulated status as part of the genre of autobiography.  Hence 
Lejeune’s pact, so useful as a means of classification and category, proves 
exceedingly fragile. 
Why, though, was the genre ever perceived invulnerable in the first place?  Who 
really believed that autobiography could be regulated, or defined so readily despite 
its particular inconstancies – the relationship between historical event and human 
memory, between truth and ego?  Indeed, James Olney wrote in 1972, in the 
important work Metaphors of Self:  The Meaning of Autobiography, fifteen years 
before Lejeune shaped the ‘autobiographical pact’, that ‘definitions of autobiography 
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as a literary genre seem to me virtually impossible.’53  For if names and dates are 
only arbitrary, or at least secondary, then what evidence can be safely relied on by 
the reader that a work of autobiography is what it says it is, that is, to say, true, and 
not ‘a guessing game.’  Crucially, there is none.  There is only a widening of the 
category, either of truth, a hopeless feat, or, then, of autobiography.  Hence, the 
genre must be extended to include works where the author has transgressed, or 
broken the ‘pact’ – so tenuous to begin with - coupled with an understanding by the 
reader that the genre is, as many critics, including Olney and Mary Evans, have 
argued, impossible.    
Yet to call a genre ‘impossible’ comes with its own pitfalls.  Does autobiography 
cease to exist in practice because it is difficult to define theoretically?  Certainly not.  
Here then it may be useful to consider some of the ways in which autobiography has 
been approached critically and why it is that I am still intent on referring to the genre 
as one marked by impossibility, despite the inherent contradictions of the term.   
The traditional genre of autobiography, a form of life writing based on factual 
events, usually faithfully constructed throughout a lifetime in the guise of notes, 
journals or diaries, existed for centuries as an established category without too much 
in the way of destabilizing, critical questioning.54  In the latter half of the twentieth 
century, however, it became an especial project of many critics to expand the 
established boundaries of many forms of literature, especially autobiography.  In a 
concentrated effort to reclaim women’s writing, feminist readers had perhaps the 
most invested in widening the scope of writing to include non-formal approaches to 
what had been perceived as conventionally masculine dominated genres, of which 
autobiography traditionally figured; by and large they succeeded in this project, 
achieving some admirable and overdue gains.  Yet exploring a few of the difficulties 
some feminist critics have faced in their readings of autobiographical form, and their 
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subsequent rejection of, may help to highlight how challenging such considerations 
truly are, as well as to provide a historical context to my own critical approach.  I 
will be the first to admit that the destabilizing of the autobiographical genre and form 
suits my purpose for this thesis; I have little desire to struggle to define a genre in 
critical terms that has, in my mind, thus far resisted and defied all definitions.  But I 
am also sensitive to how easily critical arguments descend into apologia and how the 
widening of genre to the point where it is no longer recognized as such can become a 
self-defeating exercise.   
Marlene Kadar, in her essay ‘Coming to Terms – Life Writing from Genre to Critical 
Practice,’ suggested that autobiography be read inclusively as ‘a continuum that 
spreads unevenly and in combined forms from the so-called least fictive narration to 
the most fictive.’55  Whilst Estelle Jelinek argues that the autobiographical form 
should be considered loosely or not at all, and reads the genre as ‘that work that each 
autobiographer writes with the intention of its being her life story – whatever form, 
content, or style it takes.’56  In the feminist critical study Remembered Futures:  
Women and Autobiography in the Twentieth Century, Linda Anderson stated that, in 
her work as a feminist, she has ‘not felt constrained by definitions of autobiography 
as a genre, which in any case tend to perpetuate a masculine genealogy of the 
subject;’ instead, as Anderson writes, she has made the choice to liberally place 
‘diaries, letters, fiction and theoretical writing – under the general umbrella of 
autobiography.’57  This critical position revealed by Anderson against a dismissive 
literary (masculine) culture, one that has historically undermined women’s 
autobiographical writing with an intellectual prejudice, is typical of the wider 
feminist stance.  As she discusses, ‘feminist critics have perceived the politics of 
genre at work in its turn towards a patriarchal law which delegitimizes women’s 
writing.’58 
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Without question there is a critical agenda at play here in respect to the idea of genre, 
if not an all out feminist plot.  As many feminist scholars note, historically female 
autobiographers have suffered under conservative readings by literary theorists and 
critics who have belabored unworkable points of ‘legitimacy’ and ‘truth.’   In 
reading the ‘correct’ autobiographical genre as always being historical and non-
fiction and the correct form, inevitably and ultimately, being that of the conventional 
autonomous confessional - rooted and established by the works of St. Augustine and 
Rousseau - many early critics have failed to recognize autobiography as a discursive 
and cross-representative tool, or, as Anderson writes, as ‘a reference for life.’59  
Nancy Miller, in her book Subject to Change:  Reading Feminist Writing, argues, 
however, that it is not only formal criticism that has ignored women’s writings: 
The postmodernist decision that the Author is Dead and the subject 
along with him does not, I will argue, necessarily hold for women, 
and prematurely forecloses the question of agency for them.  Because 
women have not had the same historical relation of identity to origin, 
institution and production that men have had, they have not, I think, 
(collectively) felt burdened by too much Self, Ego, Cogito, etc.60  
 
In her consideration of how even ‘postmodernist’ critical approaches assume a male 
subject and readership, Miller’s argument can be, and should be, extended not just to 
women but to marginalized fractions in general, and she makes a convincing defense 
as to why feminist or non-traditional approaches to literary theory, however radical 
the theoretical position, remain a valid consideration.   
Legitimacy of project aside, however, I am made uneasy by the general gendered 
polemic of the critics I have mentioned here, and this is not a ‘good critic, modern 
woman, bad critic, antiquated man’ argument.  Many feminist critics, in a response 
to the challenges of reading autobiography, have returned to traditional 
considerations of form and ideas of historical truth, and have sought to re-position 
the genre within more conventional confines.  Virginia Woolf, for instance, in a 
letter to her friend, Ethel Smyth, in 1940, wrote, ‘there’s never been a woman’s 
autobiography. Nothing to compare with Rousseau.  Chastity and modesty I suppose 
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have been the reason.’61  Woolf’s position here is rather difficult to assess, although 
clearly, unlike late twentieth century critics such as Anderson and Kadar, she was 
reluctant to divorce autobiography from its total truth claim, despite being aware of 
the inherent dangers for women writers, both socially and personally, if they were to 
depart from the rules of ‘chastity and modesty.’  For in another letter, Woolf stated, 
again to Ethel Smyth, who, to be clear, constituted as a specific audience, that  ‘very 
few woman yet have written truthful autobiographies.  It is my favorite form of 
reading.’62  Although Woolf’s insistence on ‘truthful autobiography,’ and the 
accusations she makes against women writers of deliberately failing to comply with 
this obligatory truth, can be read now as problematic, it is mostly sad, and, in 
Woolf’s case especially, woefully limiting.  
To return to the discussion of autobiography as a contractual method - if the need is 
to release form and to escape the tired questions of authenticity or legitimacy from 
critical approaches to autobiography in order to advance the genre inclusively across 
genders, then feminist critics are right to comply, despite the inevitable (some would 
say necessary) destabilizing of the genre.  Yet certainly women’s writing has been 
limited; it is, as Jill Ker Conway suggests: 
The secularization of European culture produced no female 
Rousseau, claiming to be the model of a new social and political type 
for a life to be understood in terms of this world.  Even if she had 
existed, we may argue that the silencing of women on matters of 
politics and theology would have required a structure for her story 
different from Rousseau’s self-absorbed narrative of his own 
creation.  The secular form of women’s narratives emerged in the 
bourgeois preoccupation with romantic love, marriage, family and 
property.63  
 
Here Conway first undermines the established canon (Rousseau as ‘self-absorbed’) 
and then posits new, or, rather, different, narrative forms – the necessary structures 
that have been used by women - as an equally valid approach to life writing in the 
19th century, thus historically repositioning women’s life-writing to include 
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household notes, cookery books, journals on child-rearing, etc.   Estelle Jelinek, in 
her exhaustive study, The Tradition of Women’s Autobiography:  From Antiquity to 
the Present, offers the argument that these different narrative forms:  primarily non-
linear and non-chronological, or what Jelinek calls ‘disjunctive narratives and 
discontinuous forms,’ serve to mirror the women writers themselves:   ‘selves that 
are weak in focus, feel ambivalent, or are intent on portraying various and often 
conflicting roles.’64   For Jelinek and other critics, women, disempowered within 
their lives and within society, negotiated their approaches to life writing not from 
positions of authority but rather from a state of personal and creative unease or 
domestic duty.  Although if we follow Jelinek’s argument to her conclusion, it does 
seem paradoxical that as western women began to initiate, in the second half of the 
twentieth century, greater authority and agency within their own lives they did not, 
as one would assume, adopt the confident, linear, ‘masculine’ approach to life 
writing, but rather reverted, on their own volition, back to the disjunctive, 
‘feminine’, structure of the subjective and conflicted.   
The apotheosis of Jelinek’s study is Kate Millet’s autobiographical text Flying, 
published in 1974.  Jelinek argues that within Flying Millet ‘exhibits most of the 
disjunctive stylistic features we have come to associate with women’s 
autobiographical tradition,’ in addition, she writes, her narrative does not resort to 
‘indirection:  omission, camouflage, obliqueness, or understatement.’65   For Jelinek, 
Flying ‘is all heart and soul, her affirmation of women’s strength.  Like Rousseau’s 
Confessions it is an expose of vulnerable feelings, especially those connected with 
adult love or sexual relationships.’66  When a contemporaneous critic (male) 
responded to Flying with the word ‘insignificant,’ Jelinek retorted defiantly that 
‘insignificant, indeed, expresses the dominant attitude of most critics towards 
women’s lives.’67  
I am weary of the implications of this argument - that there is an intuitive feminine 
literary form waiting in the wings to rise up against patriarchy through the rejection 
of sentence structure and cohesion; the subversion of language and form is too useful 
                                               
64
 Jelinek, Women’s Autobiography, p. 204. 
65
 Jelinek, Women’s Autobiography, p. 243 - 244. 
66
 Jelinek, Women’s Autobiography, p. 244. 
67
 Jelinek, Woman’s Autobiography, p. 4. 
 57
and important a tool of rebellion to ascribe its motivations to either gender.  Besides, 
I find the idea of ‘women’s writing’ as limiting a prospect as patriarchal criticism.  
And then too there is the fact that ‘insignificant’ is a valid description of many 
autobiographies (if not most) – male and female authorship alike – and is not as easy 
a charge to dismiss as Jelinek suggests.  It is difficult, for instance, not to be 
sympathetic with the critical position of Paul de Man, when he writes in his essay 
‘Autobiography as De-Facement’ that autobiography ‘always looks slightly 
disreputable and self-indulgent.’68  Herein lies a real problem for many critics - so 
many autobiographical works are poorly or haphazardly written and written by 
people who are often ‘weak in focus,’ men as well as women.  As such it becomes a 
critical necessity to separate the content and the form. 
Yet many attempts to use the content to differentiate or manipulate the form or 
category into looser subgenres of memoir and the ‘autobiographical’ fictive, or 
‘autofiction,’ as opposed to straight, rigid ‘Rousseauian’ autobiography, that is to 
delineate the limitations of memory and the regulating confines of ego, hubris and 
delusion, as many feminist critics (and others) have carefully tried to do, has only led 
to increased confusion of readers, who are unsure how to place their reading.  This in 
turn places an unfortunate reliance on categorization from an ever-slippery 
commercial industry that can never seem to resist the overextension of a tenuous 
truth claim.  For however strange or self-defeating, readers appear to prefer 
unambiguous truth-claims and publishers are eager to comply. 
Paradoxically, autobiography, the category of literature that is most preoccupied 
with the internal subject, is also the category that is most dependent on direct 
external or seemingly uncontrollable forces.  Unlike a creative genius who can create 
in a novel an entirely fictional world that needs only the mind of the author to 
determine its existence, a work of autobiography relies on, and is also limited by, a 
myriad of external and referential circumstances, beginning with the author’s birth 
and parents and ending, by and large, with the reader.  Autobiography is a crowded 
place.  The author/subject can never ‘own’ his or her essential life the same way that 
a writer of fiction or fantasy can own their literary creations; indeed, in a base and 
uncomfortable event, the author/subject frequently does not even own the 
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autobiographical text, if it is published it has been bought by a publishing house, a 
financially invested intermediary on the route to the reader’s shelf.  Thus, using the 
rules we currently have, autobiography may be impossible as a literary and historical 
act, but as a publishing phenomenon, a category of print or commercial exercise, it is 
a significant institution.   
Autobiography as a commercial genre is thriving.  Now everyone from US 
presidential candidates to victims of horrific domestic abuse writes and sells their 
life stories, often more than once.69   Recent decades have seen an explosion of 
contemporary autobiographies that detail every kind of experience, every sort of life.  
But the genre is thriving out and away from the categories we currently have in 
which to place it.  Autobiography as a lifelong project in the form of diaries and 
journals still exists, but now autobiographical works are often fragments of a life, not 
the cohesive whole – a triumph of Jelinek’s ‘disjunctive narratives and discontinuous 
forms.’  Increasingly compartmentalized, autobiography is thus becoming less like a 
studio portrait or photographic album and more like a snapshot.  The market for 
autobiography – tome or fragment – is nevertheless solid, with celebrity 
autobiographies outselling almost all other works in the market category of ‘non-
fiction’ and rivaling many fictional bestsellers for commercial domination.70 
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To achieve commercial success, autobiographical works are forced to synthesize the 
objective material or the historical event with the subjective, through the filter of 
memory, to produce a transparent result that must not only be discursively believable 
(an obligation), but, crucially, readable (not obligatory, but necessary if it is to be 
consumed).  It is the covert act of producing entertainment, in the guise of 
readability, which reduces the autobiographer from the lofty heights of the essential 
‘I’ to that of performer or storyteller - as well as an unsung cultural historian - 
compelled by the financial need, and the need of his publisher, to sell books.  Just as 
the Elohist narrator is forced to rely on what Auerbach refers to as ‘the sensible 
matter of life,’ that is human events including physical love and lovemaking, trade 
and labor, disease and poverty, so that morality be made ‘concrete,’ the 
autobiographer is forced to engage with their reader in a way that renders the story 
palatable, accessible and familiar.  That is to say that as works dependent upon the 
corporeal and on the material they rely on human reference and other modes of 
representation - neither narrator can transcend bodily reality or human struggle, 
either within their story or their audience. 
The commercial element surrounding the autobiographical project is perhaps one of 
the most important and, remarkably, the least critically acknowledged or approached 
aspect of the genre.  Yes, the autobiographical process, the writing of memory and 
self, is of itself a compelling human endeavor worthy of academic and theoretical 
study, however the autobiographical act is also, usually, an economic one.  Very few 
critical studies incorporate this element into their discussions of the genre.  The 
published autobiographer, as opposed to the private diarist, has sold his or her life 
story.  A crude metaphor could be made here connecting the autobiographer and the 
prostitute, but, nevertheless, there are similarities.  Firstly and most crucially, the 
wares need to be desired.  The reader must want what the autobiographer has to 
say/sell, and what they are overtly selling/saying is their life essence - who they are – 
be it accomplishments and experiences, or their message:  ‘you too can have what I 
have, do what I do,’ or, usually to a far lesser extent, their skill, a story so beautifully 
told that it will make the reader weep, laugh, cheer, etc.  The reader has come to see, 
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to learn and to be moved all at once.  It is difficult to think of another genre that has 
as many demands placed hungrily upon it – to teach, to lead, to reveal, to delight, to 
uncover, and all of it true - and no other author can perhaps revel in quite the same 
privileged feeling of narcissistic or entirely self-aggrandized purpose as the 
autobiographer.  
Yet perhaps this ironic position – that the most intimate of genres is best served as 
part of a broad commercial collective – is right, for whoever chooses to write an 
autobiography is choosing a public medium of expression, a platform. 
This is why the life stories of contemporary pop celebrities are so readily suited to 
the genre, most of these individuals have already become content commodities, be it 
their faces selling cosmetics or the ins and outs of their domestic lives used to bolster 
the sales of magazines; the contractual pact most modern celebrities made for fame 
and status with their publicists and agents makes little provision for privacy and 
reticence.  But it is the structure and form, too, of autobiographical writings that are 
also alien or antithetical to the event of actual life from day to day and one year to 
the next.  If we think of the Oprah quote from the introduction then it would seem 
that many readers do not want a story that is full of open wounds and messy 
inconstancies, as life truly is.  Rather they want the same seamless and ‘compressed’ 
ease of story as provided by the novelist.  Just as, by and large, the general 
readership does not want the dry, objective scholarship of the academic historian.  
For the landmarks of historical study, the ‘facts’ of proper names and dates, of 
geography and location, are not necessarily crucial to the autobiographical genre.  
Finally, I maintain that most readers of popular autobiography do not want to be 
presented with dogma or didacticism, but rather prefer example and shared 
experience, however removed from their own lives it might prove to be.  Hence for 
the autobiographer to create a work that is all of these and still be desired as a 
literary product requires not just skill but artifice. 
Artifice is anathema to truth, as Simone de Beauvoir suggests in The Second Sex, it 
‘like art, belongs to the realm of the imaginary,’ and yet the autobiographical 
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construct is far more indebted to artifice – the imaginary - than to fact.71  Again, I 
turn to Auerbach and his reading of historical form versus the ease of legend: 
The historical event which we witness, or learn from the testimony of 
those who witnessed it, runs much more variously, contradictorily, 
and confusedly; not until it has produced results in a definite domain 
are we able, with their help, to classify it to a certain extent; and how 
often the order to which we think we have attained becomes doubtful 
again, how often we ask ourselves if the data before us have not led 
us to a far too simple classification of the original events!  Legend 
arranges material in a simple and straightforward way; it detaches 
itself from its contemporary historical context, so that the latter will 
not confuse it; it knows only clearly outlined men who act from few 
and simple motives and the continuity of whose feelings and actions 
remained uninterrupted.72 
 
Legend, then, is the artifice, fictionality as it once was, the historical made 
digestible; in autobiography, this act results in myth.  A genre-conservative at heart, 
the autobiographer creates a personal myth that leaves no room for departure or 
dissent; also, the author of autobiography draws on pre-existing myths and the 
surrounding mythical discourse, as well, to validate her or his story.  It is no good to 
the autobiographer if their story is not ‘believed,’ or does not somehow ‘sound true,’ 
as they desire most of all for their triumphs to resonate, their challenges to be 
recognized and their choices validated by a knowing and informed readership. 
In this way the autobiographer relies on, indeed is at the very mercy of, the reader.  
For regardless if the reader’s a priori expectations are to be challenged or fulfilled, 
the reader must, crucially, have expectations, however loose, for this is the point of 
reference.  For instance, the reader must hold preconceived expectations - have in 
mind the referential – of how a president’s narrative voice might sound, a slave’s, a 
mother’s, a soldier’s, a prostitute’s or a priest’s, each of these discourses rooted in 
the real or referential but seemingly open, of course, to interpretation.  And yet 
surely it is true, as the sociologist Erving Goffman suggests in his study on human 
social interaction, The Presentation of Self in Everyday Life, that our ‘impressions’ 
of everyday reference possess ‘an idealized aspect, for if the performer [in this 
instance the autobiographer, in Goffman’s study the performing self in general] is to 
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be successful he must offer the kind of scene that realizes the observer’s extreme 
stereotypes.’73 Thus, the agreement between the autobiographer and the reader is that 
the performance of the identity at the center of the story will not venture too far 
away from what is recognizable, idealized, or already known.  It is for this reason 
that despite, or perhaps because of, its truth claims, the conventional 
autobiographical genre, like the photographic act that records but does not intervene, 
is rarely a place of true change; it is instead an ‘idealized’ performance of myth.74  
With ‘myth’ being those cultural frameworks, trans-historical and surprisingly 
strong, which so often dictate the terms of experience. 
 
V.  ‘To give writing its future, it is necessary to overthrow the myth’:  Roland 
Barthes and ‘The Death of the Author’75 
 
Authors of autobiographical metafiction rely on this knowledge of myth in their 
appropriation of the genre, and, as we will see, their work diligently upholds the 
referential – the ‘idealized’ or mythologized character or subject at the center of the 
text who so acutely resembles the cultural persona of their real life inspiration or 
counterpart.  However, even if the result of the metafictional act is rarely rebellious, 
in that they adhere to the same cultural frameworks as the readers’ and rarely 
challenge or destabilize these frameworks, we must nevertheless read these texts in a 
potentially radical way.  For works of autobiographical metafiction disrupt not only 
‘the autobiographical pact’ but shake the very idea of who an ‘author’ is and how she 
or he is to be read.  In the next chapter I will examine the commercial idea of ‘the 
author function’ in Michel Foucault’s reading of the modern author and the 
‘ideological product’ that she or he represents in his essay ‘What is an Author?’  Yet 
there is another way of reading the modern author that is worth considering in the 
context of autobiographical metafiction, providing as it does a fundamental 
theoretical framework in which to view these texts, I refer here to Roland Barthes’ 
essay ‘The Death of the Author.’ 
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Barthes’ influential argument, that ‘a text’s unity lies not in its origin but in its 
destination,’ called for ‘the birth of the reader,’ which, in his mind, could only be 
found with ‘the death of the Author.’76  Barthes is referring here to the author’s 
position as a critical or ‘theological’ product, as a piece, perhaps the piece, of a 
literary work that can be ‘discovered’ and thus critically ‘explained.’  To read the 
author in this way allows the critic to easily place or categorize a text, to ‘fix 
meaning’ upon it.  As Barthes writes, ‘historically the reign of the Author has also 
been that of the Critic.’77  He is right that this reading destabilizes our perceived 
critical authority; in accepting ‘the death of the Author’ we accept that the text is 
without explanation, that it is vulnerable to deviations of category and form - that it 
is bendable.  As Barthes argues:  ‘once the author is removed, the claim to decipher a 
text is quite futile.’78  As such, any meaning there is can only come from ‘the 
reader,’ a tirelessly individual and dynamic audience that is constantly being reborn.     
Autobiographical metafiction destabilizes the easy category of genre – it is fiction 
purporting to be nonfiction, and yet retains the potential of truth, of resemblance to 
the subject, that controversial referent, at its centre; it destroys the ‘autobiographical 
pact,’ nullifying the name.  And yet, inarguably, autobiographical metafiction 
enlivens the reader; the reader is prioritized, also as referent, all references are made 
to and for the reader and it is the reader who is the object of the act, the point of its 
existence.79  If the ‘reader is the space on which all the quotations that make up a 
writing are inscribed,’ as Barthes argues, then surely this is the space where 
autobiographical metafiction resides – it lives in the reader, and lives for the reader.80   
Yet this privileging of the reader at the expense of the author can also be read as 
utopian, or naïve.  I remain unconvinced that the author’s ‘removal’ truly does do 
away with the ‘claim to decipher.’  The critical action still exists and critical 
judgments are made, only now without the critical distance.  The reader is often too 
close to read critically, or, perhaps, not close enough.  Thus the text may succeed in 
remaining unexamined.  In this paradigm, deceptions, so difficult to catch at the best 
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of times, may be given even freer rein.  This is the problem as well with Therese-
Marie Meyer’s useful idea of the ‘Author Identity Model,’ or AIM, presented in her 
very interesting work on literary hoaxes and scandals, Where Fiction Ends.  As 
Meyer herself notes, ‘the texts resulting in literary scandals show authors who write 
a fictional work, with strong aspirations to authenticity, and inscribe in it a fictional 
AIM which they choose by identifying with certain groups or issues.  This AIM 
carries stereotyped features of the group that its fictional identity represents.’81  The 
problem here is that Meyer’s AIM is entirely performative.  Scandals thus exist 
undetected and, worse, unchecked by the reader who accepts too easily the 
‘stereotyped features’ of the author’s identity.   
There is, then, a danger to these readings that prioritize the reader above all – if we 
assume that the reader and the critic are distinct then the reader loses or forgoes their 
onus for critical faculty, whilst the critic is perceived as redundant.   
However, the genre of autobiography especially cannot afford to have naïve, passive 
or uncritical readers.  We will see in the coming chapters just how slavishly 
committed and indebted these texts are to their readers, how they are projects, born 
perhaps from personal or private needs but prove to be, ultimately, exercises in 
‘double meanings’ - metaphors and myths dependent on the reader as destination.  If 
anything this should make us more cynical.  Although the reader as social body 
alone may be able to decode the cues and signs of the autobiographical text, with no 
demands for overt critical faculty, that is no reason not to encourage the act of 
deeper reading or ‘deciphering.’  None of this takes away from Barthes’ argument 
that the text itself is ‘a multi-dimensional space in which a variety of writings, none 
of the original, blend and clash.’82  And in many respects autobiographical 
metafiction supports the reading that the author as ‘historical identity’ is always a 
construct.  Here, truly, the author is, as Barthes suggests, ‘born simultaneously with 
the text.’83  Yet even if we have done away with the author, we mustn’t forget that 
the reader also needs to be explored and decoded.  For I do not accept that the reader 
as ‘destination’ ‘cannot any longer be personal’, or entirely ‘without history, 
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biography, psychology.’84  Yes, the positions of readers in respect to taste, history, 
biography and psychology change, but it is nevertheless worthwhile to examine what 
these positions might have been at any given historical moment, so that we might 
better understand. 
Barthes himself does this in such works as Mythologies, when he examines the 
economic and cultural signs and cues behind the successful products of popular 
French culture and their effect on a mid-twentieth century audience through the 
exploration of their ‘ ‘collective representations’ as sign systems.’85  
VI.  ‘The word person, in its first meaning, is a mask’:  Erving Goffman and the 
performance of appropriation 86 
 
What I have been referring to as the ‘metafictional act’ - the deliberate misuse of 
genre and blurring of category – is really, of course, a kind of social and cultural 
performance, an ‘acting out’.  The ‘false’ autobiographer has adopted a character 
role different from their physical self or cultural identity and ‘performed’ that other 
life on the page for the benefit of the audience/reader.  This performance act is, to be 
sure, routinely adopted by authors of every genre, from the novelist to the historian – 
as Foucault and many others would rightly note, I am right now performing as an 
academic in my use of academic discourse and narrative style for this thesis – 
however the author of autobiographical metafiction clearly extends the idea of 
performer as universal metaphor (‘all the world’s a stage’ and so forth) into an 
especially deliberate act of role-playing and dissimulation.  This is because, of 
course, the action of performance is actual, tangible, not just theoretical, and hence 
these are, truly, socially performative texts in that by their existence they create a 
version of the subject that becomes a legitimate and valid enactment of identity.  
These performances confer meaning.87  
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What I am not necessarily saying, however, is that the fraudulent autobiographer is 
actually engaging in a visual performance, although, as we will see, many of them do 
also connect with their audience actively in this way, not content to exist merely 
passively, facelessly or anonymously on the page.  I am, though, primarily interested 
in the performer as ‘everyday’ writer, not as a slick ‘showman’ or practiced 
performance artist.  That is, in the individuals who play a role that not only has not 
been assigned to them but is otherwise impossible to enact with legitimacy, and 
those who do this without the protective cloak of the novel or under the wide genre 
of fiction, thus usurping the boundaries of genre and existing categories of identity 
and truth.   
Using the idea of performance in this way, as something with social meaning, 
indebts me to an important critical conversation - very much echoed in the language 
of postmodernism used by Hutcheon and Sontag, amongst many others - which owes 
much of its strength to the mid twentieth century sociological theories of Erving 
Goffman and of Michel Foucault’s discussions of discourse.  Post Goffman, the idea 
of social performance has, of course, benefited immensely from the work of Judith 
Butler, whose applied extension of performativity to the matter of gender in such 
studies as Gender Trouble has opened up a host of potential theoretical avenues, 
problematizing some of the sociological assumptions of the past.  I will discuss 
Foucault in some depth in the next chapter and return to Butler in the final chapter, 
but Goffman’s work I will look at now, namely The Presentation of Self in Everyday 
Life, published in America in the 1950’s and used since as a primer and useful 
general introduction into the ways in which humans conduct themselves 
perfomatively in social situations, be they doctors, confidence men or kings.  
The Presentation of Self in Everyday Life is an important text in respect to this thesis 
because it serves to demystify, as well as significantly widen, the metafictional act.  
This is to say that Goffman’s text allows us to contextualize the idea of social 
performance and extend our reading of autobiographical metafiction so that it may 
be viewed not only as a ‘breach’ of genre but also as an established social activity.  
                                                                                                                                    
the act by which it is uttered.’87  I reconcile this departure with the acknowledgement that fissures 
remain in issues of theory; I choose to prescribe with meaning that which can also be perceived as 
empty. 
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Instead of asking why the authors of autobiographical metafiction engage in their 
elaborate ruses or performances of memoir, Goffman’s theories help us to 
understand how, and why, the performance of duplicitous or disingenuous behavior 
is perhaps part of the ‘human condition’, not as much an infraction as an unavoidable 
part of life.88  Of course for Goffman’s ideas to be relevant we must accept that these 
actions of fraudulent autobiography are indeed ‘everyday,’ part of the ordinary and 
not extreme anomalies.  Yet if we look at these texts not only as belonging to the 
wider category of literary frauds, but also as part of a wider culture of autobiography 
and ‘historical’ narrative, then it becomes clear that the performative action of both 
autobiographical and biographical writing, as well as historical discourse - the 
writing of a life or moment that is not yours - is relatively indicative of the life-
writing and historical writing genre as a whole.89  In these instances of genre, the 
exercise of discourse makes performance inevitable.  In referring to a study by the 
sociologist Robert Park, Goffman stresses to his readers that ‘it is probably no mere 
historical accident that the word person, in its first meaning, is a mask.  It is rather 
recognition of the fact that everyone is always and everywhere, more or less 
consciously, playing a role… It is in these roles that we know each other; it is in 
these roles that we know ourselves.’90  This sentiment gently prepares the reader for 
the argument that all selves are a construct, and all enactments performances.  
Goffman does of course differentiate what he calls ‘the cynical performers,’ those 
individuals who are aggressively interested in deluding an audience with what they 
know to be inauthentic actions, to the everyday performances, where the aims are 
less Machiavellian or consciously devious.   
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Certainly authors of autobiographical metafictions must be read as ‘cynical 
performers,’ however, according to Goffman, they are in illustrious and perhaps 
unexpected company:   
We know that in service occupations practitioners who may 
otherwise be sincere are sometimes forced to delude their customers 
because customers show such a heartfelt demand for it.  Doctors who 
are led into giving placebos, filling station attendants who resignedly 
check and recheck tyre pressure for anxious women motorists, shoe 
clerks who sell a shoe that fits but tell the customer it is the size she 
wants to hear – these are cynical performers whose audience will not 
allow them to be sincere.91 
 
What is most important in the examples given above is that the exchange is 
collaborative with the parties accepting (or insisting upon), wordlessly, their roles; 
clearly the performer, and hence his or her performance, is acting in accordance with 
the audience and, although they may not always realize or admit to it, the audience is 
also acting in accordance with the performer.  This collaborative effort of 
performativity is absolutely in keeping with the professional industry of publishing, 
and their relationship to autobiographical texts, that we’ve seen, where the author, 
the publisher and, ultimately, the reader work in collaboration with each other.  Each 
party has an interest in the performance and a desire for the performative act to exist, 
and they often work together, in what Goffman refers to as ‘teams,’ in a concentrated 
desire to present the performance as authentic or legitimate.92  
Goffman devotes an entire chapter in his study to this concept of ‘teams’ – the 
collaborative effort by two or more interested parties to uphold a performative myth.  
He cites the example of the hospital nurse and doctor who both work together to 
present to their patient the myth that the doctor is infallible, or at least ‘expert’ above 
all, despite often having less training than the nurse.  In Goffman’s view, if the nurse 
were to assert a greater expertise than the doctor then the entire hospital hierarchy 
would fall away.  In the instance of published autobiographical metafiction, one 
could argue then that the ‘team’ is the author and the publisher, who both have an 
economic interest in presenting a unified story to the reader that the work is what it 
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says it is – authentic and in compliance with the ‘autobiographical pact’.  In the 
instance of autobiographical metafiction, however, the motivations are perhaps less 
outwardly clear than those provided in Goffman’s examples of the doctor, gas station 
attendant and shoe salesman.  For whilst the publisher’s commercial interests are 
easy enough to understand, the more interesting questions, that is to say the reasons 
that might explain the action of the author and the effect of the reader, are often 
difficult to make sense of, as they can be both commercial and ideological, cynical 
as well as personal.   
And yet, in respect to the motivations behind the reading of autobiography, I would 
suggest that many readers of this genre or category read to confirm what they 
already know – that is, to have prejudices upheld and myths or socio-cultural beliefs 
maintained.  That is they read in direct accordance with Meyer’s model of AIM, and 
its ‘stereotyped features’ of perceived author identity.  However paradoxical this 
may seem, considering the promises and pretenses of the autobiographical or life-
writing genre as one of ‘revelation’ and its relationship to historical narrative and the 
process of education, I maintain, nevertheless, that this is the case.  For in its 
performance, autobiography, as well as autobiographical metafiction, tells us - as 
readers of a genre, as customers of an industry of literature and as the audience of an 
everyday performance - what we already know about certain kinds of performers, 
reiterating and confirming our own beliefs.  Goffman writes: 
Underlying all social interactions there seems to be a fundamental 
dialectic.  When one individual enters the presence other others, he 
will want to discover the fact of the situation.  Were he to possess 
this information, he could know, and make allowances for, what will 
come to happened and he could give the others present as much of 
the their dues as is consistent with his enlightened self-interest… Full 
information of this order is rarely available; in its absence, the 
individual tends to employ substitutes – cues, tests, hints, expressive 
gestures, status symbols, etc. – as predictive devices.  In short since 
the reality the individual is concerned with is unperceivable at the 
moment, appearances must be relied upon in its stead.  And, 
paradoxically, the more the individual is concerned with the reality 
that is not available to perception, the more he must concentrate his 
attention on appearances.93 
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If we consider the autobiographical act, the reading and writing of individual life 
experience, to be a ‘social interaction,’ an exchange between individuals, then 
Goffman’s ‘dialectic’ here is revealing.  In our quest to fully understand or to ‘know’ 
others (hence the popularity of autobiography and biographical writing) with the 
reality being that such knowledge is impossible, myths or ‘substitutes’ are created to 
ease the discomfort, even fear, of this disjunction.  These mythical ‘appearances,’ 
however, need to be trusted and believed as authentic.  It is, as Goffman argues, that 
‘impressions that the others give tend to be treated as claims and promises they have 
implicitly made, and claims and promises tend to have a moral character’ and so we 
have a vested, even ‘moral,’ concern in relying on ‘impressions’ or appearances as 
truthful.  It is because of this that certain social, political and cultural myths or 
cultural frameworks flourish; as we have already invested in their legitimacy we 
have a pronounced interest in upholding their currency. 
Goffman offers an example that highlights the myth of the ‘junk trader,’ and the 
performances enacted by such traders, which result in the audience believing that the 
‘junk’ peddled is ‘valueless’ and that those who peddle are ‘down and out.’  ‘Such 
impressions have an idealized aspect,’ argues Goffman, ‘for if the performer is to be 
successful he must offer the kind of scene that realizes the observer’s extreme 
stereotype of hapless poverty.’94  It is this ‘idealized aspect,’ as well as the 
fulfillment of the ‘idealized ego,’ that motivate both the authors and the readers of 
autobiography and autobiographical metafiction.  According to Goffman, ‘if an 
individual is to give expression to ideal standards during his performance, then he 
will have to forgo or conceal action which is inconsistent with these standards.’95 
This is why mythical enactments of identity are so difficult to resist:  in their masked 
or concealed performative actions and enactments they tell us nothing that we don’t 
already ‘know’ or perceive/ believe to be true, thus maintaining our authority of 
reference and ego.  The truth claims of autobiographical texts discourage 
speculation, however it is not the fraudulent category alone that accounts for the 
general lack of critical reasoning, the reader is also to blame.  For cynical 
performances within the industry of publishing, enacted by the commercially 
oriented ‘teams’ of fraudulent author and publisher, to cease serving as a means of 
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dissimulation, readerships must hold these texts accountable as historical document 
and refuse to accept too easily the idealized subject or mythical life being presented 
through performative actions.  The reader, though deceived and ‘victimized’ by the 
fraudulent act, must remember that the prostitute’s life is more than pornography; 
that the twentieth century Native American is not necessarily an eternal victim; that 
the event of the Holocaust must not only be read as anomaly.   
For although we might not always know the difference between truth and fiction 
when it is presented to us on the page, we must not squander our position as readers 
by collapsing into the idealized.  Such contentment would be troubling indeed. 
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Chapter 2.  Les Belles de Jour:  Appropriating the prostitute, exercises in 
pornography, morality and fantasy 
 
I.  ‘Autobiography as De-facement’:  Paul de Man, prosopopeia and the 
prostitute’s body 1 
 
I return now to the prostitute, not as metaphor but as a sign.   
Few myths have had the cultural currency of the prostitute.  From Mary Magdalene 
to the Hetaera of ancient Greece, prostitution has proved a rich field of reference for 
the artist, historian, anthropologist, and, of course, the pornographer and his sweaty 
double, the social moralist.  The prostitute has been read as harlot, victim, devil, 
waif, but rarely as, simply, woman.  It has been said that the ‘history of prostitution 
is the history of civilization,’ it was, though, a man who said it.2  
As we’ve seen in last chapter, the late twentieth century literary and cultural project 
of ‘discovering’ and then critically promoting marginal voices corresponds directly 
with an expanding critical interest in autobiography.  Laura Marcus opens her 
important critical study Auto/biographical Discourses with a discussion of this very 
project.3  As Marcus notes, and I’ve discussed, feminist critics in particular have 
been especially concerned with this enterprise, with the ‘rescuing’ of lost voices and 
battling what Marcus refers to as the ‘androcentric’ tradition of autobiography and 
autobiographical criticism.   So it is unsurprising then that the prostitution memoir, 
for the feminist critic, is a genre rife with potential.  For few other marginalized 
groups have had such a historically complicated relationship to their own story.  
From the notorious Fanny Hill (written, of course, by John Cleland) to Xaviera 
Hollander’s The Happy Hooker, the prostitute as autobiographical subject has often 
struggled to gain a legitimate readership beyond the top shelf.4  And, in many 
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instances, for understandable reason - Cleland’s Hill is only the best known example 
of a male executed, entirely sexualized appropriation of the woman’s/ prostitute’s 
body/story – the subjective or autobiographical voice of the prostitute has been 
routinely and systematically ventriloquized, most usually for a singular, 
pornographic purpose.   
Paul de Man, whose own personal story and complicated relationship to historical 
truth renders him a problematic figure in the critical canon, has, nevertheless, much 
to offer postmodern or poststructuralist readings of challenging or transgressive 
autobiographical texts, most notably in his essay ‘Autobiography as De-Facement.’  
Here de Man reads autobiography as a form of prosopopeia, or what Laura Marcus 
has described as a ‘putting-on of a face or mask.’5  For de Man, prosopopeia in 
autobiography is ‘the fiction of an apostrophe to an absent, deceased or voiceless 
entity, which posits the possibility of the latter’s reply and confers upon it the power 
of speech.’6  Reading the epitaph in Wordsworth’s Essays Upon Epitaph, de Man 
argued that ‘the dominant figure of the epitaphic or autobiographical discourse is, as 
we saw, the prosopopeia, the fiction of the voice from beyond the grave,’ here again 
de Man chooses ‘fiction’ as the primary act.7  It is a ‘fiction’ of history, of personal 
past and of objectivity – it is a fiction derived from myth.   
The concept of prosopopeia is extremely useful when thinking of the history of 
political or sexual ventriloquism and/or appropriation within historically vulnerable 
autobiographical texts, such as prostitution memoirs, and it is an important and 
insightful way of thinking about any project that seeks to examine these texts as 
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anything other than gross, deviant misappropriations (even though, as we will see, 
many of them are). 
The challenge then is to, again, take the primary, early act of fiction, ‘the putting-
on,’ within the fictional or ventriloquized autobiographical text, as a deliberate 
political or ideological act and to read this act as a metanarrative in its own right.  
That is as a discursive social and cultural telling of myth, of the frameworks and 
fantasies that surround and envelop the narrative subject.  The subject here is the 
idealized ‘epitaph’ of the prostitute and her personified place in society.  In this 
chapter, I offer three examples, each concerning fraudulent prostitutes or inauthentic 
narratives of the act of prostitution, in which we can see clearly how misappropriated 
written constructs of the prostitute correspond directly to her perceived place within 
culture and society – either as a de-humanized pornographic subject, a social wretch, 
or, finally, as a subverted fantasy of female determination defined by high-glamour 
and material possessions.   Hopefully these examples will reveal both the limitations 
and the acute benefits of reading complicated and transgressive autobiographies as 
active cultural acts of ‘de-facement’ and provide a starting point in which to examine 
other instances of narrative appropriation. 
 
II.  The case of Cora Pearl 
 
The first example of autobiographical metafiction explored in this chapter concerns 
the re-telling or re-imagining of the autobiography of Cora Pearl, a successful 
English courtesan of the nineteenth century, notorious in her lifetime and historically 
remembered as an important and glamorous player in the golden era of the demi-
monde.8   
Born in Plymouth, Pearl’s prosaic real name was Eliza Emma Crouch.9  However, as 
Cora Pearl, Crouch spent most of her adult life in Paris and it was there that she 
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studiously wrote her memoirs before her death in 1886.  Initially published in 
France, Pearl’s memoirs were titled simply:  Memoires de Cora Pearl.  It is telling 
that almost immediately the soberness and simplicity of the book’s original title was 
changed to render it more provocative, as the first English edition, published only 
months after the original French, reveals.   Here the title reads in full:  The Memoirs 
of Cora Pearl:  The English Beauty of the French Empire; nevertheless, the English 
edition is otherwise a direct translation of Pearl’s discreet, often charming, text.  
Despite her insistence throughout her memoir that she does not ‘wish to pose as a 
moralist’ or bend to ‘outcries of shocked morality,’ as well as a promise that she will 
‘plainly speak of the things that others have actually done,’ Pearl’s narrative is a 
chaste account of her life and experiences.10  In what must have been a 
disappointment to many readers of the time, there are no salacious or even remotely 
intimate details concerning her affairs with high profile men such as Prince 
Napoleon; indeed, the only sexual incident that Pearl gave any prominence to in the 
text is the telling of her drug-induced rape, at fifteen, by a mysterious stranger she 
purportedly met on her way home from church.11   
There is, certainly, much to distrust in Pearl’s memoir; it is an extremely self-serving 
affair, even opening with a clearly date-amended birth certificate on the front page.12  
Historian Virginia Rounding has argued that Pearl, in providing this forged 
document, was ‘poking fun both at her readers and at all those who were taken in by 
her,’ but I think that this action simply represented a rather naïve attempt by Pearl to 
at once solidify and subvert Lejeune’s autobiographical pact, an attempt both at 
forging intimacy with her readers and trying to command a narrative authority over 
her own complicated life.13  In gently bending the facts, as with the changed birth 
date on the certificate that rendered her (unsurprisingly) younger than she truly was, 
Pearl tried to establish ownership over a life and identity whose revelation she may 
not have been altogether comfortable with. Thus small subversions or transgressions 
of the literal truth are important here not because they offered Eliza Crouch power 
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over her readers but because they siphoned power back to a vulnerable, now 
destitute woman at the end of her life, hiding behind the mask that was Cora Pearl.  
It is relatively clear that the writing of the memoir was an economic act for Pearl.  
Whilst she may have felt there was an opportunity to exonerate her life through a 
chaste and pious autobiography, biographers of Pearl confirm that, at the time of her 
writing The Memoirs of Cora Pearl - no longer being able to rely on her feminine 
charms and without having made adequate financial provisions - she desperately 
needed the money earned from the advance.  Thus, using her name and life story as 
she had once used her body, the woman who was Cora Pearl attempted to manipulate 
and seduce a public for economic gain one last time.  The ensuing result might have 
been a ‘tease’ and a disappointment for some, but little can justify the creation of the 
alternate or supplemental work The Memoirs of Cora Pearl:  Secret Erotic 
Reminiscences of a Courtesan, a pornographic metafictional re-write of Pearl’s life.  
This plainly fraudulent text, ‘discovered’ in the early 1980’s, is purportedly written 
by Cora Pearl and ‘edited’ by a William Blatchford; its title page ambiguously reads:  
‘originally published in 1890.  Not to be confused with Memoires de Cora Pearl 
published in 1886 and translated into English in the same year.’14  
Released in 1983, this memoir gives every claim to be an authentic historical, 
autobiographical document – it is not.  Rather, a prominent English (male) journalist 
and one time editor of The Poetry Review, Derek Parker, had re-written Pearl’s 
memoirs as a deliberate pornographic ploy.  Secret Erotic Reminiscences revised 
Pearl’s life story so that her sexual life as a courtesan was prioritized above her 
emotional life as an independent and self-made woman - the intended focus of the 
original memoirs.   In his ‘Introduction,’ Blatchford labels the original Memoires 
‘extraordinarily dull’ and writes ‘even the reader who disapproves of the erotic 
element in this book will probably admit that Cora Pearl emerges far more 
sympathetically from it than from her ‘official’ Memoires; her attitude towards her 
lovers is on the whole kinder, and there are traces of a much more sympathetic 
character than many of her biographers present.’15  The presumptions at work in both 
Parker’s central action and in his language here is astonishing, and yet, more than 
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that, the very idea that a women’s autobiography should be re-written so that her 
‘attitude’ towards the men who paid her for sex and occasionally abused her should 
be ‘kinder’ is deeply revealing in respect to the cultural myth of the prostitute.  It is 
clear that Pearl’s own story did not comply with the discursive rules set out, either in 
her own time or in ours, she was neither the ‘happy hooker’ nor the wretched 
Magdalene, and so her history had to be rewritten; reworked so that it resembled 
something socially safe and recognizable. 
Perhaps it can be said that this deceit by Parker, though tasteless, was short-lived and 
relatively harmless, the man came out in The Sunday Times in 1983 admitting his 
hoax and the woman had been dead for nearly a hundred years – yet now and forever 
more, when a search requesting books written by Cora Pearl is ventured at the 
British Library or any other library or institution, or with an online search engine, 
both memoirs are given equal legitimacy, despite the undeniable fact that Secret 
Reminiscences is a flagrant misappropriation and virtual reinvention of Pearl’s life. 16   
Her name and life story have been hijacked.  
Perhaps the most shocking event of Parker’s appropriation concerns the subject of 
Pearl’s first sexual experience when she was fifteen years old:  where she writes of a 
traumatic drug-induced rape, he writes, inconceivably, of a titillating adventure.  For 
in the Parker/Blatchford version of the event the young Eliza Crouch is disappointed 
when the ‘dizzying’ effects of the laced drink take hold, as she senses that she ‘might 
be about to discover the pleasure of lying with someone of the opposite sex’ and is 
excited about the prospect.17  He writes:  ‘Alas! To make the story short, my 
companion, standing over me, had only removed his coat and waistcoat and began to 
unbutton his shirt, when a second fit of dizziness overcame me, and I fell back 
senseless on the couch.’18  When she awakes the next morning, with ‘the most 
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fearful headache and sickness, and a certain soreness below’ she is ‘amazed’ to find 
five pounds left on a chair and, in absolute deviation from how the incident is 
described in the authentic memoir, she delights in the realization that ‘a good income 
was to be derived from such companionship... a greater income, perhaps, than any 
which the most hardworking milliner could command, and without the hard and dull 
work such people must endure.’19   
Compare the above with Pearl’s own narration of the event, which begins with the 
bitter affirmation that ‘the event here to be related decided my destiny.  Since the 
day of which I now write I have preserved an instinctive hatred against men.’20  Of 
the details of the rape, Pearl writes:   
The grog was sickening, the atmosphere reeking with smoke, the 
noise more and more deafening… I fell asleep upon my chair.  The 
next morning I found myself by the side of a man in his bed.  It was 
one more child ruined – wickedly, bestially.  I have never pardoned 
men, neither this one nor the others who are not responsible for his 
act.21   
 
For Pearl, the reality of the seduction was ‘a nightmare’ and its ramifications 
haunted the rest of her life:  ‘many times have I thought to myself since this horrible 
episode, that where I suffered was more in my coquetry as a woman, than in my 
virtue of a young girl.  Such seducers are made so that we should feel the horror of 
sin.’22  Surely it was this tone and these pronouncements that Parker, writing as 
Blatchford, found so ‘unkind.’  That a courtesan such as Pearl, who made her name 
and fortune through her relations with men secretly hated them, as well as the very 
act of coquetry that defined her existence, clearly jarred with the cultural and 
ideological view of ‘the woman of pleasure.’  Pearl’s own discourse was 
incompatible with the idealized fantasy or established framework that defined her 
place, as prostitute, within culture and society. 
Although Pearl’s original autobiography is marred with inaccuracy and 
fictionalizations they are relatively small matters that do not take away from the 
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authenticity of her narrative voice, and yet, because this voice refused to comply 
with the cultural role ascribed to her as a prostitute – either wretched or bawdy - the 
‘new’ memoirs succeed in their deceptions far more successfully, turning Pearl’s 
remarkable and often estimable life into pornography.  It is worth considering here 
Angela Carter’s claim that pornography concerned with the prostitute is very rarely 
about sex as ‘work,’ and that for the prostitute in pornography ‘her labour is her own 
private business … And we may not talk about it because it reintroduces the question 
of the world.’23  Parker’s narrative divorces an authentic woman from her labour, 
and seeks to hide the unpalatable truth of her position – denying the authentic 
experience of sex-work.  However, perhaps the most terrible aspect of the fraudulent 
narrative presented by Parker is that his text succeeded in usurping Pearl’s own 
voice, not only her identity as a prostitute.  The ‘real’ narrator Cora Pearl is worth 
remembering, and her voice is a valuable reminder, especially to women, that 
unconventional lives can be celebrated on our own terms: 
If louis are made to roll and diamonds to glitter, I cannot be 
reproached with having perverted from their normal uses these noble 
things.  With the latter I glittered, with the former I set rolling… I 
have never deceived anybody, because I have never belonged to 
anybody.  My independence was all my fortune, and I have known 
no other happiness; and it is still what attaches me to life; I prefer it 
to the richest necklaces, I mean necklaces which you cannot sell, 
because they do not belong to you.24 
 
III.  ‘A social act par excellence’:  Constituting the narrative subject25 
 
The motivations behind the production and publication of Parker’s Secret Erotic 
Reminiscences are obvious enough.  The book is a classic ‘dirty’ read and no amount 
of scholastic attention will rescue it from l’enfer, as the French call the national 
collection of erotica and pornography in the Biblioteque Nationale.  Paradoxically, 
though, if Parker hadn’t presented it as authentic autobiography, Secret 
Reminiscences could have been read as a prime example of historiographic 
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metafiction, as a deliberate and self-conscious fictional re-writing of the past using a 
primary historical document, and in everything but its deviant, fraudulent truth claim 
and pornographic intent it might be an otherwise critically insightful work.26  In his 
Introduction, for instance, Parker, as ‘Blatchford,’ carefully draws attention to how 
the ‘book is in idiomatic, rather careless English, somewhat ‘old fashioned’, with a 
turn of phrase which often recalls the eighteenth rather than the nineteenth century – 
as one might expect of a woman brought up in a provincial town, with little 
experience of English as spoken in society,’ and in reading the text it is clear that he 
has gone to great lengths to ape and mimic the bawdy style and pornographic 
discourse of the time.27   Parker also carefully used events from Pearl’s own life, 
genuine experiences that she had discussed in her memoir or that he could find from 
historical sources, and simply re-worked them to suit his purposes.  Although such 
an act is especially insidious here, without the qualification of fiction, it is 
nevertheless a device used frequently by authors of historiographic metafiction.  It is 
because Parker’s text did not market itself as a novel that the effect, even if it was 
unforeseen, of the publisher’s efforts, to replace, supplement and ultimately usurp all 
records of the authentic story of the woman who called herself Cora Pearl with an 
imposter’s tale is so deeply unsettling.  Here category matters. Parker’s forgery 
comes with far-reaching and frightening implications – Pearl’s identity was 
shockingly easy to appropriate and Parker’s performance of the prostitute was 
accepted with remarkable ease.  Nowhere does Parker’s fictional appropriation of 
Pearl’s life reveal itself to be fictional, and as such the work succeeds in 
destabilizing the categories of genre - of history and autobiography and fiction - that 
we rely on to navigate our reading and our responses as readers.   
Although this example is extreme, the exploitative case of Cora Pearl serves to 
highlight, again, the instability and fragility of autobiographical voice and narrative, 
shaking the autobiographical pact to its core.   It also serves to demonstrate how very 
apt the argument of prosopopeia is when considering historically voiceless subjects.  
Here it truly was a ‘dead man [woman] speaking’ but crucially, through her status as 
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a prostitute, Crouch was already absent and thus perceived as a legitimate target for 
defacement.  
As I discussed in chapter 1, the widely read and respected autobiographical critic 
James Olney wrote in an early work, Metaphors of Self, that ‘definitions of 
autobiography as a literary genre seem to me virtually impossible.’28  Yet it is not 
simply an impossibility such as Paul de Man would offer, based on aesthetic 
criticism of the genre, or perhaps as Derrida or Barthes would suggest, owing to 
impossibility of language or the impossibility of stabilizing an ambiguous subject, 
but rather it is an impossibility in negotiating a reading of texts that are always 
contradictory.  When even authentic does not mean real and the obligation of the 
name does not always deliver what we might expect, and even when it does it can 
rarely be believed.  However, despite these innate challenges or ‘impossibilities’, 
one thing is certain - whoever chooses to write an autobiography is deliberately 
choosing a public medium of expression, a platform; this is why autobiography 
always has an agenda, always has work to do.29  Unlike the possible whim of fiction, 
autobiography, whatever it is, has weight.  Again, it is a matter of intention.  As 
Stephen Shapiro writes:  ‘Aesthetic function is not its major function – education or 
reality testing is its reason for being.  Autobiography is a mixed form, less delightful 
than poetry but more useful.’30 The mixed form of autobiography, though, is really a 
no form. Indeed, other than its roots in the mythical, it is a rejection of form, or, 
perhaps it is simply, as Albert Stone has said, ‘a content not a form.’31   
Reducing the autobiographical act to simply a means of delivering content, that is, 
destabilizing any obligations to form or rules of genre, supports the reading of 
autobiography as cultural and collective metanarrative, allowing for a wider and less 
rigid critical approach, such as we have seen with the feminist discussions in chapter 
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one.  Accepting as well that autobiography is ‘useful,’ helps to locate its political and 
ideological agenda.  However the means of delivery, the central narrative action of 
the genre, is still problematized as it insists on upholding the fictions of prosopopeia.  
The act of de-facement does not go away. 
Here the inauthentic autobiographical narrator, that is to say, the fictional construct 
at the center of these metafictions, balances precariously between performances of 
believability and extraordinary magnetism.  The author/subject must be special and 
completely identifiable at once.  To achieve this end requires a studied knowledge of 
both the genuine signifiers of the type of subject as well as the perceived, mythic or 
idealized signifiers that may be held collectively by a popular readership.  That 
social reality differs from popular perception is hardly a revelation, but for many 
readers it is the popular myth that is prioritized and, for the narrator, understanding 
what aspects of reality to inject, as well as what elements of popular myths to uphold 
is the fundamental choice.  This choice is, of course, not solely unique to the 
autobiographical narrator but endemic to any narrative process working within 
‘realism’ or realist literature, that is any system that relies on a value judgment by 
the referent.  Edward Said, in discussing the important place of history within the 
nineteenth century novel in Culture and Imperialism, lucidly broke down the 
structures of authority at work within the social space of the narrative of the novel.  
His reading of the interplay of the relationship between the author, the narrator and 
‘the community’, is an important concept: 
… the constitution of a narrative subject, however abnormal or 
unusual, is still a social act par excellence, and as such has behind or 
inside it the authority of history and society.  There is first the 
authority of the author – someone writing out the processes of 
society in an acceptable institutionalized manner, observing 
conventions, following patterns and so forth.  Then there is the 
authority of the narrator, whose discourse anchors the narrative in 
recognizable, and hence existentially referential, circumstances.  Last 
there is what might be called the authority of the community, whose 
representative most often is the family but also is the nation, the 
specific locality, and the concrete historical moment.32 
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At the heart of Said’s argument is the point of reference and the fragile act of 
representation. Here we have the author writing, the narrator living and the 
community validating or, even better, guarding the referential subject.  Each action 
requires the authority of every other action to claim its status as an accurate 
historical work.  The difference with an autobiographical narrative is that the social 
guardians, with their tenuous role of monitoring and upholding ‘truth’ of 
representation, have far more to lose.  We only have to return to Gallagher and her 
reading of eighteenth century literary politics to see that this is true.  Also, there is in 
autobiographical narrative the upset of the author-function, the struggle of identity 
when the narrator’s life is the author’s obituary or de Man’s ‘epitaph’, her past, as 
well as her present ‘primary’ act. 
 
IV.  ‘An untouched record of fact’:  Discovering Sheila Cousins33 
 
With this in mind, it is both significant and revealing when the narrator of the 
banned 1938 book To Beg I am Ashamed:  The Autobiography of a London 
Prostitute, addresses the precarious balance between the validating/guarding 
authority of the community and the primary, yet circumstantial, authority of the 
subject directly in the book’s opening paragraph: 
Because I was born a lady and still look one, “How on earth do you 
come to be doing this?” is the first question most men ask me when 
they pick me up on the streets.  I came to be prostitute for many 
reasons, but in the end because I deliberately chose to be. I have been 
asked that question now often enough to be used to it.  But still, 
when I see it framing itself on the lips of some new speaker, I am 
filled with a momentary gust of irritation.  I know what it means.  
“Here you are,” go the unsaid words, “looking like a human being, 
talking like one, yet doing nightly and as a matter of course, 
something that could only be done by a beast or a machine.”  I’m not 
only low, I’m so low as to be something outside life.34 
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Tellingly, in this passage, Sheila Cousins, the pseudonym given to the prostitute 
narrator, offers the reader the same exasperated contempt that is held for the lonely 
men who walk along Piccadilly at night.  When we cast doubt upon her choices and 
question, as a monitoring body with a vested interest, her place in the world we are 
given, presumably, the same wearily brazen answer: ‘I came to be a prostitute for 
many reasons, but in the end because I deliberately chose to be.’  Cousins addresses 
us as if she knows why we are here, as if she knows that we want both to use her and 
to judge her, to take from as well as to place.  She is right, too, we read, especially 
autobiography, so we can classify, categorize and comment.  Yet, the fact that Sheila 
Cousins anticipates this indicates a level of awareness deeper even than this narrative 
first presents. 
The voice of Sheila Cousins is potentially shocking for a number of reasons.  From 
the opening paragraph it is clear that she is unwilling to be simply what the reader 
expects; her defiance, her agency and her articulation all jar with most preconceived 
popular notions of what a street-walking prostitute in modern Britain might sound 
like.  We know immediately that, although she may have been ‘born a lady,’ she is 
not an esteemed and handsomely paid society escort, as Pearl was in her day, with a 
select clientele and a fashionable flat.  Rather she solicits illegally and dangerously 
on ‘the streets’ and the men who pay for her services look at her not with respect, but 
as though she is inhuman, ‘a beast or a machine.’  The socially and culturally loaded 
statement:  ‘because I was born a lady and still look one,’ suggests that hers is a far 
murkier account than the usual sad victim of low birth and ill-fortune story of most 
streetwalkers.  Sheila Cousins warns us, from the very first line, that hers is not just 
an account, but, rather, a cautionary tale.   
Just how effective a warning it would have been to the fathers of middle class girls 
before the Second World War is impossible to say, as the book was banned in 
Britain upon publication.  Advance reviews in The Times, The Daily Mail and The 
Spectator expressed indignant outrage and horror at the book’s perceived obscenity, 
proving vehement enough that the publisher, George Routledge, withdrew its 
release, although not before the Public Morality Council complained in no uncertain 
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terms to the Director of Public Prosecutions. 35  The irony is that To Beg I am 
Ashamed is a resolutely sober work.  Like Cora Pearl before her, Sheila Cousins 
does not offer the reader salacious detail or gratify base curiosities.  Cousins’ story is 
sad, dour and wretched, mostly wretched; it was highly unlikely to either glamorize 
the profession or titillate eager readers.  A review of the American publication of the 
book, which was published without incident in 1938, in Time Magazine, reflects that 
it ‘is a record of a drab and distressing life, makes prostitution attractive to 
nobody.’36  One can only assume that it was because the narrator Sheila Cousins 
wrote well, with an ear for language and a quiet dignity beyond her station in life, 
that the book so rattled the literary establishment.  It is only necessary to read her 
insightful and unflinching commentary regarding her place in British society to see 
how remarkably sophisticated and beautifully phrased Cousins’ language could be:  
I have moments when I feel the contempt of the world weighing on 
me.  I have moments when I quail before the harsh pity of the 
Bishops and the Dames of the British Empire, whose God is graven 
in yellow soap and would save me by putting a bible in one hand and 
a scrubbing-brush into the other.  I have moments when I revolt 
against my ambiguous existence, neither legal nor illegal.  And I 
have moments when I realize that I am a person to no one, that to a 
male I am just a body, to the policeman a chance of promotion, to the 
rest simply a problem.37 
 
Yet this highly effective and arresting prose does beg the question as to whose pen it 
truly belonged to, or whose voice it really was.  For can we believe that this 
language genuinely flew from the fingertips of a young woman who had left formal 
education (a state run institution for delinquent girls) at the age of fifteen to be a 
shop assistant?  She may have been born a lady but there is no reason to think she 
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was born a literary genius, as well.  Indeed, when you consider who Sheila Cousins 
is claiming to be – the daughter of a drunken mother and an absent father, the victim 
of an abusive step-family, a convicted criminal at the age of twelve arrested for 
shoplifting and theft - it becomes increasing difficult to accept that the narrative 
voice, the sophisticated literary discourse that defines the work and gives it its 
power, is wholly authentic.   
In the revealing passage above, Cousins calls to account the political Empire and 
their God, who is not like her God.  Their God, ‘graven in yellow soup,’ is 
ineffectual, he would have her scrub in penance – scrub the floors, scrub herself - 
scrub away the taint she represents on the world.  Yet, we imagine, her God is 
different.  Her God knows that she is not the ‘problem,’ the problem is the ‘Bishops 
and Dames’ safe in the hallowed halls of Parliament and stately homes, or the men 
who see her only ‘as a body’ not as a person, and, finally, the policemen who are 
more interested in their own advancement than her welfare.  They and ‘the rest’ are 
the problem, not, resolutely, Sheila Cousins.  Thus, this passage is remarkable not 
only for the sentiment but also for the political and moral force behind it.  If it had 
not been obvious before that To Beg I am Ashamed is a highly didactic text with a 
specific social and political agenda, this poignant and inspiring paragraph quells all 
doubts.  Yet there remains the sense throughout that Sheila Cousins, whoever she is, 
cannot truly be the author, for she is not so much a person, as a case study.   
The title page of the 1961 Corgi paperback edition claims boldly that this work is ‘an 
untouched record of fact,’ followed by the now familiar caveat: ‘To avoid possible 
offence to persons perfectly innocently implicated in this story, every character in it, 
including that of the author, has been give a fictitious name.’38  It is worth stating 
here that I am not so much interested in solving the ‘mystery’ of Sheila Cousins, in 
as much as there may be one, as unearthing the motivation behind the text (although 
it could be argued that this is tantamount to the same thing).   
However it requires very little research to unearth the long running rumor that To 
Beg I am Ashamed was written by Graham Greene. First editions of the American 
print run, published by Vanguard in New York (which incidentally were not banned 
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or withdrawn and even enjoyed favorable reviews in newspapers and magazines 
such as The Nation, where it was accepted as a serious work of social importance 
and read as a sobering study on urban life) are routinely advertised as being the work 
of a young Greene and sell for a considerable amount.39  Yet Greene’s official 
biographer, Norman Sherry, expressly denies that Greene was the author, indeed he 
hardly entertains the possibility that Greene was involved at all.  However, in The 
Life of Graham Greene:  Volume 3:  1955 – 1991, the final volume of Greene’s 
biography, Sherry addresses the question of To Beg I am Ashamed in a revelatory 
chapter devoted rather incongruously to the difficult relationship between Greene 
and his friend and colleague, Ronald de Couves Matthews.   
Sherry’s discussion of Matthews, who was, like Greene, a writer and journalist, as 
well as a practicing Roman Catholic, is predominantly concerned with the 
undisputable fact that Matthews never achieved a fraction of Greene’s professional 
success and was ultimately forced to capitalize, or perhaps more accurately 
cannibalize, on their friendship in a frank biography entitled Mon Ami Graham 
Greene.  According to Sherry, Greene loathed Matthews’ biography and fought to 
suppress the publication of an English edition.   Hence the only printing has ever 
been a 1957, translated edition in France.  Sherry writes that, ‘Greene felt Matthews 
extracted too much out of him too slyly, and that the text went beyond what Greene 
knew he had said.’40  Yet, even Sherry, who came to know Greene well and had 
unparalleled and enviable access to his subject, seems perplexed by the relationship 
of the two men.  In the chapter ‘Parkinson’s Dis-ease’, in The Life of Graham 
Greene, Sherry confirms that Ronald de Couves Matthews is the author of To Beg I 
am Ashamed, he quotes from a letter sent by Matthews to Greene asking for money:  
‘I wonder if ‘Graham Greene Productions’ can see me through with the 400 pounds 
they did last year and whether we can work out a pretext for the payment?  The only 
thing I can think of is a sale of my half-share in the film rights (and t.v. rights) of To 
Beg I am Ashamed.’41   
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Rather feebly, Sherry follows the letter with the terse explanation that ‘this was a 
book by the prostitute Sheila Cousins (not her real name) ghosted by Matthews, 
which today can sell at a very high price because it is thought (wrongly) that Greene 
ghosted it.’42  Nothing else is said.  However, in the chapter notes at the end of the 
volume, Sherry concedes that ‘Greene, through Matthews, did know Cousins.  
Sometime in 1938 she solicited Matthews off Piccadilly, and he was struck (as was 
Greene) by her ‘upper-crust accent’; Sherry then provides an odd, if remarkable, 
piece of information – ‘her real name, which has remained unknown these many 
years, was Edith Margaret Emma Robinson.’43 
There would be little reason to doubt Norman Sherry’s scholarly and uniquely 
privileged account of this affair, except that the time of year, winter 1938, 
presumably supplied to him by Greene, when the men purportedly first met 
Robinson, predates the British publication of the text.  Then there is the exceedingly 
odd letter where Matthews offers to sell Greene his half of the film and television 
rights.  If Greene had no involvement with the text then it is questionable as to why 
he would possess one half of the rights.  Also, in Mon Ami Graham Greene, 
Matthews directly asserts that they collaborated together, reiterating the central claim 
that he first met Robinson on Piccadilly and struck up a conversation.  (Neither of 
the men offer any information as to whether or not they used Robinson’s 
professional services.)   
Still, it remains unclear why either of these men aligned themselves with the story of 
a London prostitute.  If what both Sherry and Matthews have written is true, and we 
have little reason to mistrust them totally, and Sheila Cousins was based on a real 
woman, Edith Margaret Emma Robinson, rather than a fictional construct or a 
composite, we can only wonder what it was about her story that compelled telling.  
For it does slightly belie belief that the shock of a passing accent was enough to 
propel a successful writer down a dangerous literary route.  Perhaps, though, this 
only serves to reveal how very naïve and idealistic Matthews (as well as Greene, his 
friend if nothing else) must have been at the time.  The intention of the text was 
clearly to raise awareness, not a storm, and the sense of disillusionment and shame 
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that the book’s legacy represents is palpable both in Sherry’s biography and in Mon 
Ami Graham Greene.  However complicated their relationship to Catholicism might 
have been, both men were guided by a deep and pronounced faith; it is worth noting 
that before the publication of To Beg I am Ashamed, Matthews’ previously published 
works included English translations, from French, of the lives of saints and military 
history.  As for Greene, Brighton Rock was about to be published and his conversion 
to Catholicism was in its tenth year.  It is easy to see how, with a history of writing 
about martyrs and generals, Matthews clearly saw an opportunity to present Cousins, 
if not exactly saintly or heroic, at least as a symbol of society’s ills and to show that 
her life, too, had been a sacrifice, as much as any soldier’s.  
 For To Beg I am Ashamed is as much a commentary on post-war Britain, its restless, 
anxious empire and the plight of its youth as it is a single story of a life, however 
extraordinary, on the streets.44  Its production was, I believe, a clear moral project.  
The book’s title is a dramatic line lifted from an odd and difficult biblical parable.  In 
the book of Luke, chapter 16, a story is told about a dishonest steward whose 
duplicity had been revealed to his master.  Fired from his position, the steward, 
unbeknownst to his employer, uses his own wiles to settle the debts owed (debts 
which he had wrongfully inflated with an eye on the excess):  ‘Then the steward said 
within himself, What shall I do?  My Lord taketh away from me the stewardship; I 
cannot dig; to beg I ashamed.’45  Yet after winning favour with the locals, who have 
had their debts slashed, the steward presents his master with the complete collection.  
Instead of further punishment, he is complemented on his shrewdness:  ‘the children 
of this world are wiser in their generation than the children of the light.’  Jesus 
himself then moralizes:  Make to yourselves friends of the mammon of 
unrighteousness; that, when ye fail, they may receive you into everlasting 
habitations.46   
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The parable of the ‘Unjust Steward’ is most often interpreted as a simple metaphor, 
the steward read as Man, who has sinned against God through the pursuit of bodily 
wealth.  The impoverished steward can do nothing to clear his name but to recant the 
debts he has inflated and give all to his master, leaving nothing for himself, with this 
act, Jesus has recognized that the steward, in renouncing his career and his thievery, 
is a greater gift to heaven than a man who has never known or lusted after wealth.  
His redemption is of greater glory than if he had never sinned.   
The title’s allusion to this parable is, certainly, far from insignificant.  When we meet 
her, Sheila Cousins is not a wealthy woman; although her profession could, in 
theory, prove lucrative, she claims not to have the disposition required to make 
immense profit:  ‘For the tart who is to be successful must be hard, hypocritical, 
orderly in her habits, resolutely intolerant of any kind of parasitism.  I am not a 
success.’47  Unlike Cora Pearl or other Grand Courtesans who made great sums 
before they squandered them away, Cousins claims to have lived a meager existence, 
without glamour or luxury.  As a prostitute she is, of course, a great sinner in the 
eyes of the world, but rather it is her use of the physical resources at hand that aligns 
her with the steward of the parable.  The stealthy, devious and wily steward resorts 
to his knowledge of the world, that is to say his street smarts, to protect himself 
against a life of poverty – he has ‘not the strength to dig and to beg I am ashamed.’  
It is this worldliness that differentiates him in the eyes of God – he is truly a child of 
his ‘generation.’   Whereas a woman like Cousins, on the margins of society, learns 
fast, and if she is not a rich woman, she is at least a shrewd one.  It is not that she has 
resorted to prostitution because she is too ashamed to beg, or has not the strength to 
work, it is rather because, as she ‘herself’ tells us, she can.  Although there are other 
options available to her, this is the life she has chosen – ‘with her eyes open.’  To 
take the title quotation removed from the parable where it originates is to ascribe the 
protagonist as a victim; if considering the parable in its entirety, the title can then 
refer to a specific kind of ingenuity and, eventually, an intense self-justification, if 
not righteousness.  ‘I cannot dig; to beg I ashamed’ is misleading.  For the steward, 
when left with nothing, uses his own resources and triumphs.     
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There is a discreet line between personal wretchedness and redemption within the 
book (as there is, notably, in most of the novels by Graham Greene).  Sheila Cousins 
is not ‘saved’ within the course of her story and yet in the beginning she writes 
eloquently and with some conviction: 
I know that – so far as choice is possible – I choose with my eyes 
open to do what I am doing today.  And I know that I have never 
enjoyed such self-respect as I do now.  I have escaped from 
emotional sponging.  I cannot be put upon.  If you want my body, 
you must pay for it.  However odd the adjective may sound, there is, 
to me, something clean about that.48 
 
Here, the narrator’s voice is unambiguous, strong, but this is rarely the case 
throughout.  Despite a remarkable degree of personal agency, during the course of 
the text Sheila Cousins narrates a life full of disappointment and grief.  The book 
ends without hope, only the sad reflection: ‘For it seems to me that my life is running 
on ahead of me, and I desperately paddling behind it, trying to catch it up.’49 
Unlike the case of Cora Pearl, the literary project behind Sheila Cousins and both the 
publication and withdrawal of To Beg I am Ashamed offer little in the way of critical 
clarity.  Here the encroachment is not pornographic, but almost more insidious, 
political and/or ideological.  For even if we trust Sherry and Matthews, and accept 
that the story is rooted in the authentic, the narrative voice and the sophisticated 
discourse at play clearly and profoundly are not – thus, it is still an example of de-
facement of the prostitute’s body.  Edith Margaret Emma Robinson, if that was her 
name, is no more ‘Sheila Cousins’ than the nineteenth century courtesan Blanche 
Antigny was Zola’s eponymous Nana.  Once again, the authentic woman acts only as 
a muse, if that, a silent and faceless participant in other people’s discourse, narratives 
fashioned and controlled by men.  To counter this we need only to read the 
prostitutes who are able to tell their stories themselves, women such as Celeste 
Mogador who writes in her autobiography:  ‘Everything I have dared not say aloud, I 
am going to put down on paper.  I do not plan to transform my life into a novel, and I 
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do not intend to try to clear my name, or pretend to be a heroine.’50  Or we can 
consult the notorious diarist Harriette Wilson and her charming and notorious 
eighteenth century memoirs, which have never gone out of print since the date of 
their first publication.51  When these women claim the lives they have lived whilst on 
the margins with their own voices then it becomes clear that there is an alternative to 
the defacement offered by Parker’s narrative or Matthews’.  Yet when the narrator 
who is Sheila Cousins writes ‘I’m not only low, I am so low as to be somehow 
outside life,’ this only reaffirms her status as epitaph.52  Excepting in this case, she 
has never even really lived. 
As to why this instance of literary trespass is a potential political threat and a matter 
of widespread importance, I return to Said and Culture and Imperialism: 
Such domestic cultural enterprises as narrative fiction and history 
(once again I emphasis the narrative component) are premised on the 
recording, ordering, observing powers of the central authorizing 
subject, or ego. To say of this subject, in a quasi-tautological manner, 
that it writes because it can write is to refer not only to domestic 
society but also to the outlying world.  The capacity to represent, 
portray, characterize, and depict is not easily available to just any 
member of just any society; moreover, the ‘what’ and ‘how’ in the 
representation of ‘things’, while allowing for considerable individual 
freedom, are circumscribed and socially regulated.  We have become 
very aware in recent years of the constraints upon the cultural 
representation of women, and the pressures that go into the created 
representations of inferior classes and races.  In all these areas – 
gender, class and race – criticism has correctly focused on the 
institutional forces in modern Western societies that shape and set 
limits on the representation of what are considered essentially 
subordinate beings; thus representation itself has been characterized 
as keeping the subordinate subordinate, the inferior inferior.53 
 
From this we can see that the act of writing Edith Emma Margaret Robinson’s story, 
the act of turning her into Sheila Cousins is an act not only of cultural representation, 
but one of ownership.  We know that her utterances, however ‘upper crust’ her 
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accent might have been, would not have read as the narrative voice filtered through 
Matthews or Greene reads.  Unaided, she simply would not have had access to their 
language, or deft command over the kind of discourse that they present.  However 
sympathetic their account or worthy their moral cause, for the men behind the 
publication of To Beg I am Ashamed the prostitute as represented by Sheila Cousins 
was a symbol, as much of a parable as ‘The Unjust Steward.’  Here and in the case 
of Cora Pearl, the act of autobiographical metafiction, the telling of the prostitute’s 
story, robs the authentic voice of its power; not the empty power to shock or to 
titillate, but the hard won battle for legitimacy as well as truth.   
It is worth considering whether or not if To Beg I am Ashamed had been released as 
a work of fiction it would have been so violently attacked.  By the 1930’s the 
prostitute had been portrayed in works of serious literature without public censure 
for centuries.  Defoe even published two tales of fallen women in the years 
immediately after Crusoe:  Moll Flanders in 1722 and Roxana in 1724.   And in 
1935, the year before the publication of To Beg, Patrick Hamilton’s London trilogy 
Twenty Thousand Streets Under the Sun, which included amongst its characters a 
young West End prostitute, Jenny, whose life on the streets and early fall from 
respectability is told no less plainly than that of Sheila Cousins, enjoyed favourable 
reviews.54  This thus begs the question:  if the story of Sheila Cousins had been 
marketed as a man’s imagined creation, rather than a woman’s authentic life would 
there have been such an easy withdrawal by the threatened establishment?   
Something amiss about the text alerted those early readers.  They may have been 
sensationalists but they were not necessarily wrong – the book, as it appeared to 
them, written by a woman, was subversive.  Paradoxically, the newspapers and 
government board came to the same conclusion Matthews’ already had those many 
months before; in the language of Said, the prostitute was barred from telling her 
story either domestically (within her own narrative) or publicly within a wider 
medium.  Her censure was absolute and complete, for in this instance the guise 
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didn’t work, the prostitute’s voice was still silenced even when commanded by a 
man. 
 
V.  ‘What difference does it make who is speaking?’:  An engagement with 
Foucault 
 
As I’ve discussed, finding a broader hermeneutical system in which to consider and 
place works of autobiographical metafiction can be challenging.  Traditional genre 
or survey studies on autobiography problematize our reading of such works but do 
not offer much in the way of insight as to their effect as cultural products and/or 
success in the act of dissimulation.55  It is not enough, either, to only supply survey 
or examples and then hope to come to terms with what I believe to be a distinct and 
important political system – the appropriation of marginalized voices within a 
sophisticated literary framework.  Although the lens of postmodernism is one way to 
view these texts, postmodernism covers a broad spectrum and not all postmodern 
critical theories are created equally.  Also, I read somewhat in opposition to a few 
elements of postmodern theory, namely in my location of the subject or ‘referent.’   
Throughout my analysis thus far, I have routinely used terms and phrases that are no 
longer critically neutral.  In choosing to emphasize the act of discourse and 
representation, I have aligned myself firmly within the thinking and writings of 
Michel Foucault (indeed, the Catherine Gallagher essay that I use to open this piece, 
as well as both of the lengthy Said quotations, are centrally indebted to Foucault).  
Although certainly his reading of ‘ideology’ is stricter than my own, I believe that 
many of his best known theoretical frameworks, crucially his notion of discourse, as 
well as the ideas surrounding the ‘author-function’ - in a continuance of the 
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conversation initiated by Barthes concerning the disappearance or ‘death’ of the 
author - directly and most usefully address the critical difficulties of reading texts 
such as autobiographic metafiction.  In developing a new way of reading these texts 
we must then search for a greater understanding of what it is they represent, 
culturally and politically; Foucault can also help us with this.  Works of 
autobiographical metafiction, difficult to locate as they are, may be key texts in 
coming to terms with complexities in respect to identity politics and social and 
cultural representation, and it is only in respect to historical and cultural theoretical 
discourses that we can fully place them in the canon of political action. 
In The Will to Knowledge, the first volume of The History of Sexuality, Foucault is 
motivated by the discourse of sexuality, that is, the multi-faceted forces of power and 
knowledge that work together to create a fluid and evolving perimeter of 
conversation and thought around the subject of sexual expression in society, creating 
a social ‘strategy,’ a necessary way of order.  I use ‘fluid’ here not to suggest that 
this is an easy or simultaneous conversation or dialogue, indeed it is not, but, rather, 
in recognition of its changing, ‘unfixed’ nature.  In respect to the verbalization of 
sexuality – ‘who does the speaking,’ and what might ‘the positions and viewpoints 
from which they speak’ be - the relationship of power and knowledge thrives in 
conjunction with one another and their products.  These ‘products’, really regulating 
narratives intent on classification, sired from mechanized and institutional language 
and silences, are the predictable structures of hierarchy within society - both active 
and historical - patriarchal, medical, familial, etc.  The discourse of power and 
knowledge shifts in focus and concentration between husband and wife, parent and 
child, doctor and patient, with one position always possessing the language and/or 
silences, and, thus, the rights of privilege.  We have seen this in action through the 
representation and appropriation of the prostitute Edith Margaret Emma Robinson as 
‘Sheila Cousins’ by the educated and literary man, Ronald de Couves Matthews, as 
well as in the case of Cora Pearl, where the regulated, male-imagined discourse of 
pornography is given cultural precedence over the female prostitute’s authentic life.   
In actuality, these key relationships, the ‘force relationships’ that Foucault writes of, 
are less stable than he would like (a fact he readily acknowledges).  The discursive 
current of sexuality is, thus, a source of possible upheaval as the system of socio-
historical discourse, a constant, inevitable and necessary process, is subversively 
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undermined by its very existence.  As Foucault writes:  ‘We must make allowances 
for the complex and unstable processes whereby discourses can be both an 
instrument and an effect of power, but also a hindrance, a stumbling-block, a point of 
resistance and a starting point for an opposing strategy.’56  We have seen the effect 
of this in the media response towards To Beg I am Ashamed.  There the discourse 
was abjectly silenced, even though (or especially because) it came filtered through 
Matthews, who, as a public schooled and university educated man, would have been 
an otherwise privileged operator within the socio-political system of modern Britain 
between the wars.  Hence, this was not the discourse voice that should have been 
narrating the story of Sheila Cousins.  However, the discursive product, even 
silenced does not disappear and the questions we ask must remain the same whether 
the discourse remains stable (i.e. socially acceptable) or not.57  It is, perhaps, owing 
to the subject (sexuality) that resistance might be anticipated.  The very words 
‘force’ and ‘resistance’ offer physical as well as intellectual properties; they are 
charged with an elemental and fundamental significance that is uniquely appropriate 
to concepts of sexuality - this is as opposed to the more relative and conceptual 
discourses that surround law or medicine – although not, I think, those of politics or 
language.  Or perhaps it is that, as Foucault writes, sexuality ‘is not the most 
intractable element in power relations, but rather one endowed with the greatest 
instrumentality:  useful for the greatest number of maneuvers and capable as serving 
as a point of supports, or linchpin, for the most varied strategies.’58    
This maneuvering agency of the discourse of sexuality is what makes it so useful 
theoretically, as well as socially strategic.  Michèle Barrett writes that ‘the word how 
is the key to Foucault’s concept of power.’59 This is made very much apparent in The 
Will to Knowledge when we are warned that ‘we must not expect the discourses of 
sex to tell us, above all, what strategy they derive from, or what moral divisions they 
accompany, or what ideology – dominant or dominated – they represent; rather we 
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must question them on the two levels of their tactical productivity (what reciprocal 
effects of power and knowledge they ensue) and their strategic integration.’60  And 
so it is the how of effective productivity – because it has been effective - and the 
how of integration between power and knowledge, which collectively and primarily 
suggest, I think, the quite obvious questions of how did we get where we are today, 
as well as considerations as to what were the strategies that got us here?   
It is clear then that primary literary representation and life writing, particularly from 
marginalized social groups, such as prostitutes, offer an especially constructive 
narrative framework in which to consider these questions of ‘how’ in the discourse 
of, in this instance, sexuality.  Foucault addresses this use expressly, although within 
The Will to Knowledge life-writing (the discourse of revelation) is subsumed by the 
form of  ‘the confessional,’ or the sexualized place where literature becomes the 
‘scandalous’ acme of disclosure.  The effect of this is that the genre is granted a far 
more suspect historical position than it might otherwise enjoy – these works are not 
so very scandalous, after all - perhaps this reveals more about the nature of 
Foucault’s own reading than any real claim on category.  As such, it is notable that 
Foucault introduces this discussion of the confessional with a quotation from the 
Marquis de Sade, taken from The 120 Days of Sodom, a work of erotic fantasy which 
is not, to my knowledge, autobiographical.  I have used the same quotation in a 
similar act as to that of Foucault, that is, to illustrate the crucial affect of revelation 
as much as that of representation.  To place the passage in its context, though, is 
useful - it is taken from the first ‘150 simple passions’ of de Sade’s text, including 
‘narration,’ where the scene is set and passions inflamed through the telling of 
stories in the form of metanarrative.  Here the storyteller is reminded that no detail, 
however seemingly insignificant, is to be left out:   
Your narrations must be decorated with the most numerous and 
searching details; the precise way and extent to which we may judge 
how the passion you describe relates to human manners and man’s 
character is determined by your willingness to disguise no 
circumstance; and what is more, the least circumstance is apt to have 
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an immense influence upon the procuring of that kind of sensory 
irritation we expect from your stories.61 
 
Revealed here within the language of de Sade is a desire not just to see, but rather to 
see through; it is not enough to know, one has to know how, where, when.  The 
narrator’s desired end is, clearly, hypersexual, but knowledge at this intimate level 
becomes an obvious form of ownership, of power.  Perhaps unsurprisingly, de 
Sade’s quotation calls to mind the notorious Victorian pornographic text The 
Autobiography of a Flea, where the prized narrative vantage point is from a thing of 
the very least circumstance.62  Here the flea is allowed not only to trespass but also 
to feed upon the woman’s person, to bite her and torment her in her most hidden of 
bodily places at the most inappropriate of times - church was an obvious favorite.  In 
unearthing what is most personal, most hidden and guarded, the narrator grants the 
audience power and command over the subject, exactly as desired by de Sade.  
When it is the subject narrating herself this is less problematic, she is complicit in 
this exchange, it is only when the narration is external, as in the case of most 
pornography as well as autobiographical metafiction, that the balance is upset.  As 
much as writing these texts is a political act, reading them, too, is an engagement of 
power.  We, like de Sade, are demanding hidden, ‘searching’ detail, more-than-
detail, from our narrators, and using it for gratification and ownership.  Yet still I 
would argue that it is desire only in an abstract or illusorily sense, we want to see 
more than we already know, but not so much that we are repulsed.  As the cartoon 
from the introduction reminds us, however, it is of course more thrilling to have 
power over something that you desire (and that holds the threat of power over you) 
than something to which you are indifferent or otherwise immune.  
To return to Foucault and his reading of revelation, as an act where the writer 
‘confesses’ and the reader consumes.  Here the ‘acme of disclosure’ is an exchange 
rooted in the modern system of power relationships, where the very language used is 
a weapon against another.  The author is the facilitator, but the discourse does not 
belong to or even begin with him or her.  Because it is power, discourse is exclusory.  
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For instance, through his social place and position, the ‘true’ author of To Beg I am 
Ashamed, Ronald de Couves Matthews, inherited a discourse rooted in historical 
literary knowledge and educated reference.  This discourse is dependent on a specific 
prose language and is maneuvered, either successfully or not, using the advanced 
mechanics of dramatic expression.  The woman Edith Robinson might have been 
capable of adopting and using this discourse, as in theory anybody can, but she did 
not have the immediate tools to access it, or at least according to what we know from 
the history presented in the book.63  This is why it is so difficult to accept that the 
narrative discourse of To Beg I am Ashamed is authentic.  In the end, de Couves 
Matthews could appropriate Robinson’s ‘story’ but she could not appropriate his 
language, cadence or reference.  
As well as de Sade, Foucault, in his discussion of the ‘confessional,’ relies heavily 
on the example of ‘Walter,’ an anonymous English diarist from the nineteenth 
century.64  For Foucault, the eleven volumes of text attributed to Walter provide an 
example of nineteenth century sexuality that, he argues, ‘will serve better than his 
queen’ (Victoria, perhaps wrongly or unjustly accused as the arbiter of puritanical 
modes) in revealing the true sexual discourse of the Victorians.65  Certainly an 
important historical document, what is perhaps most remarkable about the Walter 
volumes is the pathological nature of his discourse.  That is, the relentless sexual 
obsession presented in his work, for of all of Walter’s sexual proclivities, Foucault 
was right that ‘the strangest’ was the very act of writing. 66 Yet, despite his prolific 
and historically fascinating body of work, Walter is an ambiguous source of 
reference and Foucault was surprisingly uncurious when considering the man (or 
men) behind the faceless name.  Heavily influenced by Steven Marcus’s landmark 
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work The Other Victorians, Foucault willingly accepted that Walter was who he says 
he was.  Now, of course, Walter doesn’t say that he is anyone, his anonymity is 
carefully upheld, but his persona – an upper-middle class traveling businessman, 
with an overabundance of sexual energy, time and (usually) money - is clearly 
constructed.  The Walter debates rage quietly on in small academic circles and the 
‘truth’ regarding Walter’s identity is not really relevant here, rather it is the 
perceived eagerness of Foucault to let Walter lie unexamined that is concerning.  
The anti-essentialism that usually defines Foucault and makes him so compelling, 
the belief that things are not, usually, what they say they are, falls away surprisingly 
easily in this instance.  It is worth examining why this is. 
The case of Walter as presented above is useful as a way into considering Foucault’s 
reading of the ‘author function,’ or the role and place of the author within discursive 
practices and disciplines - historically, socially and theoretically.  In his influential 
essay, ‘What is an Author,’ Foucault examines the rise of the author, first as a name, 
and then as a function.  He addresses the authorial differences within the sciences 
and humanities, noting how they shift places in the eighteenth century when the use 
of the proper name in the sciences begins to wane, whilst in the humanities it 
becomes, for the first time, paramount.  ‘The Rise of Fictionality,’ the Catherine 
Gallagher essay that I have already discussed, is of course concerned with this very 
moment, and it is clear that Gallagher owes much to Foucault for the location and 
preliminary investigation of this pivotal shift in literary history.  However, ‘What is 
an Author’ is only concerned with this moment in respect to its legacy - the social 
status of the author as ‘owner.’  In framing his essay with a quotation from Beckett - 
‘What does it matter who is speaking?’ - Foucault’s own position as to the author 
function is fairly unambiguous; the privileged status of the author, long questioned 
but never destroyed, is again called into account.  Like Lejeune, Foucault uses the 
idea of the author’s name as a way of trying to reach an accord of ownership and 
personality.  Yet in his reading of the author’s name, Foucault finds only a socio-
political use, where the name serves a way to mark ‘the status of this discourse 
within a society and culture. It has no legal status, nor is it located in the fiction of 
the work; rather, it is located in the break that founds a certain discursive construct 
and its very particular mode of being,’ in other words, not as a binding contract to 
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the reader.67  Hence, it does not matter who is ‘speaking’ as ‘Walter’, the name is no 
more important than the illustrated picture on the cover of the paperback copy, 
without the name, as without the cover, the text and the discourse, historical and 
pornographic in this instance, still exists.   
What effect does this reading of the author-function have on works of 
autobiographical metafiction?  If I were to take Foucault’s theoretical position to its 
obvious conclusion, then the central transgression – the inauthentic name – would be 
of little consequence.  But it is important to remember that I am not only interested 
in illegitimacy of name, but also, certainly, of discourse and most crucially of all, 
that of identity.  The problem remains that very often the discourses at work within 
examples of autobiographical metafiction are entirely legitimate, even if they are not 
authentic.   
Indeed, terrifyingly, often they are more legitimate, because as socio-political and 
ideological products, they are far more adept at adopting the prevailing discourse, 
collective cultural myth or perceived narrative framework than many authentic 
works.  As a prostitute and corporeal figure of the demi-monde, Cora Pearl was 
culturally successful.  As an early media, and now historical, sensation, we know 
that her persona fulfilled the obligations and titillating perceptions of a woman of her 
profession, status and celebrity.  As an author, however, Cora Pearl was a failure - 
both historically and contemporaneously.  Her author-function as discursive symbol 
of the world she represented did not match the discreet discourse she presented in 
her memoirs.   
Foucault refers to the author as ‘an ideological product’ and it is this idea that I am 
most concerned with.  We have seen how historically the ideological product of the 
prostitute does not allow for articulation.  It does not matter who the author of To 
Beg I am Ashamed is, the ideological product of Sheila Cousins, the ‘London 
prostitute’ was not granted author status.  Whilst the cultural product that was Cora 
Pearl allowed for, even freely granted, appropriation of body and voice by a more 
convincing narrative discourse - pornography.    
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Foucault’s reading of the author-function does not solve the central dilemma at the 
heart of autobiographical metafiction.  Namely, how to divorce the inauthentic 
autobiographical project, a fraudulent individual act with individual motivation, from 
these texts and read them as critically important social documents.  To read them as 
a kind of metawork that reveal as much with their trespasses as they would if they 
were rooted in the authentic - if not, as I have argued, more.  At the end of ‘What is 
an Author,’ Foucault calls for a way of reading that moves away from the author and 
the question of ‘who is speaking’ and towards an examination of, rather: ‘What are 
the modes of existence of this discourse?  Where has it been used, how can it 
calculate, and who can appropriate it for himself?  What are the places in it where 
there is room for possible subjects?  Who can assume these various subject 
functions?’68   
These are the questions I am asking, yes, but there is still the political concern.  It 
matters who is speaking if it means that others are not.  Foucault writes that ‘the 
author does not precede the work,’ but, rather, ‘he is a certain functional principle by 
which, in our culture, one limits, excludes, and chooses; in short, by which one 
impedes the free circulation, the free manipulation, the free composition, 
decomposition, and recomposition of fiction.’69  That Foucault is specifically 
concerned with the proliferation of fiction here is revealing – rightly refusing as he 
does to accept that fiction, whether product or illusion, is arbitrary.  In my deviation 
from Derrida, I maintain that subject matter, true or fictional, exists outside of any 
narrative.  For instance, prostitutes are a fact of life.  Their life stories exist.  
However the systematic articulation process, the narrative and institutional act, is 
exclusory; yet they do not become any more or less real if, as subjects, they are 
articulated or not.  For the author to truly be an author, as opposed to a scribbler, 
amateur, dilettante, diarist or madman, he does not only write, he must be published, 
purchased and, crucially, read.  Hence the author is not only an ideological product, 
he is an institutional ideological product, born from industry as well as institution.  
What works of autobiographical metafiction remind us is that while industry and 
institution have pretended to be inclusive, they are as rooted in the process of 
exclusion as ever before.   
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It is far too easy to lose sight of the individual in the collective principles of the 
social.  Discourse and life narrative are not the same thing; there is something of the 
personal consideration missing in much of Foucault’s thought, a lack of synthesis 
between the strata of the populace and the experience of the personal (hence the 
difficulty for many feminist critics to reconcile his readings of history with their own 
political agenda – the personal is the political, after all).  Yet I suspect most readers 
are guilty of this approach.  How do we know what an ‘authentic’ life narrative of a 
British prostitute in the 1930’s, written by an author with the same life experience as 
Edith Robinson, would sound like?  And how do we – is it even possible to - know 
that it would not prove to be just like To Beg I am Ashamed?  No, of course not.  
(Unless we have had personal experience talking with or working as a genuine 
prostitute from that time.)  And just as Foucault does not care who ‘Walter’ really 
was, even if he really was, I confess that I am not overly concerned about the ‘real’ 
Sheila Cousins or, rather, her highly probable inspiration, Edith Robinson.  In 
defense of this, I would argue that for most readers these names do not in fact 
represent an individual, but rather, rightly or wrongly, represent a cultural and 
historical act.   
In going forward, I do, by and large, more actively consider the specific individual 
identities represented in works of autobiographical metafiction, identity both of the 
subject, who is inauthentic but idealized and ‘mythically’ rooted, as well as the 
commanding force, the author, who is corporeally limited in respect to his or her sex 
or race or history.  Here both parties are tethered or chained by the narrative product.  
That is, the author is limited by non-corresponding claims to identity and position, 
and thus has no choice but to remain performative, whilst the subject is doubly 
limited by cultural beliefs surrounding his or her appropriated persona that in turn 
influence their own discourse of articulation.  What autobiographical metafiction 
insures is that neither party is allowed to transcend these binds.  Considering both 
positions in tandem is key to understanding the real political and cultural process and 
influence behind these works.  The gender politics of the two prostitution memoirs I 
have discussed are relatively transparent; I have not had to devote much time 
considering or arguing the repercussions of the actions undertaken by Derek Parker 
or Ronald de Couves Matthews, or delve too deeply into the motivations behind the 
acts, they are obvious enough – a man writing a woman’s story not as speculation 
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but as ownership.  In some respects, the rest of the primary examples of 
autobiographical metafiction discussed in this thesis are equally clear, that is to say 
that they are clearly as political and clearly as proprietary – with the author more or 
less in a position of power over a marginalized subject.  Yet, as we will see, I can be 
less certain regarding the motivations behind them.   
Indeed, the ‘case of Cora Pearl’ and To Beg I am Ashamed are easily understood, 
even, to use Barthes’ dreaded word, ‘explained’ in a way that even the final 
prostitution ‘memoir’ is not.  Here in the final example, the ‘how’ of these texts must 
now share equal space both with the ‘why’, and yes, also with the ‘whom’ of the 
next.  And yet, a relentless quest for the ‘whom’ does complicate the matter of the 
final prostitution narrative to be discussed in this chapter.  If the cases of Cora Pearl 
and To Beg I am Ashamed are marked by the historical myth of the prostitute as 
narrative subject and were limited by the social mores of their respective historical 
contexts – for even Parker’s text, published in the 1980’s, was limited by its obvious 
classification as pornography - then how are we to read contemporary discourses 
concerned with prostitution memoirs and ‘true’ life narratives of prostitutes now that 
the myth of prostitute as narrator, if not the realities of the profession, has inarguably 
shifted?  This is of course a wider issue than just prostitution narratives, and one that 
I will be re-visiting at length in the final chapter.  For if the industry of narrative is 
no longer status exclusive (or at least likes to act under the pretense that it is not), 
due largely to advances in internet narratives, also known as ‘weblogs’ or, simply, 
‘blogs,’ as well as evolving social parameters of human discourse, then how are we 
to read stories, stories that are claiming to be authentic, with discernment?  The truth 
of course is that we cannot.  Contemporary life narratives, sexual or otherwise, 
whose origins are to be found ‘online,’ must be approached in a different critical 
fashion from historical narratives of the past.  In many respects, however, the critical 
methods used to approach texts of autobiographical metafiction can be especially 
useful.  If we look beyond the idea of author or authenticity, that is to say the 
‘whom’, and focus instead on the ‘what’ it is that the narrative or story represents 
culturally, as well as ‘how’ the story has been distributed and received, we have a far 
better chance of putting these texts ‘to work.’   
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VI.  ‘I am a young woman, I have sex for money, and I love to read and write’:  
Reading Belle de Jour70 
 
Even before we consider instances of metafiction, classifying sexual memoir in the 
context of contemporary English studies is already a challenging act.  Sexual 
memoir, confessionals, pornography and ‘erotica’ in general have always been 
markedly interdisciplinary and highly referential, not to mention academically 
dubious.  As such, reading these texts critically has never been especially easy.  
Consider for a moment the difficulties that arise in contemporary marketing of the 
genre of sexual narratives, which proves a fascinating exercise in commercial and 
critical relativism.  For example, the esteemed French art critic Catherine Millet is 
displayed posing coy and naked on the cover of The Sexual Life of Catherine M., 
published in 2003, a notorious foray into autobiographical sexual narrative - which 
Millet has, incidentally, since claimed is a fabrication - this book is to be found 
outward facing in the ever expanding ‘Erotica’ section in the local Borders, next to 
the shelves of popular fiction.71  Where, if we believe Millet, it might also belong.  
The volumes of Giacomo Casanova’s The History of My Life, on the other hand, are 
easily located online under the Amazon book category of ‘History.’72  And of course, 
the Marquis de Sade languishes on the library shelves under the impressive title of 
philosophy.  Only the enigmatic Walter lives true to form in the ‘special materials’ 
section at the British Library, where he is read half guiltily under the gaze of a guard. 
Still, commercial differences of genre and convention have to be made.  If non-
fiction cannot be fiction, then surely, for the good of the reading public, history 
cannot be pornography. For instance, it is clear that the current edition of Casanova’s 
The History of My Life, published by the John Hopkins University Press, where each 
volume has been elaborately annotated and studiously includes thirty plus pages of 
careful translator and editorial notes, is a document of important cultural history.  
Even without the notes, though, Casanova’s documented adventures are educational 
in a vast manner of historical ways, from matters of dress to insights regarding 
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commerce and entertainment.  The same, of course, can also be said of Walter’s My 
Secret Life, especially if we accept Foucault’s claim that Walter’s legacy will ‘serve 
better than his Queen’ in the ways of certain Victorian behaviors.  This expansive 
multi-volume text, like Casanova’s a century before, provides us with a host of 
important details spanning nearly the entire length of the nineteenth century.  
However we know enough by now to know that it is not the historical details that 
separates Casanova from Walter, but rather that small matter of authenticity.  
Whether it is the ‘narrative pact’ that Casanova made with his readers through the 
use of his own name or the stamp of critical legitimacy that the text now enjoys, The 
History of My Life has been re-classified in a way that most other sexual narratives, 
historical or otherwise, including My Secret Life, are not. 
In July 2004, The Guardian released its annual ‘MediaGuardian 100,’ or ‘the 
definitive guide to the most powerful movers and shakers in the one of the UK’s 
most vibrant industry’ – the media.  Based on criteria that included ‘cultural 
influence, economic clout and political power,’ the only woman to make the year’s 
MediaGuardian top ten, was Belle de Jour, the anonymous author of the self-titled 
weblog, ‘Belle de Jour:  diary of a London call-girl.’  ‘Belle’, whose referential 
pseudonym was unapologetically inspired by the 1967 Luis Buñuel film of the same 
name starring a young Catherine Deneuve as a beautiful and bored bourgeois 
housewife who fills her day working illicitly in a Paris brothel, published her sexual 
exploits, professional and otherwise, for exactly one year, from October 2003 to 
October 2004.73  Mid-way through that year, with a raft of media attention and the 
Guardian award, Belle signed an extremely public and much debated six-figure 
book deal in London.  The first book, The Intimate Adventures of a London Call 
Girl, based on entries lifted directly from the weblog sold well enough to warrant a 
second work, The Further Adventures of a London Call Girl.74  And in 2007, Belle’s 
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‘story’ was even made into a popular television series, Belle de Jour or, as its know 
in the US, Secret Diary of a Call Girl, starring Billie Piper, a former teen pop star.75   
Ever since her emergence in the UK media spotlight, Belle’s true identity has been 
contested.  Her erudite style, cynical wit and uncompromising approach to her job 
and human sexuality rapidly became fodder for wide ranging debates concerning the 
nature of modern sexual relationships and, of course, prostitution as a profession in 
the twenty-first century.  Belle’s voice is resolutely unapologetic:  ‘Just so you know 
– I’m a whore.  Not in the metaphorical sense, often invoked by writers my age, of 
auctioning off my intellectual abilities to the highest bidder… I’m an actual, 
exchanging money-for-sex prostitute.’76  Yet from the beginning, Belle’s 
authenticity, however plainly argued, was heavily doubted.  Now, some years after 
the weblog and initial ‘memoir’ and its sequel, the general consensus appears to be 
that ‘Belle’ was almost certainly an already established London based journalist or 
jobbing author with strong ties to the UK media and publishing industry and was 
thus uniquely positioned to manipulate the internet discourse of a fictionally 
imagined high-class London call girl with a sideline in literature.   
That ‘Belle’ actually was who she said she was and wrote the way that she did - not 
only as a prostitute, but also as a woman – seemed, for many in the media, to be 
inconceivable; just as Sheila Cousins’ lofty elevated voice led to her censure almost 
seventy years before, it was the voice of Belle, dry, removed and acerbic, that fueled 
speculation.  It would seem that in 2004 a woman could indeed be a prostitute, just 
not a funny, detached one with a sense of irony.  Indeed, a byline for a March 2004 
Times article entitled ‘ Focus:  Who is ‘Belle de Jour,’ the high class hooker whose 
web diary is about to become a literary sensation?’ and written by two male 
journalists, suggests that ‘the clues point towards a middle-aged man with an award 
for bad sex…’77 The article continues:  ‘She is a male fantasy who has always 
seemed too good to be true: a stiletto-healed sex bomb with the erudition of a college 
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professor.’78   However, it was not only male journalists who found Belle’s literary 
persona difficult to believe – a few ‘authentic’ prostitutes also came out to discount 
her narrative.  They, too, objected to her particular voice.  In her review of The 
Intimate Adventures of a London Call-Girl, Katy Guest, in The Independent, wrote 
that Belle ‘lists like Hornby.  She talks dirty like Amis.   She has the misanthropy of 
Larkin and examines the finer points of sexual technique as if she is adjusting the 
torque on a beloved but temperamental E-type.’79  The Guardian even published an 
op-ed piece written by ‘Britain’s Best Known Madam,’ Cynthia Payne, who claimed 
that Belle’s writing was ‘not erotic, nor is it believable.  It’s just filthy and far too 
clever for it’s own good.  I’ve seen a lot in my time but I haven’t a clue about what 
Belle is going on about… I’ve never met a working girl who kept a diary.  The girls I 
knew were not proud of it.’80 
Historically, of course, Ms. Payne is wrong.  Prostitutes have often written journals 
and memoirs, many of which I have mentioned earlier in this chapter.  In fact, 
despite Payne’s assertions, little about ‘Belle’ is unique.  For even amongst the 
thriving online community of literary prostitutes (and there is indeed such a 
community) - each recording their exploits under such witty noms de plume as Tasty 
Trixie, Mistress Matisse, Olympia Manet, the ‘PostModern Courtesan’ and the 
unnamed authoress of the blog ‘Pornblography’ - the voice, subject and general 
discourse of ‘Belle de Jour’ was decidedly commonplace.  
What Belle was, however, was ironic, witty and profoundly culturally astute.  For 
instance, in one of her early blog entries Belle slyly supplies the definition of 
meretricious (as supposedly ‘sent’ to her by a reader):  ‘1. Of or pertaining to 
prostitutes; having to do with prostitutes.  2. Alluring by vulgar or flashy display; 
gaudily and deceitfully ornamental; tawdry; as, "meretricious dress.  3. Based on 
pretense or insincerity; as, "a meretricious argument.’  And, as Belle rightly knows, 
‘meretricious’ is an apt word indeed for most Internet narratives.  Safe in their 
anonymity, it is impossible to gauge the ‘sincerity,’ let alone the authenticity, of 
internet voices – as each is fighting to be heard amidst an ever swelling sea of 
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competitors, all vying for the same readers in a market that is rapidly becoming 
saturated.  Jeanette Winterson, in The Times, wrote a piece on Belle, refering to the 
‘masked ball’ aspect of the Internet, and called the diary a ‘theatre act.’81 
Winterson’s article, titled ‘Of course Belle was faking it.  That’s what sex – and 
cyberspace – are all about,’ heralds the ‘mystery’ of Belle, and suggests that 
‘deception – pretending to be someone you are not – alters its meaning in cyber-
space.  Game playing is an essential ingredient of sex and the net, separately and 
together.’82 This article by Winterson is especially interesting viewed 
retrospectively, as she predicted in the piece, wrongly, that ‘now that The Times is 
almost certain that Belle de Jour is not a prostitute on the game, but a writer on the 
make, her publishing deal looks set to collapse faster than one of her elderly clients 
without Viagra.’  In fact, The Times was not able to claim convincingly that Belle 
was a professional writer, either male or female, ‘faking it’ as a prostitute.  Even if 
they had, considering the public interest in ‘Belle’ as a narrative subject I’m not sure 
the book deal wouldn’t have gone on as planned anyway. 
 
We will return to the matter of Internet ‘deception’ and how this is shaping the future 
of autobiography, metafictional or otherwise, in the final chapter, but for now it is 
enough to remember that Belle’s blog was not written, like the Memoirs of Cora 
Pearl, from her death bed; her stories weren’t told to men propositioning her on the 
street so that they might expiate themselves, as Edith Robinson’s undoubtedly were 
– no, Belle purports to be writing at the height of her good fortune, when she is 
young and alluring.  Her story has not a whiff of the social tragedy of To Beg I am 
Ashamed or of the taciturn, desperate reminisces of Eliza Crouch.  Belle’s codified 
world is a neat place of self-control and, above all, self-assuredness, if not downright 
smugness.   The persona of Belle, ‘male fantasy’ or otherwise, is of a young woman 
who chooses, as Sheila Cousins before her, ‘with her eyes open.’  However, unlike 
Cousins, Belle enjoys the ‘game’ of prostitution, thriving on it as an occupation.  Her 
personal agency is not only professional but physical and psychological as well.  As 
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Belle herself, in a feature article in The Sunday Telegraph Magazine, entitled ‘Call 
Girl Confidential:  The true confessions of Belle de Jour,’ tells us:  
Some people accuse me of being fake, and I’m flattered that anyone 
thinks my writing so good that I could not be real.  Unfortunately for 
the conspiracy theorists, there is no conspiracy.  I am a young 
woman, I have sex for money, and I love to read and write.  My taste 
in books shouldn’t come as a surprise.  After all, this job affords 
more spare time than most.  Think of Occam’s razor, the principle of 
parsimony:  what would be simpler – that I am who I say I am, and 
write about, or that I am a famous author living a double life, unable 
to tell anyone and having a joke at the expense of my agent, 
publisher and readers? 83 
 
Compare the anonymity of Belle to that of Walter.  In the most recent Arrow 
paperback publication of My Secret Life, Donald Thomas, in the introduction, writes, 
‘it matters more that we should know what Walter was than who he was… if there is 
a hero in these volumes, it is not Walter but Victorian humanity at large.’  Reading 
memoir as cultural history is indeed a way to negotiate the problems of validity or of 
voice.  This way of reading, however, becomes more difficult with contemporary 
texts, such as the ones supplied by Belle.  Jeanette Winterson writes that to read 
Belle de Jour as ‘documentary makes us naïve and stupid.’84  Winterson has a point 
in that Belle’s world of sex is one of such impossibly high glamour and glossy 
eloquence that it even if it were to be ‘true’ it can hardly be presented as being ‘real’ 
– after all, ‘Of course Belle was faking it.  That’s what sex – and cyberspace – are all 
about.’   It is clear that whoever has been writing as ‘Belle’ has been using the 
seductive language of fantasy, glamour and the world of highly paid sex workers and 
their clients to get read.  This is hardly surprising, but what Belle is, and whoever 
Belle is, does represent a cultural shift, and not only in the narrative of sexuality but 
in the matter of narrative in general. 
Belle de Jour, her anonymous Internet beginnings and meteoric rise in the British 
media tells us more about the ‘death of the author’ or the ‘author-function’ than quite 
possibly any other text I will be examining in this thesis.  As Winterson suggests, 
what matters to Belle’s readers is not her ‘real’ name or true identity but rather the 
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‘fantasy’ in respect to the person or the lifestyle she represents.  We would like to 
believe that she is real, but, in fact, her truthfulness is very much secondary to her 
myth.  
The actual name ‘Belle de Jour,’ speaks more about what it is than what it isn’t – 
that is to say, of course, that it is a well-known French film, and pointedly not a 
given name.  In the film, the ‘Belle’ is memorably played by the elegant actress 
Catherine Deneuve; in referencing this film, the author Belle de Jour has given us a 
face – the icy beauty of Deneuve – that serves as a kind of visual location or sign for 
her audience.  There is no ‘author function’ in the name ‘Belle de Jour,’ there is only 
the cultural and ideological performance/product and the historical reference.  In the 
act of autobiography, where the name should be paramount, ‘Belle’ has given us 
nothing but an ironic, clever cultural reference; in the act of sexual fantasy, where 
the image should be paramount, ‘Belle’ has only given us only the visual sense 
memory of an actress playing a role.    
Utterly performative in her shaping of the ‘high-class’ or glamorous ideal of the 
contemporary escort, Belle’s writing is, as Barthes says in ‘The Death of the 
Author’, ‘a tissue of quotations drawn from the innumerable centers of culture.’85  
And though this may be true of all instances of writing, Belle’s act is especially 
marked.  Since we are unable, at this time, to ‘impose’ upon the texts produced by 
‘Belle’ as an author, we are forced to read them, as Barthes would have, in an ‘anti-
theological’ fashion.  Without the ‘truth’ of who Belle is and the knowledge of 
whether or not her narrative is authentic we cannot ‘explain’ or solve the text.  The 
only real critical reasoning we are able to do is the kind of work I am doing now, to 
look at the text within an industry and as an ‘ideological (or cultural) product.’  
Foucault would have us read ‘Belle de Jour’ cynically as simply a cultural product of 
an economic industry of commercial media that trades on the idealized myth of ‘the 
oldest profession’ to sell books and lure in television viewers, Barthes perhaps would 
prefer the playfulness adopted by Winterson.  Both critics, however, would 
appreciate the critical shift required to read Internet narratives.  And yet, historical 
works of autobiographical metafiction - such as the few we have already looked at 
and the ones we will examine next – crucially, works that do attempt to comply with 
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‘the author function’, albeit in a bastardized or non-standard way, are incredibly 
useful in preparing us for the new narratives of our internet Age.  For they force us 
to confront the fact that vagaries of sincerity and truth in regards to genre and 
narrative are nothing new or radical, that they are acts, however cynical, of the 
‘everyday,’ and they remind us, for better or for worse, that often it truly is the 
function of the ‘myth,’ the cultural framework or the social fantasy that is more 
important than the author – the what rather than the who. Perhaps it always has been. 
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Chapter 3.  Into the territory:  Fraudulent Native American memoir and the 
politics of the ‘dispossessed’  
 
I.  ‘Fantastical identities beloved by children and the dispossessed’:  Coming to 
terms with auto/biographical ‘icons’1 
 
Although I have enthusiastically referred to the text To Beg I am Ashamed as a work 
of  ‘autobiography’ (albeit of the metafictional kind) - that is, after all, what it calls 
itself – it should be clear from my analysis that the work is far more akin to a 
confused form of biography.  Despite the insistent claims on the cover and title page, 
we now know that Ronald de Couves Matthews wrote (or ‘ghosted’ to use the shady 
technical term presented by Norman Sherry) the ‘biography’ of a London prostitute, 
Edith Robinson.  I have already posed the question as to how the book might have 
been received if it had been presented as a sober urban novel, a work of fiction.  
Perhaps, though, it would be more appropriate to consider what the resulting media 
attention would have been if it had simply called itself a biography, a ‘true life’ 
account of an anonymous female subject by an earnest male author, a man 
compelled to shine a harsh light on an uncomfortable social truth.  I am inclined to 
think that politically it would not have made the slightest bit of difference - for at the 
time of publication it is likely that any legitimate truth claim or play for authenticity 
of To Beg would have rendered the book too socially incendiary for general release.  
The critical problem of To Beg I am Ashamed was its refusal to work within the 
realm of the subtle, the fictional; in demanding authority through the legitimacy of 
non-fiction, whether the genre in question was autobiography or biography, the book 
rankled the political establishment and forced its censure.  If Matthews had played 
instead the more nuanced game of the poet or the philosopher the outcome may have 
been very different.   
The wider question of biography, though, is a crucial one.  Are not works of 
autobiographical metafiction really just anonymous biographies of a fictional but 
nevertheless legitimate subject?2  If the genre of autobiography can never truly apply 
                                               
1
 Mary Evans, Missing Persons:  The Impossibility of Auto/biography, p. 118. 
2
 Which takes us back to the slippery conversation of the subject from chapter 1.  However, let’s 
suppose this is a possible action - it is certainly possible when critics do it. Consider explorations such 
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in these instances because there is, of course, no real ‘auto’, should we be reading 
them instead in this way?  As complicated works of cultural biography, in the way 
the author of the foreward of My Secret Life, Donald Thomas, implores us to - is 
there truly a difference? 
Indeed, in the critical study Missing Persons:  The impossibility of auto/biography, 
Mary Evans refuses to draw a direct distinction between biographical and 
autobiographical narratives.  Whilst Evans is certainly using the slash between the 
prefixes to connote what Sidonie Smith and Julia Watson usefully define as ‘a mode 
of the autobiographical that inserts biography/ies within an autobiography, or the 
converse, a personal narrative within a biography,’ she is also expressly keeping the 
two categories deliberately intertwined so as to suggest a unified genre.3  To read 
Evans in such a way suggests that it is in working together as a distinct, yet multi-
faceted, literary act (the shady act of representation) that variants of life writing form 
a single genre – an impossible genre - dedicated to the pretence of portrayal that does 
not become more or less impossible whether the representative act is conducted in 
the first person or the third person narrative.   It is thus an impossibility of form; 
content, however privileged or powerful, cannot help but fall short of the unfeasible 
expectations of the genre.  Evans writes:  ‘the thesis is not, therefore, about who is 
left out, but about the ways in which the genres of autobiography and biography 
cannot represent what they claim to represent, namely the ‘whole’ life of a person.  
Furthermore, this whole person is in any case a fiction, a belief created by the very 
form of auto/biography itself.’4    
For Evans, deconstructing the pervasive cultural myth of the ‘whole’ person 
becomes the crucial focus in understanding the limitations of auto/biography.  She 
questions why it is that we, as readers and as critics, want to know so badly the 
agonized inner processes, deviant sexuality and irrational anxieties of another, 
finally landing on the psychological analysis that ‘we cannot tolerate the ambiguity 
of human existence, and we thus provide ourselves with icons of experience and 
                                                                                                                                    
as ‘the prostitute in literature’ or ‘the Native American in the cultural imagination’ or ‘the Holocaust 
in film’ and so on. 
3
 Sidonie Smith and Julia Watson, Reading Autobiography, p. 184. 
4
 Evans, Missing Persons, p. 1. 
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reality.’5  These icons, however, are not arbitrary.  They are carefully fashioned 
social and cultural products; just as not all experience is of equal importance over the 
course of a lifetime, not every subject is granted equal, that is to say privileged, 
iconic status.  Why it is that some subjects capture our cultural imagination and are 
granted iconic status while others linger on the sidelines is a central theme in Evans’ 
work.  For instance, she examines the dubious positioning of absent fathers as heroic 
figures in the autobiographical works of feminist authors Germaine Greer and Sylvia 
Plath, whilst their mothers, nobler and harder working, are the subject of ridicule and 
resentment.  As to how these personally representative actions jar with their wider 
politics as feminists, Evans writes of Greer and Plath:  ‘To praise unknown women, 
and to write hymns of praise about their tenacity and courage (even if those hymns 
have a basis in fact) is to choose between the reality of the individual identity (the 
sad fate of maturing) and the fantastical identities beloved of children and the 
dispossessed.’6  Hence both Greer and Plath collapse into myth, whilst ignoring the 
personal ‘truths’ that haunt them as uncomfortable and inconvenient.  In using the 
example of Greer and Plath, Evans seems to be asking if it is possible that our ‘icons 
of experience and reality’ are really just ‘fantastical identities’ (such as the fathers 
who are granted larger roles to make up for their very absence).  Mythical paradigms 
created to help reconcile the raw and mysterious.  
In her introductory chapter, Evans argues the resonant point that ‘we are accustomed 
to classify autobiography as non-fiction, and yet it may be useful to think of it not as 
such, but as a mythical construct of our society and our social needs,’ which is a 
succinct and eloquent summation of one of my most central arguments.7  Yet I am 
concerned with the emphasis upon the single category of auto/biography that she, 
and indeed several other academics working in this increasingly popular field, 
including Laura Marcus whose own critical work is titled Auto/biographical 
Discourses, considers to be the best reading of the genre.  It is true that often a 
biographer’s own voice and character resonate as strongly or at times stronger than 
the proposed subject, as is certainly the case with the notorious biographer Lytton 
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 Evans, Missing Persons, p. 118. 
7
 Evans, Missing Persons, p. 1. 
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Strachey and his Eminent Victorians, to use an example supplied by Evans.8  We 
also know, of course, that the uniquely positioned and highly privileged narrative of 
the legitimate autobiographer does not necessary guarantee insight or even truth.  
There is still, however, a profound difference between the two representative acts.  
Both may be impossible, as indeed I believe them to be, but the objective distance 
(falsely perceived or otherwise) of the biographer will always create a boundary with 
the reader.  The subject may emerge as ‘knowable’, yes, but, unless the 
circumstances are unusual, it is almost always at the expense of the narrator.  For if 
the narrator emerges as the true subject then surely in the reader’s eyes the work 
ceases to be an uncompromised biography?  Auto/biography demands both complete 
objective access to another, as traditionally presented by biography, and the 
subjective narrative license of autobiography - ultimately destabilizing both 
categories.   
In many ways then auto/biography is the best example of how the genre is marked 
by chaos and impossibility.  Like the myth of the ‘whole’ person, Evans asks us to 
consider the myth of the entire genre, certainly expecting us to discover that the 
Emperor, indeed, has no clothes.  I, too, have no love for the pretences of the genre, 
and yet I cannot wholly discount the importance of the personally representative act.  
The autobiographical act - metafictional or ‘true,’ impossible or otherwise, authentic 
or not - has urgency and potency and power.    It is unfortunate, yes, that so often 
biography is trapped and suspect, whilst autobiography is granted an easy and 
undeserved authority.  (Consider my own attitude towards Norman Sherry, the 
biographer of Graham Greene, who is a respected academic and I’m sure a 
trustworthy and upstanding man; yet I remain convinced that he has not been as 
forthcoming regarding To Beg I am Ashamed as he might have been.)   Yet when 
there is no boundary between the narrative and the primary act, at least not as viewed 
by the reader (recall the false ‘transparency’ of Sontag’s photographer), there is the 
greatest scope for effect, and, of course, trust.  I do not need to belabour the point of 
empathy and identification; as seen with the de Sade quotation from Foucault, 
autobiographical detail confers knowledge, which confers power and finally 
ownership.  Reading a biography, however engaging or dramatic the narrative, 
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 Lytton Strachey, Eminent Victorians (Harmondsworth:  Penguin, 1990). 
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grants the reader a relationship with the subject only through the process of, the lens 
of, education; with autobiography, though, this bond is far stronger, gleaned as it is 
through revelation, which is why the autobiographical act is ‘more than’ history. 
Yet, as we have seen, for those writers who choose to produce autobiographical 
metafiction the process of revelation is tethered to mythic cultural representation.  
With little or no original source or claim over the authentic life, they can only reveal 
what is already commonly known.  Ironically, a legitimate biographer would have 
far greater claim towards genuine revelation of the subject in question, hence the 
obligation of these metafictional texts to produce a conservative narration that 
resonate as socially and culturally ‘true’.  And though it could be, indeed I believe 
should be, argued that the author/narrator of autobiographical metafiction is actually 
providing a useful biography or historical example of a specific cultural myth, 
retracing or telling its origins and cementing its historical place in contemporary 
culture, there is no popular reading public or industry in place willing to grant 
authority to this kind of historian or biographer.   For there can never be a legitimate 
qualifying process that will serve as substitution for authenticity, no degree that 
would enable someone to truthfully create an alternate reality or entirely separate 
identity, other than those developed ‘fictionally’ by a novelist.  Why is it then that 
works of autobiographical metafiction continue, even flourish?  Perhaps it is because 
they are propelled, in no small way, by an audience comprised, as Evans refers to 
them, of ‘children and the dispossessed.’9 
To return to Evans’ ‘icons of experience and reality,’ though, it is worth considering 
briefly who or what some of these ‘icons’ might be and to what purpose might they 
exist before considering, finally, how they retain their iconic positions.  As we know, 
not all cultural icons are granted equal status; some, such as the prostitute, are held 
up as signs of degeneracy and pollution, and they are obligated to fulfil this cultural 
reading either through victimization or sordid, pornographic representation.  Other 
marginal groups, however, such as the Native North Americans, a community who 
have also suffered numerous metafictional assaults, as we will see, represent an 
entirely different, more esoteric, aspect of human experience.  
                                               
9
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II.  ‘If you want anyone in the world to like you, just tell them that you’re 
Indian’:  The Native American in the United States’ cultural imagination10  
 
As the successful Native American author Sherman Alexie has said in an interview, 
“if you want anyone in the world to like you, just tell them that you’re Indian… I’m 
so popular I could start a cult.  I could have 45 German women living with me 
tomorrow.”11  Ever since their social and cultural standing became a relatively 
stable, that is to say non-violent and non-threatening, political matter in America in 
the mid nineteenth century - marked by brutal historical episodes of relocation and 
desperation, such as the Cherokee nation ‘Trail of Tears’ and the Navajo ‘Bosque 
Redondo’ - the Native American has served as the country’s collective folk-hero, 
less industrious than the pilgrim or west bound pioneer but more noble.  Native 
Americans now exist in the cultural imagination as sages or otherworldly figures, 
whose mystic, spiritual relationship to ‘mother nature’ grants them psychic wisdom, 
as represented by such figures as the Shaman Black Elk.  More to the point, 
celebrating Native Americans as reverential icons in this way fulfils both a political 
and psychological need to expiate a brutal past.  Historically, of course, the 
American Indian played a vastly different cultural role, serving as the profound 
‘other’ of expansion and western capitalism, representing a savagery to be fought 
and tamed.  
In this chapter I will be examining the uneasy relationship between the 
representative myth of the Native American within the multi-faceted discourse that is 
United States history and the vast field of American popular culture, as revealed in 
three relatively contemporary works of autobiographical metafiction.   The myth of 
the ‘Indian’ has evolved into a profoundly powerful cultural and political legacy that 
resonates deeply within the American psyche, perhaps second only to slavery as 
America’s foremost collective memory and uncomfortable reminder of its own 
brutality and complicated, ruthless past.  However, perceptions of Native Americans 
remain skewed and deeply flawed.  Mythologizing an entire race is another form of 
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 The Native American author, Sherman Alexie, quoted by Matthew Fleischer,‘Navahoax.’ 
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 Sherman Alexie, quoted in ‘Navahoax.’ 
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oppression; what the following texts clearly show us is that in contemporary 
America the ‘Indian’ is still perceived as the ‘other.’   Native American 
autobiographical metafictions are especially telling for their themes and discourses 
of separation and difference.  And yet perhaps more importantly, in these texts the 
‘Indian’ also serves as a metaphor for America and its own complex relationship 
with its past.  I believe that metafictional representations of Native Americans 
provide us with surprisingly accurate cultural litmus tests of the country at large.  As 
we will see, these are as much biographies of a changing country as they are 
individual metafictions; collective projects as much as they are personal. 
 
III.  ‘A human document of universal meaning’:  The Education of Little Tree12 
 
The sun had tilted towards the farther mountain and drifted through 
the branches of the trees beside the trail, making burnt gold patterns 
where we walked.  The wind had died in that late afternoon of 
winter, and I heard Granpa, ahead of me, humming a tune.  I would 
have liked to live that time forever… for I knew I had pleased 
Granpa.  I had learned The Way.13   
 
In a recently published survey work of Native American literature, author and 
academic David Treuer writes that there exists no book ‘about Indians’ that ‘is more 
popular and more reviled than The Education of Little Tree.’14  Little Tree, published 
in 1976, is an autobiographical account of the adoption and spiritual education of an 
orphaned half Cherokee boy by his Native American grandparents set in the remote 
and rural Appalachian Mountains in the 1930s.  Central to the unease unmasked by 
Treuer is the problem of the book’s truth claim, which has been publically and 
systematically refuted - Little Tree is not an authentic autobiographical text.  Indeed, 
its very status as a work of ‘Indian’ literature has been thoroughly debunked.  Yet 
publication has never been halted.  The Education of Little Tree may well be the 
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 Rennard Strickland, writing on The Education of Little Tree in the introduction of the book’s 25th 
Anniversary edition from the University of New Mexico Press, 1991.  Strickland, ‘Sharing Little 
Tree,’ in The Education of Little Tree (Albuquerque:  The University of New Mexico Press, 1991), p. 
v. 
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 Forrest Carter, Little Tree, p. 11. 
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 David Treuer, Native American Fiction (Saint Paul:  Graywolf Press, 2006), p. 159. 
 120
most widely read Native American literary work, fictional, non-fictional, 
metafictional, or otherwise.   Further complicating and differentiating this text, not 
only in the eyes of Native American academics such as Treuer, but also for the 
purpose of my own project, is that The Education of Little Tree is now primarily a 
book for children.   
Best loved and vigilantly defended by many readers who remember Little Tree with 
affection and loathed by some who have discovered it as a fraud, a book that is at 
once so ‘popular and reviled,’ as Treuer reminds us, is to this day caught in the 
middle between those who would have it be either championed or angrily banished.  
Like Mark Twain’s The Adventures of Huckleberry Finn, The Education of Little 
Tree, when read as a text for children, is now both more and less vulnerable to 
explorations into its history and authorship, as well as to pressing questions 
regarding its political and cultural position.   
A truly iconic and loved children’s book is a magical thing and there is always a 
danger of over-reading – a charge that could perhaps be applied to the following 
pages.  It is possible that the popularity of the narration is owed entirely to the 
tragic/poetic construct of the winsome Little Tree, the text’s eponymous narrator, the 
innocent and idealized voice at the heart of the text, and that the book’s surrounding 
politics are both too nuanced and too abstract for its core audience.   Indeed, how 
likely is it that many readers, when they first meet the book as children, care about 
specifics regarding the truth claims of the text or questions of genre over and above 
central plot and story?  And yet I do not feel it is over-reaching to suggest that these 
readers have a genuine investment in The Education of Little Tree as a work of 
‘truth,’ and that they want to believe that the story, or at least the charming narrator 
at its core, is real, because that is how the information has been presented to them by 
the author - as history.  Young readers moved by the text clearly have an interest in 
Little Tree’s life and experiences, they want to know and believe that his history and 
his triumph is part of their own (as Americans, as children, as part of ‘the 
dispossessed’).  For many children, the most enduring myth of Little Tree is that, 
despite being victim to universal human experiences – grave circumstances of family 
tragedy and poverty and displacement, issues that have little to do with race or 
history - he is happy. 
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As ideological tools go, literature and other entertainment produced for children is 
potentially the most insidious.  It requires considerable effort to shake beliefs 
indoctrinated from childhood, especially those sanctioned by parents and teachers.  
As such it is fertile ground for the seeding of myth and the establishment of any 
number of cultural totems and icons, usually gleaned from socialized exposure such 
as the passing on of favourite books.  Most of these ideological effects are benign, 
and often important for social human development – children’s literature helps instil 
morality, empathy and other life skills – didactic apparatus, perhaps, but by and large 
not the stuff of great controversy.  In this respect, perhaps it is understandable as to 
why the publishers of The Education of Little Tree, The University of New Mexico 
Press, have kept the text’s true authorship and fraudulent truth claim uniformly 
ambiguous or even absent, despite knowledge and revelations that render the whole 
project deeply suspect.15 
Indeed, it has been argued that The Education of Little Tree is greater than its 
authorship, bigger than the uproar, that it somehow transcends its very creation and 
exists wholly independent as a force for true good.  In the forward to the 1991 
paperback edition of Little Tree, a prominent member of the Native American 
community, the director of the Centre for Indian Law and Policy in Oklahoma, 
Rennard Strickland, with no mention of the text’s conflicted past or suspect 
parentage, wrote that ‘Little Tree is one of those rare books like Huck Finn that each 
new generation needs to discover and which needs to be read and reread regularly.’16  
Strickland’s comparison of Little Tree to Huck Finn is hardly incidental; neither was 
my own comparison of these two texts earlier.  The Adventures of Huckleberry Finn, 
like Little Tree, is an American children’s literary classic mired in political, namely 
racial, controversy.  However, Mark Twain’s position as a talented author and 
important American philosopher and intellectual commentator has weathered these 
political assaults and flourished, and Huck Finn remains, for all but a small minority, 
a treasured symbol of American childhood.   It is, thus, understandable as to why 
Strickland, commissioned by Carter’s publishers, would like to have us believe that 
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Forrest Carter was another Mark Twain - an irrepressible maverick, irascible at 
times, yes, but an invaluable, even canonical, voice of history.  And yet, despite 
Strickland’s best efforts to convince us that he wrote ‘a number of important books’, 
Forrest Carter, as we will see, was no Mark Twain.17   
Tellingly, there is little that Rennard Strickland does tell us about the author of Little 
Tree, most of his forward is dedicated to extolling the enthusiastic response of the 
text since initial publication in 1976, including the myriad of positive reviews that 
the text still enjoys.  Strickland writes that it has been ‘universally acclaimed’, and 
he glowingly presents the continued use of it as an aid in classrooms, as well as the 
recommendation by teachers, librarians and parents across the country, as evidence 
that the book is an effective tool in promoting both literary and historical interest 
amongst children.  Only a single sentence is dedicated to the author, and this is 
rapidly followed by an emotional evocation to the text as ‘universal’, a work of 
human interest larger than its respective subject or historical moment: 
Originally to have been called ‘Me and Grandpa’ Little Tree is 
Carter’s autobiographical remembrances of life with his Eastern 
Cherokee hill country grandparents.  But Little Tree is more, much 
more than a touching account of 1930’s depression-era life.  This 
book is a human document of universal meaning.  The Education of 
Little Tree speaks to the human spirit and reaches the very depth of 
the human soul.18 
 
Yet however brief, Strickland’s account of the story of Little Tree, its original 
humble title and clear autobiographical credentials successfully locates it as an 
authentic Native American autobiographical work.  There is, then, no escaping the 
fact that it is because Little Tree is believed to be authentic that Strickland has the 
strength to suggest that it is, and will continue to be, important reading for 
generations to come.   The irony is that this importance may indeed be the case, just 
not for reasons that Strickland would have us believe. 
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 Strickland, p. v.  Strickland highlights the Outlaw Josey Wales as amongst these, more on Wales 
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 Strickland, ‘Sharing Little Tree,’ p. v. 
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David Treuer rightly notes that ‘there is a long history of fake Indian texts, just as 
there is a long legacy of fake Indian artefacts’; I will be looking at a few of these 
texts in this chapter, yet there is something especially unsettling about the story of 
Forrest Carter and Little Tree.19  Of all the works studied in this thesis his is perhaps 
the most insidious, not least because it has been the most commercially successful 
but more than that, it has also proved the most lasting.  So many autobiographical 
metafictions, which are in effect culturally and historically specific myths of time 
and place, rapidly lose their influence if they are read outside of their historical 
moment.  The Education of Little Tree, however, has been able to transcend this 
limitation and continues to resonate for new audiences.   
 
IV. ‘A Klu Kluxer’:  The remaking of Asa/Forrest Carter20 
 
Forrest’s true identity was Asa Earl Carter, born 1925, neither orphan nor Cherokee 
but rather an all-white man from Alabama.21  Asa or ‘Ace’ was a one-time member 
of the Ku Klux Klan and a prominent member of the southern politician George 
Wallace’s campaign team in 1963, responsible for the now infamous slogan of racist 
policy:  ‘Segregation today, segregation tomorrow, segregation forever!’22  As 
Treuer writes, ‘what makes his novel so revolting to so many people is a 
combination of Carter’s true and disturbing identity and the wholesome, sun-
dappled, rosy-cheeked innocence of Little Tree; it is like discovering that Hitler was 
the true author of Old Yeller.’23  Diane McWhorter, whose Pulitzer Prize winning 
book Carry Me Home provides an excellent critical overview of the Alabama state 
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Civil Rights movement, or ‘revolution,’ and Carter’s place of dissent within it, has 
also used a Hitler analogy when discussing Little Tree and Carter; she writes that 
divorcing Carter from his racist past when considering the book is akin to 
‘publishing a book of Hitler’s paintings without mentioning the word Nazi.”24  How 
it was, though, that Asa Carter, violent and vitriolic white supremacist, was able to 
legitimately pass (and successfully publish) as Forrest Carter - Texan out-law, 
‘Indian’ sage and outspoken scourge of the ‘Guv’ment’ - is not such an extraordinary 
tale, after all.  Contrary to F. Scott Fitzgerald, it would seem that in America there 
are second acts, after all.  Yet, as we will see, there is still a lot of ‘Ace’ left in Little 
Tree, for running deep within the book, ‘sun-dappled’ as it is, there is a dark 
undercurrent of civil unrest and malcontent.  
In reading The Education of Little Tree, it is difficult to reach any concrete 
conclusions as to whether the utter naiveté and complete lack of guile of the narrator 
is in fact a cleverly imbedded, highly offensive slight by the author.  It could be 
argued that infantilizing the narrator is a covert testament by Carter to the overall 
intellectual capacity of the Native American community he is portraying.  Because 
the voice of the book is a child’s, Carter is able to maintain Little Tree’s narrative 
tone as perpetually awed and winsomely sweet.  Charmingly, Little Tree usually 
thinks the best of people, even when he is clearly a target of ridicule.  This 
characteristic is illustrated early on in the text, in a scene that occurs on a bus, the 
first bus ride that Little Tree had ever been on: 
The bus driver told Grandpa how much it was and while Grandpa 
counted out the money real careful- for the light wasn’t good to 
count by – the bus driver turned around to the crowd in the bus and 
lifted his right hand and said, “How!” and laughed, and all the people 
laughed.  I felt better about it, knowing they was friendly and didn’t 
take offense because we didn’t have a ticket.25 
 
The idea that Carter used Little Tree’s utter lack of awareness as an insidious way of 
ridicule, a kind far subtler than that used by the people on the bus, must be 
considered - the slow counting that Little Tree attributes to bad light is far more 
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likely a result of the Grandfather’s poor numeracy skills and, of course, the cheap 
taunt by the driver and ensuing laughter of the passengers is clearly and 
heartbreakingly misinterpreted as a sign of welcome.  If Carter’s intent was indeed 
duplicity, then this would place The Education of Little Tree on even par with such 
objectionable works as the nineteenth century ‘Uncle Remus’ stories of Joel Harris, 
the ‘whimsical’ folktales that portrayed black characters as congenitally ‘simple’, 
their cheerfulness and lack of guile used as indications of a general mental inferiority 
to the slave owning whites.26  With his bigoted past, we cannot dismiss the 
possibility that Carter was using Little Tree in such a way.   Whatever his intent, 
though, it is clear that in choosing to narrate the book as he did, Carter not only 
appropriated but also infantilized the Cherokee voice.  Or perhaps it is simply, as 
Laura Browder has suggested in her excellent book Slippery Characters:  Ethnic 
Impersonators and American Identities, that Carter ‘succeeded in this impersonation 
by trading on his deep knowledge of racial and ethnic stereotypes, a knowledge 
honed during his years as a professional racist.’27  This resonates with my reading of 
autobiographical metafictions as dominant cultural and social myths – they are 
believed because they provide conservative, stereotypical accounts of what we 
‘know’ to be true.       
 Treuer argues that the character of Little Tree is ‘merely a cipher through which 
Indian knowledge and a nostalgia for an Indian past can be passed on to the reader,’ 
and thus we return to the idea of autobiographical metafiction as a form of cultural 
biography, a telling of myth through the use of myth.28  However, in using the voice 
of Little Tree specifically, Carter is able to not only educate but also manipulate the 
reader.  As Granpa himself says ‘when ye hear somebody using words agin’ 
somebody, don’t go by his words, fer they won’t make no damn sense.  Go by his 
tone, and ye’ll know if he’s mean and lying.’29  I would suggest that the tone of The 
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Education of Little Tree is as carefully chosen as its words, and that Forrest Carter 
succeeded where Ronald de Couves Matthews so obviously failed, in that the tone of 
his fiction – the innocent, naïve, utterly harmless discourse of a child – allows for 
otherwise incendiary and inflammatory prose.  To Beg I am Ashamed was a chaste 
book that just sounded dangerous; The Education of Little Tree, on the other hand, is 
a potentially problematic or incendiary book that sounds safe.  Hence, again, we see 
all the ways that these texts are not what they appear.   
Before The Education of Little Tree, Forrest Carter published a successful duo of 
pulp Westerns set in the aftermath of the Civil War with a renegade character named 
‘Josey Wales’ as the white rebel hero (‘Wales’ is also the name of Granpa in Little 
Tree).  These were, incidentally, the ‘important books’ that Strickland refers to in the 
foreword.30  The first book, initially titled Gone To Texas  - after the notorious 
confederate acronym G.T.T., which the Confederates would write on their doors as 
they fled the Northern Army, accurately believing that Texas would prove a more 
sympathetic environment - later re-titled The Rebel Outlaw: Josey Wales, was even 
made into a 1976 film directed by and starring Clint Eastwood, the consummate 
cowboy.31   
As a genre, American Westerns are notoriously libertarian.  With their outlaw heroes 
and legendary dustbowl towns, they are the last bastion championing of a mythical 
renegade lawlessness and vast, wild country; the Josey Wales’ books are no 
exception.  The general theme of the two texts is one of rampant anti-federalism, 
Wales’ enemies are a gang of vicious union ‘redleg’ soldiers and the confederate 
hero is set in marked opposition to these lying, thieving and murderous Northerners.  
Asa Carter, after divorcing his first wife and distancing himself from his family, had 
already left Alabama for the Texan desert in his own enactment of G.T.T, 
ceremoniously changing his name to Forrest, after the Confederate War General and  
founding member of the Ku Klux Klan Nathan Bedford Forrest, before publishing 
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the paperback Wales books.32  It is not difficult to see how a fiercely Southern 
loyalist disillusioned with his government, having had a professional history in 
speechwriting and holding divisive personal politics might be inspired to pen a 
Western adventure starring a wizened Southern outlaw.  Asa/ Forrest Carter and 
Josey Wales are a good and sensible fit.  What is perhaps less understandable is how 
his next protagonist would transpire to be a five-year old Cherokee boy, whose story 
would not be told as a raucous fictional adventure but rather presented as a tender 
autobiographical account.   
Yet the similarities between The Education of Little Tree and the Josey Wales books 
are in many ways pronounced.  In both stories a country renegade is battling for his 
freedom against a corrupt federal Government.  The real hero of the story, after all, 
and the route-master of ‘the Way,’ is the fiercely independent Granpa ‘Wales’ and 
throughout the book he is actively fighting his own battle against the United States 
Government or ‘Guv’ment,’ as Little Tree says.  Little Tree is a highly heteroglossic 
text, to use the term put forward by Mikhail Bakhtin in reference to multi-layered (or 
‘tongued’) literary narratives comprising of different voices serving different 
ideological purposes.33  In Little Tree, however, one voice is prioritized above all 
others:  Granpa.  In using Granpa as a guide, Carter is able to deftly steer the book 
towards a relatively overt political agenda.  This is clearly illustrated in the episode 
where a politician from ‘Washington City’ comes to give a speech at the general 
store and Little Tree happens upon the man railing red-faced about the threats posed 
by Catholics:  ‘Catholics, he said, was the rottenest, low-downest snakes that ever 
lived.  He said they had fellers called priests that mated women called nuns, and the 
young’uns that come of the matin’, they fed them to a pack of dogs.’34  After hearing 
this distressing speech Little Tree repeats to Granpa what the politician has said, he 
then asks innocently, ‘do ye know any Catholics?’ Granpa’s response and Little 
Tree’s asides are especially revealing: 
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“Iff’n ye taken a knife and cut fer half a day into that politician’s 
gizzard, ye’d have a hard time finding a kernel of truth.  Ye’ll notice 
the son of a bitch didn’t say a thing about gittin’ the whiskey tax 
taken off…’er the price of corn…’er nothing else fer that matter.”  
Which was right.  I told Granpa that I had noticed the son of a bitch 
never said a word about it. Granpa reminded me that “son of a bitch” 
was a new cuss word, and was not to be used around Granma.  
Granpa said he didn’t give a lick-damn if priests and nuns mated 
every day in the week, no more’n he cared how many bucks and does 
mated.  He said that was their matin business.35 
 
It is obvious from the above passage that Granpa, a whisky bootlegger and an 
illiterate, shares more than a name with the outlaw Josey Wales.  Little Tree is 
content to defer to Granpa in all matters, dutifully fulfilling his role as ‘a cipher,’ 
even appropriating his language.  Granpa’s politics are never questioned, as the 
politician’s so eagerly were, and when Granpa says that you would have a hard time 
‘finding a kernel of truth’ in the gut of a politician, Little Tree takes him at his word, 
although we already know how problematic ‘words’ can be.   
Clearly The Education of Little Tree is not only a fraudulent autobiography of a 
Native American boy drawing on the cultural and historical myth of the Native 
American, it is also a complex and deliberate political treatise disguised as a 
mountain fairytale.  With Little Tree, Carter succeeded not only in reinventing 
himself, but also in giving legitimacy to a suspect and unpopular political movement, 
extreme libertarianism.  How many parents would actively encourage their children 
to read a book that fuels disbelief and dissent in the political system were these 
views not couched in the dulcet tones of Little Tree’s sweetly broken syntax?  Carter 
is extremely accomplished in the nuances of creating a narrator who is utterly non-
threatening and utterly clueless at once; we know that Little Tree mistakes 
derogatory remarks as friendly gestures and hence we do not expect him to question 
the nature of his grandfather’s politics.  As Little Tree says, ‘me and Granpa thought 
Indian.  Later people would tell me that this is naïve – but I knew – and I 
remembered what Granpa said about “words.” ’36 And thus Carter has scored a 
double victory, if he needs to distance himself from Granpa’s beliefs he can do so, 
                                               
35
 Carter, Little Tree, p. 85. 
36
 Carter, Little Tree, p. 123. 
 129
using Little Tree’s naiveté as an excuse, yet in voicing the beliefs through Granpa, 
who is otherwise the arbiter of all knowledge, these political leanings become part of 
‘the Way.’  
 
V.  ‘Nasty Gossip’:  The inconvenient legacy of Forrest Carter and Little Tree37 
 
Compared to other extreme literary frauds, including the two other examples of 
Native American autobiographical metafiction that I’ll be discussing later, the 
industry fallout from Little Tree has been extremely mild.  Despite high profile 
media coverage - most notably in one of the literary establishment’s mightiest media 
giants, The New York Times - somehow Forrest Carter and The Education of Little 
Tree have escaped the usual rallying battle cries of public betrayal and indignation.  
There are several possible reasons for this, not least of all Carter’s ignominious death 
in 1979.  For though Carter’s game, as they say, was up even before the publication 
of Little Tree, having been ‘outed’ during a publicity junket for the Josey Wales 
Clint Eastwood film in 1976 by Wayne Greenhaw, a journalist from Alabama, his 
New York publishers, Delacorte, either refused to believe the evidence or simply 
didn’t care.  Indeed, later Eleanor Friede, from Delacorte, would tell a journalist 
from The New York Times that ‘anyone who wrote Little Tree could not have worked 
for George Wallace.  To me, it’s just a very sad bore.  I just don’t believe it.  I know 
it’s not true.’38 
The irony of Little Tree is that for all of Granpa’s raging about politicians and the 
‘Guv’ment,’ Asa Carter not only worked on a number of political campaigns for 
George Wallace and his wife Lurleen, but also ran his own losing bid for the 
Alabama state gubernatorial race in 1970.  Who better perhaps than a failed 
politician to write angry anti-government diatribes veiled first as genre fiction and 
then, with increased confidence and purpose, as a poignant historical document.   
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Laura Browder believes that Carter ‘took on a Native self, as, among other things, a 
way of leaving his racist reputation behind him.’39  This may be true, but I do not 
trust that he left his racist beliefs entirely behind him.  Indeed in an interview for the 
Josey Wales film publicity campaign Carter was quoted as saying, when asked about 
the historical legacy of the confederacy, that ‘the values of a civilization never die so 
long as they’re kept alive in legend.’40  For ‘values’ we can certainly substitute 
ideologies and political beliefs, and, if we except that Forrest Carter had a political 
agenda in mind when he penned Little Tree, then we can see how badly he must have 
wanted the authority of the historical, non-fictional autobiographical genre – a genre 
where nobody could call him a lunatic racist or question his political motives.  In 
1976, as the American political landscape was rapidly changing, extremist and ex-
Klan member Asa Carter must have increasingly felt that he had no place in his own 
country; even George Wallace denied ever knowing him.  At a time when good ol’ 
boys were being lampooned in popular culture, with television series such as The 
Dukes of Hazard, and affirmative action had already begun in earnest on college 
campuses, he may have felt he had no choice but to become someone else.  Through 
the appropriation of a genuine struggle, the Native American plight, Carter was able 
to rail against the United States government in a way that would force the reader to 
forge an alliance with him – as the (paradoxical) victim and the oppressed.  Better 
still, they would find that he, Asa/Forrest Carter, in the guise of Little Tree, was 
irrepressible.   
In using the facts of history and the myth or legend of the Cherokee Nation, Carter 
was able to both shine a light on a brutal legacy of America’s past, drawing attention 
to the darkest side of the ‘Guv’ment’ and the corruption of its ruling parties, which 
in turn served his purpose of dissonance, as well as capitalizing on the especial 
esteem placed upon Indian knowledge and wisdom.  Carter knew that Granpa would 
be celebrated as a sage and granted iconic status just by the mythical virtue of his 
race - what better platform could Carter have to spread dissent?  As an author of 
Native American autobiographical metafiction, Forrest Carter, an old Southern 
‘rabble rouser,’ was finally afforded legitimacy. 
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We can imagine Forrest Carter’s delight if he had known that, as a ‘re-discovered’ 
word of mouth sensation, The Education of Little Tree would spend months on The 
New York Times paperback bestseller list in 1991, fifteen years after its initial 
publication.  It was only after the book had won a bookseller’s association book of 
the year award, the ‘Abbey’ prize for excellence, and sold 340,000 copies in the 
summer of that year alone, that Dan T. Carter, a professor of history at Emory 
University and distant cousin of Asa Carter, published an op-ed piece, ‘The 
Transformation of a Klansman,’ in The New York Times, October 1991, thoroughly 
‘outing,’ for the second time, Forrest Carter and Little Tree.  Dan T. Carter’s piece 
unflinchingly visits the vicious history of Asa Carter; however, Carter does credit his 
relative with, at the very least, a sense of irony:  ‘anyone who transformed himself 
into a new-age wise man for the greening of America while taking the name of 
‘Forrest’ Carter couldn’t be entirely humourless.’41  Finally, Dan T. Carter offers a 
last insight into the strange  life of Asa Carter as he ends his column with an 
anecdote:  ‘one explanation is suggested by the Calhoun County High School 
yearbook for 1943.  The senior class prophet predicated he would return to Calhoun 
County as a “famous movie star.” ‘42   
Dan T. Carter’s piece was not the first New York Times article to mark Asa Carter as 
a fraud, or worse.  In 1976, months before the initial publication of Little Tree, the 
journalist Wayne Greenhaw had already made the connection between the failed 
political maverick and the drawling Texan who, according to another journalist who 
interviewed Carter during the Wales era, Allen Barra, resembled ‘an old photo of 
Wyatt Earp’, another mythical and iconic figure from the American west.43  Carter 
and his publishers denied the Times’ accusation and with the public assurance of 
Carter’s wife the matter seems to have quietly disappeared, certainly helped in part 
by the death of Carter in 1979 before the completion of his second ‘memoir,’ Cry, 
Geronimo!, which was to be a follow-up to Little Tree.44  The irony that Carter was 
recognized on television whilst publically courting press for a film does, however, 
appear to be in accordance with the 1943 yearbook prophecy, which predicted fame 
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and notoriety in Carter’s life, and there is certainly a strange cinematic quality both 
to the life of his characters and, of course, the man himself.   
A film version of The Education of Little Tree was released in 1997, briefly 
renewing the book’s controversy to little overall effect.45  Yet the film’s director, 
Richard Friedenberg, did offer this insightful comment to The New York Times on 
the subject of Carter:  
Here was a guy who did bad things, disappeared off the face of the 
earth in Alabama, where he was a Ku Kluxer, and reappeared in the 
Oklahoma-Texas area near the Cherokee reservation of the Western 
Cherokee nation, where he proceeded to write several books.  It 
strikes me he spent his literary life, and whoever he was in his 
second phase, in some kind of grand apology for his first life.46  
 
Insightful, that is, not in respect to Carter but rather in regards to Friedenberg’s 
reading of him as a repentant sinner working for redemption through a forged 
literary persona.  Whilst in a telephone interview with Carter’s publisher, Eleanor 
Friede, for the same article, from December 1997, the now retired industry insider 
tellingly exclaimed that ‘ “he was definitely a segregationist, but so was most of the 
nation at the time, certainly the State of Alabama… but he was not a member of the 
Ku Klux Klan.  I honestly don’t see the point of all this nasty gossip dragged out 
years ago.” ‘47    
Richard Friedenberg’s casual use of the term ‘Ku Kluxer,’ a seldom used phrase that 
presents membership in arguably the most violent and feared organization in 
America’s history as if it were somehow equivalent to the support of a local football 
team or akin to a social club, as well as Eleanor Friede’s apologist remark that ‘most 
of the nation’ was pro segregation in the 1960’s potentially reveal why it is that Little 
Tree has been allowed to remain in print and is still easily available, even actively 
recommended as a book for children. Clearly the ugly past has been usurped by 
mythical reinvention.   Carter’s legacy is his ‘second phase,’ as is America’s.  
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Forrest Carter did not only appropriate the voice of a small Native American child, 
he created a new dialogue for America.  Old wounds would now be couched in the 
panacea of ‘the way,’ a mythical reinterpretation of political and racial injustice.  An 
imperialist through and through, Carter did not so much as ‘steal’ an identity but 
rather re-appropriated the privileged status that he must have felt was always 
rightfully his.   That is, after all, ‘The American Way.’ 
The political mood has shifted somewhat since Edward Said published Culture and 
Imperialism in 1993, and it is no longer altogether true that  ‘imperialism as a word 
or ideology has turned up only rarely or recently in accounts of United States culture, 
politics, history.’48 Indeed it is now the dominant theme of most recent political 
academic articles and books regarding America and its policies, both foreign and 
domestic.  But Said was certainly correct that within America, then and now, ‘the 
connection between imperial politics and culture is astonishingly direct.’49 The 
Education of Little Tree can be read as a biography of American ideology and its 
relationship to its past, a metafictional narrative that uses the autobiographical voice 
both to promote historical legitimacy but also as a powerful political technique.   
Always the supremacist, Forrest Carter dominated both inside and outside the 
cultural and racial divide.  The book’s denouement comes when Little Tree is 
removed from the mountain retreat of his grandparents and their whiskey still by 
‘Guv’ment’ authorities and made to live in an orphanage where he is the only 
‘Indian.’  He is also, as the ‘Reverend’ who runs the orphanage, tells him, ‘the only 
bastard.’50  At the orphanage, Little Tree is badly and unjustly beaten by the 
‘Reverend’ and eventually Granpa comes to take Little Tree home.  Home with his 
grandparents is, of course, where Little Tree rightfully belongs.  However, if we take 
Carter’s history into account, it must be considered that this touching and emotional 
scene has a potentially darker side – for despite how idyllic Little Tree’s life with his 
grandparents may be it is also one of clear separation/ segregation from the white 
community.   
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Laura Browder reads the myth of Little Tree somewhat differently.  She reads it as ‘a 
fantasy perfectly attuned to an American public well-versed in the rhetoric of self-
actualization and, more specifically, the recovery movement,’ arguing that ‘Little 
Tree presents us with a new vision of Native American identity for the 1970’s and 
beyond, what I call the inner child Indian, a figure that represents lost innocence and 
a sense of wonder.’51  Browder’s Little Tree is a ‘Rousseauean idyll’ and the myth is 
of primitivism and, as she says, ‘anti-intellectualism.’   All of this is true.  Certainly 
a crucial aspect of the text’s popularity and the driving force behind its continued 
appeal, especially for child readers, is the text’s innocence; she is right, too, that 
1970’s America was desperately trying to ‘recover’ a sense of innocence after the 
Vietnam War and Watergate scandal.  However, I do feel that Browder glosses over 
some of the text’s darkness.  It could be that I am more cynical than Browder, but for 
me, at least, Little Tree, idyllic as it may be, has a serpent’s tail.   
The end of Little Tree is bleak; everyone close to Little Tree, even the dog, dies and 
Little Tree is left alone on a mountaintop.52  Though both Little Tree and the reader 
have learnt by now that death is part of ‘the way,’ and both Granpa and Granma are 
cogent enough on their death beds to produce the same dying mantra:  ‘It was good, 
Little Tree.  Next time will be better,’ in the end the education of Little Tree is one 
of loss.   
Read as a darker text, then, one of segregation, isolation and extremism, it is worth 
considering how The Education of Little Tree concurs with the myth of the Indian 
and the ‘new’ myth of America.  For unlike the redneck boys Asa Carter and Josey 
Wales, Little Tree does not ‘go to Texas’, rather he heads off into the wilderness 
with no clear direction home.  The diaspora was over; there was nowhere for Little 
Tree to go – he has lost his way.  This, then, is the myth, that this is the end of 
history, that all the ‘true’ Indians are dead - the warrior bootleggers like Granpa, the 
dancing medicine women like Granma.   This becomes all the more apparent if we 
consider how starkly different the ending for Little Tree is to The Adventures of 
Huckleberry Finn, where Huck, at the end of his story, decides to ‘light out for the 
                                               
51
 Laura Browder, Slippery Characters, p. 134. 
52
 It would appear that bleakness was a characteristic of Carter’s.  The Josey Wales books end in mass 
death, as well, leading the journalist Allen Barra to suggest that Carter pre-supposed the western 
abyss of Cormac McCarthy’s work.  Barra, ‘Little Fraud.’ 
 135
territory’ in a renewed quest for adventure.  Indeed the same year of Little Tree’s 
release another book concerning the end of the Indian way, Visions of a Vanishing 
Race, was published.  This book, an edited reader comprised of select 
anthropological essays and romantic photographs from the life work of Edward S. 
Curtis, an early historian and anthropologist of Native North American culture, reads 
not so much like a work of history as an extended obituary.53   
It is true that by the time of Little Tree and the publication of A Vanishing Race a 
perceived blight had begun to invade people’s mythical perceptions of the American 
Indian reservations, where the majority of Native Americans live.  High instances of 
alcoholism, drug abuse, poverty, illiteracy and teenage pregnancy were revealed to 
be widespread within many communities; from the outside it must have seemed that 
the proud Cherokee of Little Tree had turned into just another disadvantaged 
minority, that the ‘race’ was truly lost.  David Truer, speaking from within the 
Native American community, has commented upon how ‘we are perceived as not 
living up to our potential…we are perceived as being decrepit, broken.’54  As Laura 
Browder reminds us, Little Tree is historical fantasy; many Americans now think of 
Native Americans as fat casino owners, or else as unfit alcoholic mothers who give 
birth to babies with Fetal Alcohol Syndrome.  This is the new myth of the Indian 
and, incidentally, the new myth of America – a broken place bloated with greed, 
where children are addicts.     
For a man like Forrest Carter the real America, at least as he imagined it, was 
history. His America was defined by the days of the dominant, victorious white 
settlers and the righteous pioneers, the cowboys and the gentry; in setting Little Tree 
in the past he negated the present.55  Yes, in the end Little Tree survives - 
somewhere there is a future, but it is empty and it is bleak.     
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Presumably bowing to pressures after Dan T. Carter’s 1991 expose in The Times, 
The University of New Mexico Press, which had purchased the rights to Little Tree 
in 1986, removed the words ‘True Story’ from all subsequent paperback editions and 
offered this press release:  ‘Regardless of what he did as an adult, when we found out 
that he wasn’t really an orphan, we decided it probably was not a good idea to say it 
was a true story.  We’re now just saying it’s a book.’56     
 
VI.  ‘A genre on the verge of extinction’?:  Writing race in a ‘post-racial’ 
world57 
 
Unlike many other authors of autobiographical metafiction, Forrest Carter truly 
embraced or ‘lived’ the literary lie, radically changing his entire life and persona to 
fit into the guise of his second act.  You could argue that this propels him out of the 
merely literary and into the exalted realm of the professional imposter, joining 
people such as Anna Anderson, the German women who until her death steadfastly 
claimed to be Anastasia Romanov.  This is not though, a study on imposters.  I am 
only interested in fakes of the autobiographical literary kind, and only those to the 
extent in which they reveal hidden, and sometimes overt, political, cultural and 
ideological motivations.  There are many excellent and entertaining books on 
fraudsters, imposters, phoneys and grand literary hoaxes, such as the fake Howard 
Hughes letters and autobiography by Clifford Irving or the scandal of the ‘Hitler 
Diaries.’58  In these instances, most of the individuals involved are motivated by 
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money, status or inter-personal vendettas - fascinating all of them, but not the focus 
of this thesis.   
Hoax, however, does seem to be the current buzzword and easy media marker for 
many of the works of autobiographical metafictions that I am looking at.  Indeed the 
profusion of Native American cultural and literary fraud has even earned its own 
clever subgenre nickname – ‘Navahoax’ – lifted from the title of an expose by Los 
Angeles journalist Matthew Fleisher on the curious case of Nasdijj, whose story we 
will be looking at shortly.   Clever as Fleisher’s pun is, a hoax is fundamentally a 
joke.  It is a route to or ruse of deception, yes, but it is a word derived from the trivial 
and harmless, ‘Hocus Pocus’, and means very little.  Fraud is certainly a better word, 
but contemporary implications are financial not social; to accuse someone of fraud 
now is to accuse them of theft and although ‘identity theft’ is the current crime du 
jour, again the implications are of financial gain, not an actual personal or social loss 
of identity.   And although writers of autobiographical metafiction have been 
accused, and sometimes even charged, with fraud, it is fraud foremost against an 
industry:  against the publishing community and against the media, or it is fraud 
against the readers who spent/wasted money on their work.59  So there is still the 
perception that the real losers are those who have wasted time or money, not the 
people from whom they actually stole, the communities whose voices they aped and 
whose lives they cynically plundered.  
In the conclusion to her exhaustive historical study on ethnic impersonation in 
America, published in 2000, Laura Browder wrote:  ‘The great commercial success 
of The Education of Little Tree in the early 1990’s seems to indicate that the ethnic 
impersonator autobiography is alive and well.  Yet Asa Carter’s book may be part of 
a genre on the verge of extinction.’60   As identity has changed from a fixed term to 
one of increasingly fluidity, so too have representations of ethnicity; Browder sees 
this as a limiting factor to would be ethnic impersonators, arguing that contemporary 
writings on race ‘present not a successful performance of authentic racial or ethnic 
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identity, but a deconstruction of racial categories.’61  Browder is right, of course. 
Destabilizing historical and cultural boundaries of ethnicity has become an important 
objective in current discussions pertaining to race.  For instance, ‘planetary 
humanism’ or anti-relativism, as put forward by academics such as Paul Gilroy, 
rejects current categories of race and racial profiling as ‘marketing opportunities,’ 
and in a global world connected by millions of invisible wireless networks this once 
radical view is becoming easier and easier for many to accept.62   
Yet it was perhaps naïve of Browder to believe that this new way of writing race 
would not be appropriated.  Indeed, if anything, contemporary confusion regarding 
what it means to ‘be black’ or to ‘be Native American,’ coupled, at the same time, 
with what it means to simply ‘be American’ (or English, or African, or Chinese...), 
actively encourages works of autobiographical metafiction.  Any text that purports to 
tell us, firmly and with the authority of ‘true life’ behind it, what it is really like to be 
part of these communities, what the truths of these slippery identities are, and thus 
enables us to navigate our way through what Mary Evans calls ‘the ambiguity of 
human existence’ is given privileged status by anxious readers. As old totems fall we 
need myth, and narratives that will uphold myth, more than ever.    
My next two examples of Native American autobiographical metafiction or 
‘Navahoax’ were both released after the publication of Slippery Characters (which 
marks them as extremely contemporary).  And whilst these texts share many of the 
qualities of historical texts of ethnic impersonation, including The Education of Little 
Tree, especially in respect to the enactment of performativity, they are different, too, 
content, even eager, to question and destabilize the very myths they are actively 
upholding in a process.  In this way, these texts are not unlike works of 
historiographic metafiction, albeit in a bastardized form.  No longer forced to 
pretend these myths are anything but fictional, these modern autobiographical 
metafictions become, ironically, even more convincing when they show signs of 
struggle.  Yet just because the public and social dialogue has grown more 
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sophisticated and theoretically engaged on the subject of race, does not mean, 
however, that these recent works are any less beholden or tethered to the social and 
cultural myths still in place.  Hence these new stories are, in their own way, as 
conservative as those told by their predecessors, with whom they share a clear 
political agenda, as we will see. 
 
VII.  ‘To Become Again’:  The story of Nasdijj63     
 
There are currently 562 federally recognized tribal governments or Indian Nations 
within the United States, and many more state recognised communities that are not 
government sanctioned.64  Forrest Carter used the Cherokee, one of the largest and 
best-known tribes, as the inspiration both for Little Tree and his own fabricated 
lineage.  Timothy Barrus, writing as ‘Nasdijj’, borrowed a narrative identity from 
another large and well known nation, the Navajo, for his three works of Native 
American autobiographical metafiction:  The Blood Runs Like a River Through My 
Dreams, The Boy and the Dog are Sleeping and Geronimo’s Bones.65  To this day 
Barrus insists that in the language of the Navajo, Navajo Athabaskan, ‘Nasdijj’ 
means ‘to become again,’ a claim disputed by Navajo Nation members and 
academics.66  Whatever the origin or legitimacy of the word, the meaning as ascribed 
to Timothy Barrus is significant; like Forrest Carter before him, Timothy Barrus was 
a man potentially in need of a second act. 
‘You are your history’ is a refrain that runs repeatedly through Nasdijj’s first book, 
The Blood Runs Like a River Through My Dreams.  Over and over again in his 
fragmented, episodic syntax, he repeats this phrase like a mantra.  But it is clear that 
history as lived by Nasdijj is ephemeral; it has no real place or solidity.  He tells us: 
‘I have no clear vision of the past even though I was there.  It comes to me in dreams 
and flashes,’ and when he does talk of his past it is in broken fragments - 
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‘emergencies were everywhere.  Like rape.’67   He insists that the only way he can 
reconcile the past or negotiate his place within history is to mythologize it; he writes, 
‘I do not know that I can explain it outside the context of telling and allowing the 
stories to tell themselves.’68  Myths, then – corrupted historical retellings and Native 
American folklore mythology are woven into his own blurry and opaque personal 
myth - are crucial to the story of Nasdijj, a story that, lest we forget, is supposed to 
be a work of non-fiction, of truth.  In these purportedly autobiographical writings 
facts and histories are constantly undermined by alternate mythical versions.  Reality 
is rendered so suspect within the books and memories of Nasdijj that any and 
everything can be read as mythic and is, thus, thoroughly destablized.  The loose and 
slippery phrase ‘You are your history’ suggests that Nasdijj knows that for his 
audience history is for the taking and that history, like race, like identity, is very far 
from fixed.  For Nasdijj, history is what you make of it and it is how you present or 
perform it that matters most.  
Everything as presented by Nasdijj is suspect.  With no clear linear structure, The 
Blood runs from one episodic chapter to the next; from the shard-like stories of the 
central protagonist’s drunken, migrant parents, to his own harrowing bouts of 
poverty, unemployment and loss, all interspersed with rages against the ‘white’ 
establishment, Nasdijj forgoes an easy plot or simple historical trajectory.  ‘Memory 
is not enough.  One needs a mythology, too,’ he writes.69   
Hence it is an impossible book to summarize or define, as it is not just memory, but 
also history of birth, parentage, ethnicity and other solid, universal human ‘facts’, 
that for Barrus and his Navajo creation Nasdijj, are ‘not enough’.  Each and all are 
subject to interpretation; each and all can be dismissed.  Barrus cleverly positions 
Nasdijj’s identity as racially ‘mixed’ - in the books he claims to be a product of a 
white father, whom he resembles, and a Navajo mother.70  As a legitimate part of 
these two worlds Nasdijj is entitled to pass judgments on both, which he does at 
length, and though he often struggles to find acceptance or a place within either 
‘white man’s town’ or on ‘the rez’ (a slang term used repeatedly in reference to the 
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Indian reservation), it is clear where his spiritual home lies.  Of his father’s race he 
writes disparagingly that ‘he is the part of me that has no culture, that has no people, 
that only has the light, which is a ruthless omnipotence.’71  Aligning himself with his 
mother’s people, the Navajo or dine, which is what the community calls itself, is not, 
however, without its challenges.  A fact that he readily acknowledges:   
To this day, there is still much stigma attached to a Navajo who 
comes into contact with white men.  Navajo who come into contact 
with white men must be cleansed.  The white part of me will always 
wrestle with this.  There will never be a resolution to the struggle.  I 
am constantly being told that I cannot be both white and Navajo.  
Trust me.  I can be both.  I am a migrant.  A mongrel.  A crow.72   
 
At other times, Nasdijj appears to relish his mixed parentage and his unique position.  
He writes that, ‘there is no such thing as a purebred Navajo dog.  Navajo dogs are 
mongrels.  Mine is.  I am a mongrel myself.  That mix of the morbid, the mystical, 
and the misbehaved.’73 
Each of these struggles or positions as presented by Nasdijj in respect to his feelings 
towards his complicated racial identity appear to be in keeping with Browder’s 
argument that new narratives of ethnicity are motivated not by  ‘a successful 
performance of authentic racial or ethnic identity,’ but, rather seeking ‘a 
deconstruction of racial categories.’74  However, Nasdijj is, if anything, overly 
content to uphold the categories that separate his father’s whiteness and thus glaring 
‘lack’ of both ‘culture and people’ with his mother’s prized Indian blood.  The 
binary positions of racial quality and ethnic superiority are as clear as if they had 
come from a speech penned by Asa Carter.   
Routinely appropriating the historical suffering of the Navajo community, Nasdijj 
relentlessly polarizes ‘white people’ with Native Americans.  In telling the story of 
‘The Long Walk’ or the ‘Bosque Redondo’ – a term which refers to the name of the 
arid desert camp and subsequent government treaty - a brutal historical moment in 
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the mid-nineteenth century, where many Navajo were marched from their homeland 
to reservation camps 300 miles away, Nasdijj writes:   
You are your history.  Ethnic cleansing comes in many forms.  The 
Bosque Redondo was a concentration camp, the final solution to the 
problem of the Dine.  No white person objected to the reality of 
genocide.  The Navajo would be worn down, run down, frozen, 
starved and forced to march to the Bosque Redondo, where the 
winters were deadly cold, the summers deadly hot.  For thousands of 
Dine, it was the end… The Navajo were not expected to survive.  
Navajo who could not keep up were shot.  Navajo who attempted to 
escape were shot.  Navajo who refused to worship the white man’s 
god were hanged as an example to the others.75 
 
With the contemporary language of atrocity at his disposal, phrases such as the ‘final 
solution’ and ‘ethic cleansing’, Nasdijj reminds his readers, again, that we are our 
history and thus seemingly implicated in the historical suffering of others.  This, 
though, is historical posturing.  The American government and ‘white people’ of the 
time, however brutal, relentless and unjust, were not Nazis.  There is no benefit to 
the blurring and mixing of historical facts the way that Nasdijj does.  He tells us how 
with a friend, Bobby Coyote, he too walked the Bosque Redondo.  It is presented as 
Bobby’s idea and Nasdijj is initially hesitant (‘no one has walked to the Bosque 
Redondo since 1863’) but soon he is buoyed by the thought ‘that this was untraveled 
territory.’76  Barrus as Nasdijj is not just content to retell and re-appropriate a 
devastating historical episode in Navajo history but must have the reader believe that 
he personally battled the terrain, as well.  To suggest that somehow he is the true 
legacy of the Bosque Redondo is a shocking arrogance and, to my mind, one of the 
most disturbing untruths in the entire first book.  Also concerning is the fluidity of 
movement between the mention of his ‘experience’ at the Bosque Redondo and his 
tourist visit to Auschwitz:  ‘I did it,’ he writes, ‘I remember bones at the side of the 
trail. I remember horses on the way.  I remember Auschwitz too and how it looks so 
much like the Polish countryside.  Auschwitz in those picture books at school.  In the 
final analysis, both Auschwitz and the Bosque Redondo are ordinary places.’77  In 
respect to his time at the Bosque Redondo, however, we know from Nasdijj himself  
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‘that memory is not enough’ - his memory of bones is as solid as the facts and 
figures of the unknown dead – figures Nasdijj has inflated - which is to say, as thin 
as air.78 
Nasdijj writes of another brutal historical episode in Native American history, the 
story of the Spanish invasion of New Mexico and the butchering of the Acoma 
Indians.  He tells how the triumphant conquistadores cut off the right foot of every 
Acoma man, yet this was, he says, ‘only one of the cruelties that were perpetrated 
against them.’  He then chronicles a litany of sensationalist horrors worthy of both 
Goya and Hollywood:  ‘The women were raped.  Pregnant women were 
disembowelled.  Young men were publically castrated.  Old people and children 
were put in cages and fed to vicious dogs.  Babies had their brains bashed in with 
rocks.  Medicine men were burned at the stake.’79  He follows the rendition of this 
scene with the shocking statement:  ‘It was not a good time for native peoples.  
Then, as now.’ He belabours the point with a hammer to the head:  ‘Today the war 
against the Indians continues as a cultural experiment to be celebrated.  It is a history 
that is ignored.  It is a history never published.  It is a story that cannot be told.  
White people will not allow it.  It is the history of the Indians.’80  To compare, even 
metaphorically, atrocities committed four centuries ago by the Spanish to American 
Indian life today is not only misguided, it is bombastically wrong.  Yet Nasdijj is 
committed to the myth of the Indian is soaked in blood.  ‘Then, as now.’ 
There is unarguable legitimacy in some of Nasdijj’s political rants – in the late 
twentieth and early twenty-first century the Native Americans have suffered abuses 
anew through economic policy and corrupt Government dealings with mining and 
land rights, as well as misguided educational and social policy.  Mistreatment of the 
Native American people has and continues to be a concern and active cause for a 
large proportion of the American liberal left.  However Nasdijj’s inflated posturing 
does not help this movement, rather, it cheapens it.   
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The myth of the modern Navajo as presented by Nasdijj is one of pornographic 
poverty, disease and abuse.  As if historic atrocities are not enough, he writes of a 
contemporary Native American experience that is full of misery and sordid scenes.  
He tells us in the first chapter that he has a mild case of Foetal Alcohol Syndrome 
(FAS), because his Navajo mother, an alcoholic, whom his sadistic father would ‘sell 
to migrant men for five bucks,’ ‘was a heavy drinker when she had me.’81  He writes 
that he ‘saw her go through whole bottles of vodka while she was pregnant,’ and that 
he remembers her miscarrying - ‘at least they were lucky enough not to be born 
alive.’82  FAS is, of course, more than a myth, it is a devastating social reality that 
affects many communities.  No ethnicity or racial group is immune to the 
debilitating effects of FAS, or indeed any alcohol related disease.  In Nasdijj’s first 
book, however, The Blood Runs Like a River Through My Dreams, FAS and 
alcoholism is actively presented as a unique problem affecting Native Americans.  
Perhaps it is because Nasdijj claims to owe his authorial success to FAS that he is so 
committed to upholding this cultural myth.  It is, after all, because of FAS that 
Nasdijj even came to prominence - the story of Nasdijj began as the story of 
‘Tommy Nothing Fancy.’  
 
VIII.  ‘It’s a white people word’:  Writing the ‘Indian’ as victim 
 
Twenty years after Little Tree there was Tommy Nothing Fancy, another simple, 
orphaned boy adopted and indoctrinated in the way of his people by a benevolent, 
surrogate father.  The story of this boy would, again, make a kind of history when in 
1998, Esquire magazine received an ‘unsolicited’ manuscript with the following 
letter attached:   
In the entire history of Esquire magazine, you have never once 
published an American Indian writer.  This oversight is profound.  I 
am a Navajo writer who has written (enclosed) an article about the 
death of my son from fetal alcohol syndrome.  FAS is an issue of 
concern to Native Americans.  It should be an issue of concern to 
white people, too.  I hope my article – The Blood Flows Like a River 
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Through My Dreams – interests you.  Thank you.  Sincerely, 
Nasdijj.83 
 
The article, which would later appear as a chapter in the book of The Blood, was 
published in June 1999, after Esquire had, according to staff writer Andrew 
Chaikivsky, met and photographed the man who purported to be Nasdijj in Key 
West, Florida, researched and fact checked the medical symptoms of FAS and seen 
photographs ‘of a dark-haired, dark skinned child,’ presented to the editors as 
‘Tommy Nothing Fancy.’  The article opens bluntly: 
My son is dead.  I didn’t say my adopted son is dead. He was my 
son.  My son was a Navajo.  He lived six years.  They were the best 
six years of my life.  The social workers didn’t tell me about the 
foetal alcohol syndrome when they brought my son to the Hogan I 
was living in on the Navajo Nation.  Perhaps they didn’t know.84  
 
Tommy Nothing Fancy dies during a fishing expedition, which Nasdijj lucidly 
chronicles.  The account of the boy’s short life is harrowing and the strength of the 
writing merited the author a nomination for a National Magazine Writing award and 
cemented a book contract with Houghton Mifflin. 
How similar is the creator of Nasdijj and ‘Tommy Nothing Fancy,’ Timothy Barrus, 
to Forrest Carter, and his first best-selling book, The Blood Runs Like a River 
Through My Dreams to The Education of Little Tree?  Both are certainly 
auto/biographical texts, to use the phrase, relying on the autobiographical voice to 
provide mythical ‘biographical’ insight - Granpa in the case of Little Tree and 
Tommy Nothing Fancy (amongst many others) in The Blood.  More importantly, 
though, both books are absolutely metafictional, telling stories within stories like 
concurrent rings exposed on a tree stump, each with a deliberate political agenda.  
For though Barrus may not share Carter’s bigoted past, he does use the myth of the 
Indian to posit his own political views - albeit without any of Carter’s subtlety, 
imagination or nuance - subverting and vulgarizing the cause in the process. 
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Timothy Barrus, as Nasdijj, often lectures or, more than that, declaims to his readers.  
For instance, on the issue of FAS he writes, ‘this disease is my enemy.  A foetus is 
damaged when the mother drinks alcohol.  Any alcohol.  It’s that simple.’85  Perhaps 
this didacticism can be justified, FAS is, after all, a serious matter, but then he says 
with total earnestness and absolute audacity:  ‘But Indian babies do not count.  They 
do not matter.  All the old, vicious morality that accompanies the stereotypical image 
of the inebriated Indian rises to this issue the way a hungry salmon rises to a fly.’86 
Yet Nasdijj himself, collapsing seamlessly into that self-same ‘vicious morality,’ 
then says, ‘I cannot recall my mother ever being completely sober.  And there it is.’87  
In another instance he writes:  ‘My mother was a hopeless drunk.  I would use the 
word ‘alcoholic,’ but it’s too polite.  It’s a white people word.’88  Like his polarizing 
use of historical episodes, Nasdijj reveals a personal and political agenda here that 
potentially undermines any true legitimacy.   
As with other authors of autobiographical metafiction, Barrus, as Nasdijj, may 
appear to be countering the cultural myth, in this instance that of the ‘inebriated 
Indian,’ yet, in fact, he is actively upholding it.  Then, too, there is the active reliance 
on the ‘new’, that is to say currently dominant, stereotype presented by Barrus 
through Nasdijj, Tommy Nothing Fancy and throughout The Blood, of the Indian 
diseased with FAS.  Which is to say, of an Indian who is brain damaged, illiterate, 
emotionally unstable, and with a predisposition to alcoholism.  Of his own 
symptoms Nasdijj writes:  ‘my version of the disease manifests itself in some rather 
severe learning disabilities.  All my craziness, my inability to deal with authority, my 
perceptual malfunctions… and my rage come from FAS.  I have never held a real 
job for more than a year of my life.  Reading and writing are torture for me.’89  If 
Forrest Carter infantilized the narrative voice of the Native American, Timothy 
Barrus, has made him diseased.     
As well as FAS, another disease that Barrus weaves within the story of Nasdijj and 
The Blood, and then uses as the dominant subject of his second memoir, The Boy and 
The Dog are Sleeping, is AIDS.  He cannot, of course, even pretend to claim that 
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AIDS is anything like culturally unique to the Native American community, as he 
attempts to do with FAS, but he does, nevertheless, try to re-position and polarize the 
disease so that it becomes, again, an issue of the white man against the Indian.  He 
writes in The Blood, ‘White people don’t think of the reservation as a place of AIDS 
because such notions don’t neatly fit the stereotypes.’90  Whatever these stereotypes 
might be is not articulated.  But loathe to miss an opportunity to prophesize and 
divide, Nasdijj tells us that ‘AIDS is not a gay disease, and it isn’t limited to people 
who shoot drugs, either.  I have known many heterosexual men who have taken 
comfort in the stereotypes that are presented to them by a white media determined to 
put everyone and everything into one box or another.’91  From his soapbox, Nasdijj 
is compelled to remind us that ‘AIDS is hardly confined to the limits of a city.  AIDS 
is hardly confined to the limits of a sexuality. AIDS is not confined to racial 
minorities who shoot drugs (which most Indians cannot afford)’ and finally that 
‘who will and who will not get AIDS is not always black and white.’92  Again, he is 
telling us this in 2000, as if the cultural myth of AIDS has not shifted from its initial 
moment in the late 1980’s.  Whilst it is clear that Nasdijj has an agenda here, it is not 
initially obvious what that agenda is, other than to provide the reader with a strange 
work of ‘pathography,’ a sub-genre of life-writing which Roger Luckhurst refers to 
as ‘autobiographical accounts of illness or third-person memoirs by partners, 
children or caregivers.’93  However, on reflection, these odd diatribes and the clear 
pathographic intent might offer the best indication as to exactly who the author really 
is and what his real motivations might have been. 
 
IX.  ‘Navahoax’:  Unearthing Nasdijj94 
 
After The Blood Runs Like a River Through My Dreams and the publication of two 
more subsequent memoirs, Nasdijj’s reputation in the literary community should 
have been solid.  Although only a relatively modest 27,000 copies were sold, the 
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reviews for The Blood were of the type that first authors dream about.95  Perhaps 
unsurprisingly Esquire called it ‘very nearly perfect,’ but across the country book 
critics and reviewers fell over themselves to praise a new and interesting voice.96  
The New York Times Book Review wrote that it was, ‘riveting… fascinating’ and that 
‘it reminds us that brave engaging writers lurk in the most forgotten corners.’97   And 
yet by 2005, Nasdijj was already black-marked by a change of publisher and a 
dismissal by his agent.  He was known to be a loose cannon at awards ceremonies, 
on one occasion he publicly called a prominent New York literary agent ‘a white 
bitch,’ but what really concerned many people were the postings on his blog, which 
has, sadly for this project, since been taken offline.98  In reference to the blog entries, 
journalist Matthew Fleischer, who broke the story of Timothy Barrus and Nasdijj in 
his article ‘Navahoax,’ writes that whilst ‘in the books his passion and fierceness are 
modulated and concentrated, his blog posts are full of rants and denunciations.’99  
Fleischer lists as favourite subjects for these rants: ‘the American health care system, 
government treatment of Indians, middle class values and, especially, the publishing 
industry’; he then comments that ‘Nasdijj’s blog is typical of a recent shift in his 
work.’100   
This ‘recent shift’ refers in part to the increasingly sexualized stories presented by 
Nasdijj in his final book, where he graphically documents the rape and abuse he 
suffered at the hands of his father.  Sexual abuse is hinted at within The Blood and 
the word ‘rape’ is used alarmingly often.  The rape of Indian women by white men is 
an image conjured repeatedly, but the analogy of rape is also one of his favourite 
dramatic devices.  As for abuse, The Blood hints at this with a profound lack of 
subtlety - when Nasdijj’s father finds he has been writing secretly in notebooks he 
reads them and then ‘throws them into the trash.’  He writes:  ‘ I would rather that he 
touch me than throw my notebooks into the trash.’101 
However blunt, even this attempted subtlety is entirely lost by the third memoir, 
Geronimo’s Bones.  Of this work Matthew Fleischer notes that ‘Nasdij’s tales of 
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suffering [are brought] to startling heights, or lows depending on your 
perspective.’102  Fleisher reports that on his blog Nasdijj not only composed ‘graphic 
accounts of adolescent sexuality’ but also included sadomasochistic pictures of the 
author and disturbing images of ‘the open anus and testicles of a supposedly cancer-
ridden teenager.’103  Ironically it was the explicit sexual nature of the blog that 
compelled Fleischer to investigate Nasdijj, not his books or even his Navajo identity.  
An Internet search reveals a review of The Boy and His Dog are Sleeping by an 
alleged relative of Barrus, who states that ‘I find this book full of the author’s 
misinformation regarding his family.’104  Fleischer traces the name of the reviewer 
(Helen Cowdry) through an online lineage database and, using the name of Nasdijj’s 
daughter, Kree, whom he has written about on his blog, discovers the name Timothy 
Patrick Barrus.  ‘Yet another Google search,’ writes Fleischer, ‘brings up the 
heading “Sadomasochistic Literature” and the following:  ‘Some of the best 
pornographic fiction to come out of the leatherman tradition is by Tim Barrus whose 
Mineshaft (1984) describes the sexual exploits of the infamous New York S/M 
palace of the same name.’105   
And with that, the curious case of Nasdijj was blown wide open.  Barrus is 
discovered to be an all-white, middle class man from Lansing, Michigan.  Though 
Barrus is currently married, Fleischer unveils a homosexual past and reveals that 
Barrus was a prominent member of a notorious S&M scene of the early eighties.  He 
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was also a previously published author who had already toyed with constructs of 
truth and identity in previous works.  In his third published book, for instance, 
Anywhere, Anywhere, Barrus, who never served in the military, wrote a fictional 
account of a gay man on active duty in Vietnam.  Although this book was presented 
as a novel, Barrus intentionally left the truth claims ambiguous and hinted that it may 
have been an autobiographical account.  A quotation by Barrus in 1994, discovered 
by Fleisher, reads:  ‘I knew a lot of gay men in Vietnam.  Not that I had sex with 
them.  No one was telling their story.’106   
The authenticity and truth claims of Nasdijj had already been under heavy scrutiny in 
the Native American community before Fleischer’s expose.  One of the most 
prominent Native American authors, Sherman Alexie, even contacted Nasdijj’s 
publisher, Houghton Mifflin, in 2000 to raise the alarm that The Blood was a fake, 
and that the story presented by Nasdijj curiously resembled his own troubled history 
which he had already documented in a successful autobiographical novel, 
Reservation Blues, but it was to no avail.107  In an editorial for Time Magazine in 
2006, after Fleischer’s article publically broke the story of Barrus, Alexie recalled 
his initial response and those of Nasdijj’s publishers; he also offered an insight into 
why Barrus’s appropriations of the Native American voice ‘matter’:   
As a Native American writer and multiculturalist, I worried that 
Nasdijj was a talented and angry white man who was writing as a 
Native American in order to mock multicultural literature.  I 
imagined that he would eventually reveal himself as a hoaxer and 
shout, “You see, people, there is nothing real or authentic about 
multicultural literature.  Anybody can write it.”  Angry, competitive, 
saddened, self-righteous and more than a little jealous that this guy 
was stealing some of my autobiographical thunder, I approached 
Nasdijj’s publishers and told them his book not only was borderline 
plagiarism but also failed to mention specific tribal members, clans, 
ceremonies and locations, all of which are vital to the concept of 
Indian identity.  They took me seriously but didn’t believe me …  So 
why should we be concerned with his lies?  His lies matter because 
he has cynically co-opted as a literary style the very real suffering 
endured by generations of very real Indians because of very real 
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injustices caused by very real American aggression that destroyed 
very real tribes.108 
 
Alexie’s comments are revelatory for several reasons, but primarily because they 
sadly expose just how ineffectual most internal oppositions to autobiographical 
metafictions truly are.  Yes, To Beg I am Ashamed was vehemently opposed and 
censured but the complaints were not made from inside the community, rather they 
were imposed from the outside.  And though we saw some feeble attempt to garner 
criticism within the ‘prostitute community’ in respect to ‘Belle de Jour,’ it was not 
granted nearly the same level of seriousness that the media reserved for its own 
commentators.  Perhaps if objections to The Blood had been made externally then 
Nasdijj’s rise might well have been curtailed, and it is telling that it wasn’t until a 
white journalist in Los Angeles grew concerned about the sexual exploitation of 
adolescent boys that the real story finally came out.  Alexie’s concerns, legitimate 
and accurate as they were, were not sufficient to battle the performative myth 
presented by Barrus.   
The character of Nasdijj, like all successful performances of autobiographical 
metafiction, was too located in his historical moment for an easy dismissal.  If 
Forrest Carter relied on innocence, on the ‘native’ and ‘Rousseauean’ qualities of 
Little Tree and Granpa to speak to his audience and resonant truthfully, then Tim 
Barrus, post AIDS, used the language of anger, toxicity and disease to support his 
truth claim.  It is worth noting that in the passage I quoted from the Time article, that 
Sherman Alexie used the word ‘angry’ both to describe Nasdijj and himself.  Many 
of the reviews of The Blood also commented on the obvious anger of the work – The 
Seattle Times said of Nasdijj that, ‘his writing is honest, not infrequently angry and 
refreshingly opinionated,’ while Ted Conover in The New York Times, wrote that 
‘this is an outsider’s book.  Nasdijj has sympathy for the downtrodden and anger 
towards the world that marginalized them.’109  In contemporary America, where 
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apathy often reigns, to be angry is at least to be invested.  Emotionalism equals 
honesty, and anger, it would seem, equates to truth – after all, Esquire called The 
Blood ‘unfailingly honest.’  Nasdijj writes that his ‘rage’ is a product of FAS, and 
thus would like us to believe that it is culturally specific.  Clearly, however, this is 
not the case.  Sherman Alexie was right to suspect that Nasdijj, whoever he was, was 
‘a talented and angry white man;’ a product not of FAS but rather a victim of 
narcissism, motivated in large part by a complicated political and social resentment 
towards his country and his own cultural identity.  
As Nasdijj writes, ‘I hated white people, and the fact that I was one, slurred and 
mixed, did not prevent me from hating them.  White people had hurt me time and 
time again.  I hated white people because I could not understand what they wanted, 
and found that a big, big part of life consisted of giving white people what they 
wanted.’110  Over and over again Nasdijj exploits the heated discourse of divisive 
identity politics and racial differences.  Although for Nasdijj these differences might 
be cultural rather than purely racial, within his books there is still the insistence that 
‘White People’ are not like ‘Indians,’ and though it is simplistic, the reverse 
hierarchy that Nasdijj presents – white people bad, Indians good – is an effective 
telling of an American myth, the same myth that Forrest Carter relied on in Little 
Tree.  For who are these ‘White People’ that Barrus/ Nasdijj hates so much?  They 
are, of course, Carter’s ‘Guv’ment’ – the ruling parties, the ‘people’ in charge.  
Nasdijj is as anti-government as Carter, and, in much the same way as Carter, he 
uses poor or unjust policy legislation that has disproportionately affected Native 
American communities, as well as terrible events of historical brutality, to provide 
for the reader a disarming and manipulative way into his dissonance.  Whilst past 
historical campaigns of land grabbing and policies of internment are held up as 
evidence of systematic mistreatment and abuse, current government policies 
regarding education and medical treatment are used by Nasdijj to highlight the 
ineffectuality and prejudice of contemporary America.  On the experience of an 
Indian child in a public school he writes, ‘it’s a passive kind of racism that 
unconsciously equates failure with the darker color of the kid.  It’s a passive kind of 
racism that trains these kids to pass the state’s standardized tests as it assumes that 
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really teaching them the fundamentals of anything is more than they can do.’111 
Because he shows them to be biased against Indian children, Nasdijj can undermine 
state schools as an institution and thus question the very fabric of the state. 
It is not just the ‘Guv’ment’ that Nasdijj resents and rails against, he holds an 
especial hatred for the publishing industry, which he sees, almost pathologically, as a 
kind of cabal.  In The Blood, his first book, Nasdijj, in conversation with old friends, 
tellingly discusses his experiences as a writer: 
I look white to you and to everyone else but for the life of me I still 
do not understand what it is white people want.  I can’t figure out the 
conventions and when I do it’s like a noose around my neck.  I look 
white to you but the people I write about aren’t white and so what I 
do gets assigned to that niche where we’re all familiar with the 
edges.  The literary world is very, very white.  It’s left me savouring 
my bitterness over twenty years of complete failure.112 
 
Repeating to two of his closest friends twice that although he ‘looks white to you’ he 
is not part of the white ruling community, including the ‘literary world,’ should not 
have been necessary – if it were true they should have known this instinctively.  It is 
clear then that the audience Nasdijj is truly speaking to is the reader, to whom 
Nasdijj does indeed appear as ‘white.’113  In doing so, he protects his literary 
interests as much as he appears to be biting the very hand that feeds him – it is Their 
fault that he is a failed writer, and now the only way he can be successful is for him 
to accept the niche They place him in.  He wants us to believe that he has accepted a 
Faustian pact rather than having abused and cynically appropriated the language of, 
as Alexie writes, ‘multiculturalism’ for his own vainglorious purpose. 
What is, though, this language of multiculturalism?  Is it writing in the language of 
American phonics, which we will see in the next work, Margaret B. Jones’s Love 
and Consequences, rather than the English of the ‘white’ elite?  If so, Nasdijj does 
not do this in his books.  Despite a few carefully placed spelling mistakes – 
‘hoongry’ for hungry appears at one time – a cynical ploy within a professionally 
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published and edited text surely positioned to remind the reader that this a man who 
supposedly struggles with language every day, Nasdijj’s writing, with its sweeping 
metaphors and nuanced plays on words and phrasing, shows clear mastery of the 
English language and its affects.  Is the language of multiculturalism then simply a 
rejection of the ‘white’ world?  We know from countless literature that this need not 
be the case – true multiculturalism champions all voices, all cultures, no one at the 
expense of any other and no one claiming superiority over another.114   
It is clear that Barrus positions Nasdijj not as a multicultural writer but rather as its 
very antithesis, a voice involved in disparaging and denigrating another culture.  
That this culture is Barrus’s own reveals his act to be political.  Again, the true 
purpose of Nasdijj was not to ‘steal’ or appropriate the language of the Native 
American community, or even multicultural literature as a genre, in order to reveal 
that the language itself was empty, as Alexie feared in his Time article, but rather, 
like Forrest Carter, to use it to undermine the dominant ‘white’ social and political 
structure, as well as the established cultural history.  Barrus manipulated the 
historical and contemporary myth of the Native American and America’s brutal past 
to his own political advantage.  And he was able to do this because the myth sounded 
authentic; the myth, with its language of anger, rape and disease, sounded true. 
Of course Timothy Barrus writing as Nasdijj drew not only from cultural ‘myths’, 
rooted but not necessarily tethered to the real, but from solid social realities, that is to 
say ‘genuine signifiers,’ as well.  One of these realities is that a racially mixed 
individual can be difficult to place, often physically favouring one parent’s ethnicity 
over another.  Hence, when Nasdijj wrote that he resembled his white father over his 
Navajo mother it was an assertion difficult for readers to argue with or reject.  Other 
creators of autobiographical metafiction, including Forrest Carter in his later phase, 
have relied on physical ambiguity to assert their own claims towards an ethnic 
identity.  Certainly this is a key reason as to why the Native North American identity 
has been relatively easy to appropriate, and thus has proved a relatively popular 
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metafictional path, as the physical racial components are potentially less problematic 
to claim than many other ethnicities.115  
The other unassailable circumstance used by Nasdijj in The Blood is the government 
policy of racially profiling potential adoptive parents of Native American children – 
privileging individuals who belong to or have a legitimate claim towards the Indian 
Nation.  The congressional act responsible for this social policy, the ‘1978 Indian 
Child Welfare Act’, is supposedly how Tommy Nothing Fancy came to be placed 
with Nasdijj and his wife, inspiring that first short article ‘The Blood Runs Like A 
River Through My Dreams.’  A minefield in the politics of identity, the legacy of 
this much debated government act is also responsible for the central premise of the 
next work of Native American autobiographical metafiction discussed in this 
chapter, Love and Consequences. 
 
X.  ‘A Refugee from Gangland’:  Love and Consequences116 
 
The accelerated rise and fall of Margaret ‘Peggy’ B. Jones, the author of Love and 
Consequences, is almost a mythical tale in its own right.  Jones’s book, a ‘memoir of 
hope and survival,’ chronicles the experience of growing up in a foster family in the 
violent streets of the predominantly black neighbourhoods of South Central Los 
Angeles, home to some of the country’s largest criminal gangs, as a half white, half 
Native American child; it also provides a fascinating contemporary illustration of 
how the publishing industry remains as beholden to the whims and mores of the 
news media and its vast audience as it ever was.  As with To Beg I Am Ashamed in 
Britain, Love and Consequences suffered total withdrawal across America directly at 
the time of publication.  The difference is that this time the public outrage came not 
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over incendiary content, but rather because the author, after having been fêted by the 
media, her book awash with positive, high profile advance reviews, was revealed – 
by her sister, no less – to be a fraud.  Margaret B. Jones was discovered to be 
Margaret Seltzer, an all-white, middle class girl, privately educated, with two 
biological parents, who was raised not on the streets of South Central, but rather in 
the cloistered, suburban community of Sherman Oaks, in the San Fernando Valley 
area of Los Angeles.  It would seem that, like Forrest Carter and Nasdijj before her, 
Margaret Jones was a fictional creation born from a misplaced identity and a 
seductive cultural myth. 
The case of Love and Consequences is very recent.  A New York Times journalist, 
Motoko Rich, broke the story of Margaret Jones in early March, 2008, a week after a 
glowing review of Jones’s book appeared in the same paper, followed two days later 
by a human interest story about the author and her young daughter, entitled ‘A 
Refugee From Gangland.’117  In her exposé, Rich writes, ‘Ms. Seltzer’s story started 
unravelling last Thursday after she was profiled in House and Home section of The 
Times.  The article appeared alongside a photograph of Ms. Seltzer and her 8-year-
old daughter, Rya.  Ms. Seltzer’s older sister, Cyndi Hoffman, saw the article and 
phoned Riverhead to tell the editors that Ms. Seltzer’s story was untrue.’118  Thus far 
The New York Times is the only news organisation that has been able to reach 
Seltzer, despite a number of pre-publication interviews given by Seltzer, posing as 
Jones – complete with a gangland accent - to promote her book.  However before 
examining Seltzer’s response to Rich and The Times’ report, I would first like to 
consider the wider industry and media repercussions. 
Although there has been relatively little time for this specific work of metafiction to 
make an historical or lasting cultural impact, due to the high profile articles in The 
New York Times Seltzer’s act of literary fraud rapidly generated a cluster of 
headlines and seemed to capture, if fleetingly, a good deal of public interest.  I have 
followed the events of the story slavishly and even paid an exorbitant online price 
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for an advance review copy of Jones’s book, which is where all subsequent 
quotations are taken from (many copies of the book have since been pulped, but 
advance copies can still be found).  For many this is just another scandal, another 
case of fraud motivated by greed and duplicity; clearly Seltzer’s actions are in direct 
accordance with other instances of Native American autobiographical metafiction 
looked at in this chapter, and we know that she is far from unique.  Yet, if we 
consider that Timothy Barrus was able to publish three books as Nasdijj before being 
outed by a journalist made suspicious not by his books but rather by his increasingly 
erratic behaviour, and that Forrest Carter’s publisher was still defending him and 
Little Tree twenty years after publication, the trajectory of Jones’s story is notable 
for its incredibly rapid, very public rise and fall.  From literary star to social pariah in 
the course of a single week, Margaret Seltzer hardly had time to establish her place 
either in or out of the establishment and she has now all but disappeared. 
This leaves us to consider the actions and/or failings of the publishers, Riverhead, a 
small imprint of Penguin America, and the editorial team working with Seltzer.  
Riverhead have released this statement: 
Riverhead relies on its authors to tell us the truth… Prior to 
publication the author provided a great deal of evidence to support 
her story:  photographs, letters, parts of Peggy’s life story in another 
published book; Peggy’s story had been supported by one of her 
former professors; Peggy even introduced the agent to people who 
misrepresented themselves as her foster siblings.119 
 
That this is an industry phenomenon is indisputable.  Riverhead, or any other 
publisher, is responsible for any fact checking or corroboration of any personal 
claims put forward by their authors.  However, the list of ‘evidence’ supplied by 
Seltzer acting as Jones reveals a deeper problem – both for her publishers and for the 
wider public.   
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To what extent should we question the everyday evidence supplied to us as being 
‘true’?  If Seltzer provided her publishers with everything that they claim they asked 
for, can they be blamed for somehow failing to see that the documents were forged, 
that the testimonials were scripted or even that the other people unwittingly 
involved, such as the university professor, were potentially as in the dark as they 
were?  Newspaper and Internet responses to this story have been full of cynicism 
about the failings and responsibility of the publishing industry; Cyndi Hoffman, 
Margaret Seltzer’s sister, has been quoted as saying ‘I don’t know how they do 
business, but I would think that protocol would have them doing fact-checking.’120  
And yet, if we believe them, they did and it all checked out.   
It could be, of course, that Margaret Seltzer provided such an elaborate watertight 
claim towards legitimacy that no one would have ever discovered her true identity if 
she had not been seen in high profile visibility on the pages of an international 
newspaper, but I think it is far more likely that Seltzer, like Carter and Barrus before 
her, did not need to try very hard to encourage belief – as with other successful 
works of autobiographical metafiction - her story simply felt true.  Recall the inverse 
paradox introduced in the Catherine Gallagher essay and discussion regarding the 
Elohist narrator in Mimesis, that whilst modern fiction encourages ‘disbelief,’ 
autobiographical metafiction demands the very opposite – we are encouraged to 
believe at all costs, to disbelieve is to cynically lose faith.  And although the review 
of Love and Consequences in The New York Times did reflect on the way in which 
some of the episodes in the book felt ‘self-consciously novelistic at times’, these 
comments were countered by the reviewer’s sincere belief that ‘what set Ms. Jones’s 
humane and deeply affecting memoir apart is not just that it’s told from the point of 
view of a young girl coming of age in this world, but also that it focuses on the 
bonds of love and loyalty that can bind relatives and gang members together, and the 
craving after safety and escape that haunts so many lives in the ‘hood.’121 
What is perhaps most significant about this passage, other than perhaps its 
sentimentality, is the casual abbreviation of ‘hood’ at the end of the sentence.  The 
use of ‘hood’ as a slang synonym for neighbourhood, and more specifically a black 
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neighbourhood where gang activity is rife, is a telling cultural statement.  It is of 
course possible that Michiko Kakutani, the journalist who wrote the review, is 
intimately connected to the gangland streets that Jones’s memoir purportedly 
chronicles; yet a brief Internet search reveals her to be an extremely accomplished 
Japanese-American literary critic and the daughter of a respected mathematician.  It 
is unlikely then that Michiko Kakutani has much personal experience with the 
‘hood’, and yet the word is so clearly a part of the myth of gang-life that the use of it 
in this context is entirely appropriate.  If a Japanese-American literary critic can 
throw around vernacular slang in a newspaper piece about gang life and sound 
authentic, then surely the life in question – gang warfare in Los Angeles – has 
reached, through various media, the level of cultural myth where we already know 
what is, and, more importantly, what sounds ‘true’.  Seltzer, in telling us what we 
already believe, but in a way that was, in the words of Kakutani,  ‘so sympathetic 
and unsentimental, so raw and tender and tough-minded’ could not help but sound 
‘true.’ 
The story of Margaret Seltzer is different from that of Asa Carter and Timothy 
Barrus; her past is not so obviously full of murky, suspect details and she is, on the 
surface, less concerned with outwardly political themes.  As such, the motivation 
behind her metafictional act is far less easy to understand.  She does, however, share 
many of the performative traits of Carter and Barrus and, like them, has gone to great 
lengths to adopt a vernacular and manner that is in fitting with her adoptive identity.  
She writes in the ‘Author’s Note on Language, Dialect, and Kontent’ in the front of 
her book that:  ‘my words and views were learned in the dirt and desolation of South 
Central Los Angeles.  The streets where I grew up were run by the laws of the local 
gangs.  Their laws shaped what we wore, how we talked, and how we navigated the 
city.’122  These laws are the myth of South Central, the truths that everybody knows 
– ‘Bloods’ wear red and ‘Crips’ wear blue; they greet each other with complicated 
hand symbols, mark their neighbourhood territories with gang insignia and graffiti, 
and share a rivalry as angry and murderous as any feud in history.  Jones’s book 
seeks to expand expertly upon these myths, even to the point where she replaces the 
letter ‘c’ in many words with the letter ‘k’ – as her foster family affiliation is with 
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the Bloods.  Of this she writes:  ‘please do not confuse the use of slang and my 
replacing c’s with k’s as ignorance or stupidity.  I choose to write as we chose to 
speak in the world of my childhood.  A world where Bloods and Crips have such a 
deep-seated hatred for each other that Bloods smoke bigarettes and Crips celebrate 
C-days rather than B-days (birthdays).  I do it in order to offer up the whole story.’123 
It is a concerning indictment if ‘the whole story’ can be told through the misspelling 
of a couple of popular words and the use of a particular vernacular – if that is a story 
at all, it is an anthropological or linguistic one.   And though it is true that the details 
are often what make life and stories meaningful, there is also the danger of relying 
on details to ‘prove’ factual legitimacy, as Jones does, and then trusting that the 
readers will let them rest unexamined.  Jones writes, not without eloquence, that 
‘there is something beautiful and comforting about the slang to me … Something 
about the vernacular hints toward the will to strive to survive.  It has a sense of 
authenticity, and with it the hope of pride.’124  It is clear that she is using and 
appropriating the language of ‘the streets’ to further her own claim to authenticity, 
except of course that she is speaking performatively.  Jones’s utterances are careful 
enactments of the mythical voice of ‘gang-bangers.’  Spoken dialect in Jones’s book 
represents not just a difference in voice but rather a way of life, a way of thinking 
and acting according to the rules governed by the social circumstances of gang life.  
Consider how she recounts an early morning telephone call from a ‘homie’ in her 
introduction: 
‘Sup, ma?’ 
‘Wassup with you?’ I ask. 
‘Damn, ma, my cousin, lil Chris.  I feel real fukked up rite now.  I jus 
called to tell you he’s chillin wit God now.’ 
 
To the reader, Jones says that she prefers ‘the thought that “lil Chris is chillin wit 
God” ‘ to the harsh reality, ‘of him as a victim of a gang-related homicide, another 
statistic in the saga of black-on-black crime.’125  However, moving between the 
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dialect of ‘the streets’ to that of the establishment here, Jones demonstrates to the 
reader that she also speaks our language.  It may be that she prefers the ‘beautiful 
and comforting’ language of black slang, but her use of this vernacular throughout 
the text ultimately serves to ‘other’ the speakers that are not her, rendering them 
quaint, even simple.  The passive phrase ‘chillin wit God’ does nothing to suggest 
the inner rage and injustice that an untimely gang related death must surely invoke; 
whilst the ‘homie’ is only allowed to express a basic sentiment, Jones takes it upon 
herself to impart to the reader the truth that this is a tragedy and a travesty.  Like the 
infantilized voice of Little Tree, the mythical language of the faceless ‘homie’, as 
well as the other ‘street’ characters in the book, provide authority for the author – 
she is at once in and out of this language, both better than as well as ‘humbled’ by 
the other speakers because she has the authority, as Said suggests, to ‘report, portray, 
characterize and depict,’ whilst they, for whatever reason, do not. 
 
XI.  ‘If you look white, you white’:  Ethnic passing and North American 
identity126 
 
To be clear, Love and Consequences is only very peripherally concerned with Native 
American life or identity; Jones only claims her Native American ethnicity as a way 
into the black community of South Central where her true metafictional ambitions 
lie.  However, like Nasdijj, she cannot help but to confront the disparity between her 
outward appearance and her ‘true’ ethnic self – for what she feels she is and for what 
she ‘passes’ for.  Paradoxically, because they ‘look white’ both Jones and Nasdijj 
suffer.  Emotionally they identify with and privilege a racial identity that is not 
white, in an act that subverts the perceived ‘colour hierarchy’ within the United 
States and suggests a different kind of racial narrative than is otherwise presented, 
where ‘white isn’t always right.’127  For Jones both prioritizes and trivializes race in 
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her book - identity is not owed to a race but rather tied to gang allegiance and 
affiliation; her own colour does not hinder her from joining the local chapter of the 
Bloods, for instance.  Yet, like Nasdijj, she routinely uses her position to cast 
judgement on the white community, as we can see in the exchange below, in the only 
overtly racial conversation that she ever has with ‘Big Momma’, her foster mother: 
It was the first time I had heard myself called white.  I heard it as a 
powerful insult.  Living here, white seemed to mean rich people who 
didn’t understand or care. 
‘What’s wrong, baby?’ 
‘Terrell being mean,’ I offered as the arms pulled tighter around me.  
‘He called me white,’ I bellowed.  Big Mom said nothing, but rocked 
me gently back and forth, slightly chuckling patting my shoulder. 
‘Well,’ Big Mom started, laughing outwardly a little now.  ‘He’s 
only part right on that, because you are white, but you white an 
Indian mixed.  Jus like I’m black an Indian mixed.  That’s what us 
black folk called a redbone.  But white folk, they jus call us black no 
matter what we mixed with.  Black is black to them’ 
‘What they call someone who’s white and Indian mixed?’ 
‘Well,’ Big Mom thought for a minute, ‘Indian people might got a 
word for it, but I’m not too sure.  Ta white folk, if you look Indian, 
you Indian, and if you look white you white.’ 
I thought about that for a minute and then looked at Big Mom.  Her 
eyes were the deepest brown I had ever seen. ‘What if I don’t wanna 
be white?’128 
 
And so, in Love and Consequences the all-white Margaret Seltzer, writing as 
Margaret Jones, relies on both of the now familiar tropes of a racially mixed, but 
outwardly ‘white’ protagonist, and the theme of adoption, to locate her metafictional 
story.  Although Jones’s story is far more concerned with the myths of ghettoized 
black America than those of Native Americans on a reservation, she needs to 
appropriate the Native American ethnic identity as a way into an otherwise racially 
closed community, exploiting the political loophole of the 1978 Indian Child 
Welfare Act.  As discussed earlier, this congressional act prioritized the adoptive 
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placement of Native American children with Native American families in an attempt 
to control the cultural erosion of Indian Nations across the United States.  Nasdijj 
writes disparagingly, if somewhat ironically, about the legacy of the act, bemoaning 
the lack of qualified foster and adoptive parents and the blinkered effect of denying a 
child a right to a loving family based purely on the racial profiling of the 
participants.  However Jones cynically appropriates the act, and uses it to explain 
how a ‘white’ child could have been placed in one of the most racially segregated 
and violent parts of the country.   
Despite Jones’s significant deviations from the solidly Native American metafictions 
of Carter and Barrus, there are, as we have seen, clear similarities in the shaping and 
delivery of Love and Consequences to these earlier texts.  Although Jones’s story 
appears to be the antithesis of the segregation principle that can potentially be read in 
Little Tree, she still uses the language of polarity when discussing the attitudes of 
‘white folk’ versus those of ‘black folk’ or even ‘Indian people.’  ‘Black’ and ‘white’ 
though are not racial categories here as much as they are social ones; Jones may 
write a new kind of racial narrative in an idealized ‘post-race’ or bi-racial world but 
the war between cultures that Love and Consequences purportedly documents is a 
divisive as any skin tone or gang allegiance.  And then, too, there is the subtle, 
insidious disparaging of the political or Government system.  Claiming to be a child 
victim of sexual abuse, in her book Jones writes about enduring three years of 
transitioning from foster family to foster family before settling into Big Momma’s 
house in South Central at the age of eight.  The years before Big Momma are 
covered rapidly and elusively, but some details of singularly horrific experiences as a 
foster child at the mercy of the ‘system’, or government care, are supplied.  She 
writes: 
The child I was or could have been outside of the system was dead 
within the first year I entered it, and there was no reviving her.  I had 
become a completely different person.  Ironically, considering the 
reason I was removed from my home, I found a full range of abuse in 
foster care … One family ate together each night, not allowing any of 
their foster kids to join them.  After they had had their fill they would 
leave the table and allow us to eat the leftovers off their dirty 
plates.129 
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Jones’s early experiences in foster care result in the diagnosis of a host of emotional 
and psychological disorders.  She is labelled by her teachers as ‘difficult and 
stubborn’ and writes that she had ‘attention deficit disorder, reactive attachment 
disorder, post-traumatic stress disorder’ as well as suffering from being ‘SED’, or 
‘severely emotionally disabled.’130  It is difficult not to read Jones’s terrible litany of 
traumatic disorders as deliberately fulfilling the cultural myth and social discourse of 
the foster child.  Of course, like the infant born with FAS, the foster child who has 
been beaten down by the system and psychologically and physically damaged 
beyond repair does exist, and their lives are a tragic and shameful reality of 
contemporary society.  However, Jones’s appropriation of such a life is made easy 
by the cynical knowledge that she must only list trauma or detail abuse to be 
believed.  Here the author of autobiographical metafiction, in her exploitation of a 
cultural myth, knows only too well what we the audience expect.  That is to say, we 
expect these children to be as emotionally unstable as Jones tells us she was, and 
hence believe her performative act.    
Jones relies heavily on the myth of the foster child to position her story; the message 
of Love and Consequences is that greater love and stability can be found in a 
community besieged by lawlessness and violence where, as Jones writes, ‘life is 
more comparable to that in a urban third world country’, than in politically 
sanctioned care.  Is it truly better for a child to be raised in an environment where 
she is running drugs and given a handgun for defence at thirteen but nevertheless 
feels to be part of a family, than for her to be lost forever in a cold government 
‘system’?  Perhaps.  Margaret Jones would like us to accept that this is the case.  Just 
as Nasdijj would like us to believe that he did the right thing by refusing to take 
Tommy Nothing Fancy to the hospital when he was dying.   And when ‘Big 
Momma’ the saintly but beleaguered foster mother at the heart of Jones’s story beats 
her with an extension cord there is a clear understanding that the abuse is enacted out 
of love.  Big Momma has ‘tears in her eyes’ during the violent episode and tells 
Jones that ‘ “I don’t do this because I hate you.  I don’t even do it cause I’m mad at 
you.  I do it because I LOVE you.  It hurts me more than it hurts you, but I gotta 
                                               
130
 Jones, Love and Consequences, p. 32. 
 165
make sure you’re a good gurl, so that it neva comes on someone who don’t love you 
to have to do this or worse.” ’131   
Earlier in the book Jones discusses the violent punishments used by Big Momma to 
command order and respect in her house, especially from the boys, and attempts to 
contextualize it as ‘a psychological scar inherited from slavery.’  She writes:  ‘A 
child allowed to misbehave at home might misbehave in front of an overseer or the 
master, calling down a punishment far worse than anything a parent would ever do.  
Historians also say that the constant upheaval of slave families, the selling of 
children away from their parents, instilled a fear of loving their children too 
much.’132  This justification is the worst kind of woolly relativism – a member of the 
black community cannot be blamed for what is clearly child abuse as she has been 
conditioned to treat children this way.  That the beatings from Big Momma are both 
emotionally and historically sanctioned in the text, whilst the cruelties of the other 
foster families are treated with unequivocal abhorrence, reveal a political agenda not 
unlike those that can be found within The Blood Runs like a River Through My 
Dreams or The Education of Little Tree - an agenda that seeks to undermine the 
socio-political and cultural system through the use of myth, metaphor and 
manipulation. 
 Of the numerous cultural myths used by Jones in Love and Consequences the 
American myth of the individual is perhaps the most pervasive.  The dust-jacket 
cover calls this a memoir of ‘Hope and Survival’ and throughout the text it is clear 
that Jones’s story is not like Little Tree’s or even Nasdijj – she did not survive 
because of her difference, or specific cultural place, but rather in spite of it.  Indeed, 
as the consummate outsider there is no real culture that Jones can celebrate or claim 
as her own.  She is the wrong race for South Central, yet has the wrong look for the 
‘white community,’ as she tells a friend:  ‘“Only black people think I look white.  
White people always think I’m Mexican.”’133  She know nothing about her Native 
American roots; her biological parents are hardly mentioned in the text and it is 
taken for granted that her foster family is as legitimate as her biographical one.  
Jones’s only allegiance is to a gang arbitrarily based on location.  She becomes a 
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Blood because her foster family’s home was within the Blood boundaries, otherwise 
she and her foster brothers would have been, just as easily, Crips, a fact she readily 
admits.  This American identity revealed here is one of profound isolation marked by 
arbitrariness.  There is nothing real or solid about the perceived differences, hatreds 
or struggles between Bloods or Crips, except of course that now they run criminal 
enterprises on their respective turfs; the Government is cold and ineffectual, family 
life is violent and the only hope is complete personal autonomy.  Little Tree does not 
choose to be alone at the end of his story but he is left with no other choice, his 
people are gone, Jones, however, has no people – in her book it has always been her 
alone. 
 
XII.  ‘Maybe it’s an ego thing’:  Fraudulent Native American memoir and the 
continuing ‘culture of narcissism’134 
 
For whatever reason, I was really torn and I thought it was my 
opportunity to put a voice to people who people don’t listen to.  I 
was in a position where at one point people said you should speak for 
us because nobody else is going to let us in to talk.  Maybe it’s an 
ego thing – I don’t know.  I just felt there was good that I could do 
and there was no other way that someone would listen to it.135   
The above passage is Margaret ‘Peggy’ Seltzer quoted in the article that broke her 
fraud and destroyed her burgeoning literary career.136  Described as ‘sometimes 
tearful, often contrite’ during the telephone interview with Motoko Rich, Seltzer’s 
reasoning does not offer the kind of apology that many people might expect.  Instead 
of a mea culpa admission, Seltzer appears to remain steadfast in her self-justification 
that the story needed ‘a voice’ and that if she didn’t provide it ‘there was no other 
way that someone would listen to it.’  This is a disingenuous and highly suspect 
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claim – by and large America is riveted by gang culture, it is at the epicentre of 
much of the current music, television and film produced in the country.  Gritty 
television programs, such as HBO’s The Wire, show the devastation of gang life on 
families and communities, whilst rap artists and hip hop music video portray the 
glamorous side of drug money and espouse the closeness of gang members and 
‘crews.’137  The perspective that Seltzer offered, a white woman’s, might well have 
been novel but, like the narrative supplied by ‘Belle de Jour,’ there is nothing 
otherwise new or fresh in her book.   
However tired the message, Love and Consequences does demonstrate that hers was 
indeed a privileged perspective.  ‘For whatever reason’ Seltzer’s story made it past 
the starting block and successfully onto the highly competitive racetrack.  That the 
run was thwarted is almost incidental (other than the fact that otherwise we would 
never have known the truth).  As was the case with Asa Carter and Tim Barrus, 
Seltzer’s act of metafiction complied with the story that America had already been 
telling itself.  I maintain that in each case it was not only a story about race or 
ethnicity, but also a story about a country that is perceived, by many, as rapidly 
losing a sense of national identity and purpose.  The devastation and disease of the 
Native American community served as a metaphor in The Education of Little Tree 
and The Blood Flows Like a River Through My Dreams, whilst Peggy Seltzer 
provided a cynical and exploitative biography in her attempt to showcase a country 
whose allegiances are pointless, its government ineffectual, its history toxic and 
whose future is more about selfish survival than hope.  These are big claims, but the 
subject of race and the United States is too important to be an arbitrary narrative.  
These were ideological acts against a country that had disappointed.  In exploiting 
the racist history of the US, these authors were able cut more deeply than they 
otherwise might have. 
In 1979 Christopher Lasch published The Culture of Narcissism:  American Life in 
an Age of Diminishing Expectations, where he wrote that for Americans ‘to live for 
the moment is the prevailing passion – to live for yourself not for your predecessors 
or posterity.  We are fast losing the sense of historical continuity, the sense of 
belonging to a succession of generations originating in the past and stretching into 
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the future.’138  We can see how the three writers I’ve discussed exploited America’s 
complicated relationship to the past to further their own respective ends:  for Asa 
Carter, the past was a golden age never to be repeated and the future offered only 
desolation; for Timothy Barrus, the past was a place of horror with the future 
buckling under the weight of expiation.  Finally, Margaret Seltzer destroyed the past, 
and the only promise offered from the future she presented was one escape.  None of 
these approaches are necessarily psychologically balanced, fair or healthy (then 
again, what is?); none of them have a sense of continuity or an aura of hope, but they 
are all seductive and because of this they cannot be easily discounted.  These texts 
are not metaphors, but fantasies.  In its own way each narrative must be considered 
as an authentic telling of a country’s relationship with a difficult historical legacy.  
These stories are evidence that the United States is far from secure with the shadow 
it casts and of the raw reminders of its dispossessed. 
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Chapter 4.  False Testimony:  Misappropriating the Holocaust 
 
I.  ‘If you didn’t have an amazing story, you didn’t survive’:  What to do when 
all the stories are extraordinary1 
 
In 1991, Henry Louis Gates, in a well known essay in The New York Times Review of 
Books, ‘ “Authenticity” or the Life Lesson of Little Tree’, defended Forrest Carter’s 
fraudulent autobiographical act, arguing that ‘no human culture is inaccessible to 
someone who makes the effort to understand, to learn, to inhabit another world;’ he 
also offered the sage maxim that, ‘to fake it, is to make it.’2  For Gates, authenticity is 
simply another decayed and misplaced ‘ideology,’ as suspect as the claim that one 
could infer the race of a musician simply by hearing them play.3  Gates is right, in 
that ‘authenticity,’ especially in respect to culture or ethnicity, is indeed a myth 
serving as metaphor for an impossible ideal – the ‘true’ or the ‘essential’ of a given 
race, society or culture.  We have clearly seen how, in their quest for authenticity, 
most autobiographical metafictions remain in the grips of the conservative, beholden 
to clichés and intent on recycling old and easy tropes to gain legitimacy and 
recognition. There is, however, another approach used by authors to create a sense of 
authenticity - a paradoxical use of the fantastic.  Some authors of autobiographical 
metafiction begin with an impossible story, a life utterly without precedent and then, 
by virtue of history, they locate it within a place, or a community, where every life is 
unbelievable and every story fantastical.  
The Nazi Holocaust is such a place – an extreme historical location and time where 
all stories are unimaginable, all accounts shocking.  Although it is not the only site of 
such stories - an important point to remember - the Holocaust has become one of the 
most significant locations of historical life narratives of our time, because, 
provocative as the statement may be for some, the Holocaust has become a mythical 
arena, a space of conjecture, imagination and, yes, appropriation.  Fictional accounts 
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of the Holocaust are viewed as suspect by some critics who are distrustful of the 
motivations behind an industry of entertainment, rather than of authentic, or perhaps 
‘authenticated,’ remembrance.  Indeed the arguments are not so different from the 
Platonic conversation regarding fictionality and its role in the modern world that was 
discussed in the first chapter.  That is to say, for many the Holocaust is seen as a 
place where fiction, if it is not impossible as some believe it to be, is on the one hand 
vulgar and on the other hand dangerous.  Elie Weisel has said, ‘a novel about 
Treblinka is either not a novel or not about Treblinka,’ whilst Adorno suggested in 
reference to ‘Holocaust literature’ that ‘so-called artistic rendering of the naked 
physical pain of those who were beaten down by rifle butts contains, however 
distantly, the possibility that pleasure can be squeezed from it.’4   
If we are able to go beyond the terrible historical event and focus specifically upon its 
place in twenty-first century contemporary culture, however, the Holocaust is an 
industry abounding with products, each at its nucleus an individual story more 
inspirational, heartbreaking and terrifying than the next.  What’s more, these are 
presented as important stories, told not for entertainment but rather for education – 
the individual in this case is far less important than the historical whole.  Yet the 
audiences for such works are not comprised entirely of sadists or historians, and so 
there must be something in the accounts to satisfy a night out at the cinema, or an 
evening alone with a book.  
As such, the Holocaust has inspired an ever-thriving genre of art and literature, and 
like all genres the products are both good and bad, high and low.  Most notably, 
certainly for this thesis, is how the events of the Holocaust may have singularly 
transformed the genre of the modern ‘testimonial’ (although I don’t believe the event, 
as Elie Weisel has said, created ‘a new literature’).5  As Robert Eaglestone argues in 
The Holocaust and the Postmodern, an excellent academic exploration as to how the 
legacy of the Holocaust has influenced postmodern thought and artistic production, 
‘Holocaust testimony’ is not only a way of writing, it is also a way of reading.  On 
the act of reading Holocaust testimony Eaglestone writes:  ‘Where fiction utilizes, not 
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exclusively but largely, the process of identification, the genre of testimony both in 
its texts and – this is crucial step – in the basis for interpreting and reading those texts 
rejects identification.’6  Whilst I agree that the genre of ‘testimonial’ has changed and 
evolved because of the Holocaust, as we will explore later, in accepting Eaglestone’s 
reading of this ‘new’ genre and the demands placed upon its readership who must 
‘reject interpretation,’ many difficult and complicated questions are forced to the 
forefront.  For even if we do not or can not understand the event, I find it impossible 
to accept that non-victims of the Holocaust willingly or consciously reject 
identification, and though it may no longer be true, as Derrida said in an interview, 
referenced by Eaglestone, that ‘today nothing at all can be burnt, not even a love 
letter without thinking of the Holocaust,’ the Holocaust still exists as a place, perhaps 
the place, of narrative power and thus exists as a site of significant status.7  To think 
that the power of such texts are somehow not directly motivated by the pleasure/pain 
of identification and that this ‘pleasure,’ however suspect, has not been capitalized 
upon by authors and actively sought out by readers is contentious.  Although 
Eaglestone is right that in respect to these narratives the reader as ‘interpreter’ is key, 
I would suggest, however, that this is far more in keeping with Barthes’ idea of ‘the 
death of the author’ and the primacy of the reader over the ‘explaining critic’, than 
the question of identification, as we will see.          
The genre of testimonial and the event of the Holocaust, as a legacy of the twentieth 
century, have helped to create a new mythology of the victim/survivor, and this myth 
is now a dominant myth of our time, surprisingly easy to appropriate.  Nothing could 
be more real and, sadly, shared than human suffering, and yet it is suffering, 
presented as unique, that has shaped the new myth – such as when Timothy Barrus 
acting as Nasdijj tried to ‘claim’ or ‘own’ FAS.   The result is that, if we are not 
invited to identify with the suffering of others, either on, as Eaglestone argues, 
‘epistemological grounds’ where ‘a reader really cannot become, or become 
identified, with the narrator of a testimony:  any such identification is an illusion,’ or 
‘ethical grounds’ where ‘a reader should not become identified with a narrator of a 
testimony, as it reduces and “normalizes” or consumes the otherness of narrator’s 
experience and the illusion that such an identification creates is possibly pernicious,’ 
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then we accept that human experience, all experience, is inherently closed.8  This is 
plainly not the case or else life-writing narratives of any kind would not exist.  We 
know that, despite problematic critical approaches to life narratives, the genre is 
thriving as an industry.  And yet somehow the myth of uniqueness or ownership 
persists, and with it the difficulty of identification; so either we are reading to 
understand, and when we are told we cannot possibly understand we read yet another 
text to try to understand, or else we read, as Eaglestone suggests, in order to not 
understand.  It is the latter act that supports the myth. 
Norman Finkelstein has written cynically that we are in the midst of a modern, 
western ‘culture of victimization’, where ‘identity’ is ‘grounded in a particular 
history of oppression.’9  Finkelstein, the Jewish-American author of the polemical 
and controversial book, The Holocaust Industry, about the perceived misuse of 
Holocaust’s legacy by powerful, often financially motivated American lobbies, is far 
from alone in this view, although he is especially critical of what he views as the 
contemporary Jewish use of this culture in respect to the event of the Holocaust.  
Whereas African Americans have the devastating knowledge of slavery and Native 
Americans have the relentless and violent history of western expansion, Finkelstein 
argues that, ‘Jews accordingly sought their own ethnic identity in the Holocaust.’10  If 
we accept Finkelstein’s argument, a holocaust-derived identity has been created that 
can be, perversely given its abominable origins, perceived as enviable – that is, an 
identity worth appropriating.  Arguing Finkelstein’s central tenet from his 
controversial study, The Holocaust Industry, that the historical event of the Final 
Solution and Nazi genocide has evolved into an ideological weapon used and abused 
by Israel and the powerful American Jewish lobbies to acquire ‘victim status’ is not 
relevant for my argument in this chapter.  However, Finkelstein’s location of the 
Holocaust as a place of contemporary privilege in respect to narrative and ‘status’ is 
worth considering. The Holocaust rightly holds an especial historical place in 
contemporary culture, yet, as we will see from the following works of 
autobiographical metafictions, this has allowed for a mythical reading, not, to be 
clear, of the event itself, but rather of the narratives surrounding the event, the 
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‘testimonials’ and first-person accounts of the survivors.  Here we can see how 
seductive such privileged ‘victim status’ can be.  
I am aware that the continued use of the word ‘myth’ in respect to the Holocaust is a 
politically loaded act and could be perceived as offensive or worse.  Yet I hope it is 
clear exactly what my intentions are with the use of this word in this chapter.  In no 
way am I placing the historical event into the realm of myth - the events and misery 
of the Holocaust are well documented, the evidence of its scale is exhaustive and 
overwhelming, whilst the testaments of its horrors have never lost their power to 
shock, humble and terrify.  Rather, I am referring to and discussing the cultural 
framework that now surrounds our understanding of the Holocaust.  This 
understanding has been made mythical because so many of its components are now 
idealized, and, as this has happened, the scenes and events have become increasingly 
easy to manufacture and recreate in a believable context.  
Although the desire to be granted ‘victim status’ may explain some of the motivation 
behind the actual fraudulent metafictional act (and I believe that it does), it does not 
explain the industry wide success of testimonials or survivor accounts, especially if 
Eaglestone were to be right about the inherent impossibility of identification within 
such texts.  For, as Finkelstein writes, ‘among groups decrying their victimization, 
including Blacks, Latinos, Native Americans, women, gays and lesbians, Jews alone 
are not disadvantaged in American society.’11  Thus the appeal of these texts is not, 
potentially, to glean insight from or identify with an otherwise silent and oppressed 
minority, as may be the case with works in the previous chapters, but rather they are 
telling us something else; indeed the Jewish identity here, though certainly important 
in respect to the narrator’s perceived character, is not necessarily crucial in respect to 
the actual narrative, or at least not in the way that the Native American identity was 
in chapter 3.  In the two works of autobiographical metafiction we will be looking at, 
Fragments and Surviving with Wolves, the issue of Judaism itself is very much a 
distant or secondary theme to the overwhelming accounts of human survival and 
tragedies of war.  This does then seem to subvert the myth of identity over 
experience that we have been privileging thus far in our discussions of 
autobiographical metanarrative.  Although our questions up to now have primarily 
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been concerned with, as Erving Goffman writes, ‘whether or not the performer is 
authorized to give the performance in question’ and not necessarily ‘the actual 
performance itself’, we will see how in these instances the performative order must 
be reconsidered, with experience prioritized over identity.12 
For many readers the authorship, or ‘author-function,’ of Holocaust narratives, 
though interesting asides, are ostensibly less important, owing to their subject, than 
how they are presented as a worthwhile ‘historical document.’  To extend 
Eaglestone’s argument, if the readers of these texts were to seek identification at all it 
could only be on the most basic, human level, removed from any vestige of shared 
experience – and the question then is, how are such ‘unique’ or anomalous 
experiences to be authenticated and how blindly, or perhaps better fully, are they to 
be believed? 
So we return briefly then to the problem of authenticity.  For many people the 
‘authentic’ is a place of ‘purity’, an unwavering comfortable space of fixed 
recognition that does not allow for deviation.  Which is why Gates’ reading of 
‘faking it’ has proved so inflammatory.  As I’ve said before, it is because of this 
reluctance to accept that the ‘authentic’ is so often illusory that works of 
autobiographical metafiction exist so easily and rarely, if ever prove, revelatory.  For 
they tell us, again and again, what we already know.  Authentic Holocaust narratives 
complicate this, however, in that they tell us extraordinary stories, impossible stories, 
because of course, as one survivor has wryly noted, ‘if you didn’t have an amazing 
story, you didn’t survive.’13  In so doing this the impetus is taken away from the 
‘author’ and becomes far more dependent on the story itself, and, most especially, 
particularly if we are considering an autobiographical act, on the reader or culture of 
readers, who are now responsible for the delicate existence of both reference and the 
all important state of belief. 
Historian Stefan Maechler writes lucidly about this very contradiction: 
On the one hand, the Nazis performed the singular feat of 
transforming their grisly phantasmagoria into reality, exterminating 
an entire people with industrial efficiency.  What they made true was 
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unthinkable until then, a thing so horrible that people at the time had 
enormous difficulty believing it even when they knew about it.  More 
than a half-century later, we still find ourselves overwhelmed when 
grappling cognitively and emotionally with that crime in its full 
dimensions.  Dealing with the Shoah means first of all having to 
account for something beyond belief.  On the other hand, we know 
from the reports of many of those who were saved that they have a 
concatenation of lucky and improbable circumstances to thank for 
their survival.  Where being murdered was normal, every escape was 
a grand exception.14 
 
Here, then, the authentic is marked by implausibility, impossibility even.  The 
metafictional act is at once easier because of this, as with the fluid, changing 
narratives of ethnicity that were discussed in the last chapter, and yet rendered 
complicated by the tenuous line of historical and human possibility.  If all stories 
about the Holocaust are presented as  ‘unbelievable,’ how far can you push your 
readers until they begin to lose faith in your narrative?  Although some things really 
are beyond the wit or capabilities of man, until faced with them it is virtually 
impossible to know what they might be.  If the event itself is so unthinkable, then 
how could the stories around the event be anything but?  This reasoning must serve 
as a preamble to the works explored in this chapter.  Each text so defies logic or 
reasoning that it is easy, indeed tempting, to discount them, but this is in retrospect, 
post fact, when we know them to be metafictional; as such it is necessary to move 
beyond this and examine their respective implausabilities as part of the myth.  
Ironically and conversely, for many readers the more unreal these narratives sound, 
the more authentic.  Clearly the myth we tell ourselves is that, here, there is no room 
for normality, no space for the everyday.  
The allure of such a myth is clear, as are its dangers.  These stories, marked by 
extremism, are meant to be distant, or even wholly removed, from most lives and 
although, yes, they happened once, in being so amazing, so unbelievable, it feels 
impossible that they could ever happen again.  Thus it is not only the escapes and 
survivals that prove the ‘grand exception’ but the very event itself, despite, sadly, 
evidence – the USSR under Stalin, Cambodia terrorized by Pol Pot, the genocides in 
                                               
14
 Stefan Maechler, The Wilkomirski Affair:  A Study in Biographical Truth (New York:  Schocken, 
2001), p. 285. 
 176
Africa – to the contrary.  It is for this reason that Finkelstein remains highly critical 
of individuals who posit that the Nazi Holocaust was and is ‘historically unique’.15  
And though Finkelstein emphatically reads these individuals who are willing to 
suggest that the Holocaust somehow, as Elie Wiesel has said, ‘lies outside, if not 
beyond, history’, as part of the ‘Holocaust Industry’, I think it is a wider phenomenon 
than that.  For it is not just Elie Wiesel who has an interest in believing such an event 
to be an anomaly; far beyond Eaglestone’s ‘epistemological’ or ‘ethical’ grounds we 
want nothing about the Holocaust to be normal because that is to admit that it is 
possible.  This then is the myth presented by the following metafictions:  that the 
Holocaust, rather than being an act of genocide in war, manifestly extreme but not 
historically unique, is a place so impossible that it can’t even be imagined or related 
to, yet alone ever happen again.   
This myth is wrong and it is dangerous, as Zygmunt Bauman wrote in the important 
sociological study, Modernity and the Holocaust, in a chapter entitled ‘Uniqueness 
and Normality of the Holocaust’:  ‘To put it bluntly there are reasons to be worried 
because we know now that we live in a type of society that made the Holocaust 
possible, and that contained nothing which could stop the Holocaust from 
happening’ (Bauman’s own italics).16  The worst crime of the following texts, in their 
presentation of impossible fraudulent events, is that their narratives support a reading 
of the Holocaust as historical anomaly, as something as impossible as it was terrible. 
 
II.  ‘Memory thief’:  Binjamin Wilkomirski and Fragments17 
 
Binjamin Wilkomirski has been dubbed ‘a memory thief’ by journalists and critics 
for his 1995 narrative appropriation of Holocaust survival in the memoir Fragments, 
a work of autobiographical metafiction.18  Fragments purportedly tells of the 
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extraordinary survival of a very young child, Wilkomirski, hidden in various 
concentration camps and occupied Eastern Europe before his eventual adoption and 
forced assimilation by a Swiss couple after the war.  Although the life narrated within 
Fragments is untrue, the term ‘thief’ as applied to Wilkomirski is a rather ironic 
label, and somewhat misplaced – Fragments has taken virtually nothing away and 
given more than most people can realize.  Binjamin Wilkomirski’s story, a piecemeal 
account of the Holocaust, has shown us the myth, and it has given us, however 
complicated, a way into an understanding of both authentic Holocaust testimony as 
well as the wider place of metafictional texts and the role each genre plays in the 
telling of historical narrative.    
Robert Eaglestone calls Fragments, a story ostensibly set in the children’s barracks of 
Majdanek, Birkenau and war ravaged Latvia, ‘a parody’; he writes, ‘a parody works 
by playing on its audience’s expectations, in this case, the readership’s expectations 
of a Holocaust testimony.  Once the “truth of the fiction” was revealed the readership 
looked like dupes; the parody had been at their expense.’19  Leaving the ‘readership’ 
aside for a moment, Eaglestone’s statement is especially interesting because he 
acknowledges that the genre exists with clear ‘expectations’, that it is part of a pre-
existing and conditional community of reference recognized by modern readers.  
Eaglestone acknowledges that ‘there could be no Fragments without Levi, Wiesel, 
and other testimony.’  Although, in referring to Wilkomirski as ‘parasitic’ rather than 
considering the conventional limitations of ‘testimony’ - although he does accept that 
they do exist - Eaglestone misses some of the reasons why Wilkomirski is important.  
What Eaglestone does do, though, is recognize that Fragments is a ‘meta-text’, 
requiring us to look beyond the act of ‘theft’ or ‘parody’ to accept that Fragments, 
uncomfortable as it may be, is culturally significant in its own right, being as it as a 
mythical act of memory and a complicated response to the events of history. 
Fragments is a childhood memoir.  It is not, however, a story of childhood like The 
Education of Little Tree or a bizarre bildungsroman such as Love and Consequences, 
but rather it begins and ends in the depths of early childhood where memory is often 
suspect and place exists without time.  This is a clever location for such a story, 
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allowing the author to privilege emotional truth over factual event, and Wilkomirski 
uses the narrative voice effectively – he knows that here ambiguity is acceptable, that 
the child’s memory is always fragmented.  Thus when he writes of the camp of 
Majdanek and occupied Riga, or of the Swiss Orphanage where he lived in the post-
war months before his adoption by a non-Jewish Swiss couple, his language is 
purposefully oblique and his images unconsciously suspect.  On the very first page he 
writes: 
My earliest memories are a rubble field of isolated images and 
events.  Shards of memory with hard knife-sharp edges, which still 
cut flesh if touched today.  Mostly a chaotic jumble, with very little 
chronological fit; shards that keep surfacing against the orderly grain 
of grown-up life and escaping the laws of logic.  If I’m going to write 
about it, I have to give up on the ordering logic of grown-ups; it 
would only distort what happened.   
I survived; quite a lot of other children did too.  The plan was for us 
to die, not survive.  According to the logic of the plan, and the 
orderly rules they devised to carry it out, we should have been dead. 
But we’re alive.  We’re the living contradictions to logic and order. 
I’m not a poet or a writer.  I can only try to use words to draw as 
exactly as possible what happened, what I saw; exactly the way my 
child’s memory has held on to it; with no benefit of perspective or 
vanishing point. 20 
 
The complete text of Fragments is told like this, somewhat maddeningly, without 
‘the ordering logic of grown-ups’ (otherwise known as the rules of narrative), and 
thus Wilkomirski sets the tone of his text as one impossible to take exception to – he 
‘survived’, what does it matter if memories are jumbled if ‘law and order’ has 
already been shown to have failed?  Fragments tells us that in a world without 
reason transparency is only another impossibility.  This is, of course, the myth – that 
the story is so impossible it can’t be told clearly, that because we don’t understand 
the ‘why,’ the ‘how’ does not need to make sense either.   
In an essay entitled ‘The Holocaust as Seen Through the Eyes of Children,’ written 
and published before Fragments was unearthed as inauthentic, Andrea Reiter 
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discusses Wilkomirski.  Reiter suggests that within Fragments, the child narrator’s 
‘inability to interpret and the lack of comprehension have a parallel in the adult’s 
failure to express.  The child’s situation thus can be used by the adult author to 
compensate for this shortcoming.’21  Thus, as a literary trope, the child narrator 
conveniently obscures ‘shortcomings’ in the guise of memory or factual details; so, 
although for the purpose of chronology Wilkomirski needed to position his time in 
the camps during the years when he was extremely young, too young really for such 
memories to exist, in doing so he was also able to appropriate the confusion of 
childhood, especially traumatic childhoods, to make up for what would otherwise 
have been clear and obvious lapses.  As Reiter suggests:  ‘the younger the child 
during the ordeal, the more gaps in the memory.’22 
Binjamin Wilkomirski is a musician and one-time doctoral candidate, who researched 
the historical events and studied archival remnants of the Holocaust for years before 
‘rediscovering’ his own childhood memories of time spent in two death camps – the 
children’s barracks of Majdanek and then, later, Birkenau.23  Unwittingly or 
otherwise, Wilkomirski caused an international scandal with the publication of 
Fragments, his ‘wartime’ story of remembrance, and its ‘outing’ in 1998, three years 
after publication, by a Swiss journalist, Daniel Ganzfried.24    
Mostly what Fragments does is offer its audience, like so many works of 
autobiographical metafiction, what we already know from historical document and 
other pre-existing narratives – recycled stories that are, in turn, familiar, historically 
factual and idealized.  Wilkomirski tells us that Holocaust camps were places of 
death and extreme misery led by sadistic guards, that adults can be cruel and children 
are powerless in their presence and even that anti-Semitism was rife in Europe post 
the Second World War despite the all-too recent horrors of Nazism.  He also shows 
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us how children can be insensitive to other children, and, finally, that traumatic 
experiences can render us mute, broken and alone.  There is very little that is 
surprising about the actual book.  Wilkomirski uses familiar tropes and tactics in 
addressing his readers; he is at once a victim and survivor, a sage and a frightened 
child.  His book is also highly inter-textual - he borrows from genuine Holocaust 
narratives, to be sure, but he references many other texts as well, some more 
surprising than others.  For instance, the atmosphere in children’s barracks is 
disconcertingly similar to the hideout of the lost boys in J.M. Barrie’s Peter Pan:   
I had certainly heard other children using the word ‘mother’ from 
time to time. I’d heard some of them crying and calling out for 
Mama.  And they fought about it. 
Some of them said ‘everyone has a mother.’ 
The others objected to this, and insisted that there were no mothers 
anymore, that it had only been that way once, back then, a long time 
ago, in another world, before all children had been brought together 
behind the fences and in the barracks.  But since then there hadn’t 
been any mothers, and the other world had disappeared long ago, 
forever.25     
 
Whilst in his reading of Fragments, Stefan Maechler recognizes a scene from another 
children’s literary classic, the beloved Swiss story Heidi, by Johanna Spyri, in which 
an orphaned child compulsively hoards bread, just as Wilkomirski claims he did post 
the war.26  That the events of both Peter Pan and Heidi are driven by the well-used 
trope of damaged motherless children  - Heidi is, after all, suffering from bouts of 
dangerous sleepwalking and the lost boys are, before Wendy Darling’s domestic 
arrival, little more than thugs led by the fantasist Peter - renders them more 
appropriate texts than many for Wilkomirski to glean inspiration from.  However, in 
their influence, they also reveal the fantasy or mythical element of Fragments and its 
‘fairy tale’ quality of good and evil.  In children’s literature the child’s world and the 
adult world are kept separate, distinct, and this is what we see in Fragments, which is 
in itself a kind of inverted fairy tale that subverts the sun-drenched genre of 
childhood fantasy whilst borrowing heavily from its tropes and themes.  As with 
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many works of children’s literature, the world of Fragments is naïvely polarized:  
Jews vs. Nazis; children vs. adults; Eastern Europeans vs. Western Europeans.  The 
narrative is equally skewed, the voice of a child jars with the telling of traumatic 
events and Wilkomirski’s own lack of ‘perspective’, to use his word, means that 
some scenes are presented bombastically whilst others are told with surprising 
flatness. 
There is very little order in Fragments.  Memories of the barracks are juxtaposed 
with memories of the Swiss orphanage, and memories of prison guards bleed into 
memories of Wilkomirski’s  so-called brothers.  A good memory always begets a bad 
one.  For instance the birth of Wilkomirski’s first child is mentioned in tandem with a 
memory of a dead woman in the camp, a woman who seemingly ‘gives birth’ to a rat 
who has burrowed into a wound in her stomach:  ‘the wound springs open, the wall 
of the stomach lifts back, and a huge, blood-smeared, shining rat darts down the 
mound of corpses… I saw it, I saw it!  The dead women are giving birth to rats!’27  
This scene is juxtaposed with the birth of Wilkomirski’s son:  ‘the first thing that 
slowly became visible was the half-round of the baby’s head.  As a first-time father, I 
didn’t know how much dark hair a new baby can have.  I wasn’t ready for this little 
half-head of hair.’28  The implicit understanding within the scene is that Wilkomirski 
suffers a terrifying moment of uncanny when he sees the ‘half-head of hair’, and he is 
forced to bear witness again to the woman in the camps.  Clearly this narrative 
structure serves a purpose in that the past is always fore-fronted – it exists always on 
the surface - as we can see in a scene in which two new boys arrive in the orphanage 
speaking ‘a mixture of Yiddish and Polish’ and the narrator is transported back to the 
barracks:   
Without eating my breakfast or saying a word to the child next to me 
I ran back into the empty dormitory, jumped onto my bed, and bit 
down on the pillow so as not to cry out.  Panic.    
I couldn’t stop the vivid memories of the new boy in the big 
barracks.  They forced me to lie still and for the thousandth time I 
had to be a spectator at what had happened to the new boy in front of 
the barracks, and how it was my fault and my crime.29 
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The ‘crime’ is that Wilkomirski tells the boy to urinate in his bunk rather than go 
outside and incur the wrath of the night guards who make a habit of torturing the 
children who could not make it through the night.  On one instance the guards are 
said to ‘have taken little sticks and pushed them up into the boys’ penises as far as 
they’d go.’30  The next morning, though, the new boy is discovered and killed for his 
transgression:  ‘we waited, motionless.  Then there was a crack of bones, then hard 
footsteps and the sound of something being dragged toward the block in the rear’.31  
Back in the orphanage, Wilkomirski is terrified he will be recognized and 
‘discovered.’  The boys do eventually leave and the narrator is left alone in peace.  
However the episode produces a kind of epiphany:   
No matter how hard I tried, I couldn’t pull these two worlds together.  
I hunted in vain for some thread I could hold on to.  I could only get 
away from this unbearable strange present by going back to the 
world and the images of my past. Yes, they were almost as 
unbearable, but they were familiar, at least I understood their rules.32 
 
Here the relationship between the historical and the present within Fragments is 
clearly laid out.  The past is set up as being distinct, foreign, it can’t be linked to the 
present, only returned to through memory, sometimes at will, as an escape from the 
present, but most often this return is involuntarily, as we saw with the birth of his 
son, and disruptive.  This is hardly an unusual reading of the past but it is mythical or 
idealized, and, if we think of Lasch, narcissistic.  We know the present to be a 
continuation of the past, not a separate entity.  For the Holocaust to be presented as a 
completely other world, impossible to reconcile with this one, as something that ‘lies 
outside, if not beyond, history,’ is obviously an aim, if not the aim, of Fragments.  It 
is, of course, not just the Holocaust that is presented this way but also childhood, and 
even the wider historical context of Europe during the Second World War, and yet it 
is his time in the camps that are privileged as ‘ahistorical,’ and thus it is these 
memories that are ‘unique’.  The myth, though, is not that these ‘two worlds’ cannot 
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be made to fit together, but rather that they are, terrifying as it may be, ‘two worlds’ 
at all. 
 
III.  ‘Outside, if not beyond, history’:  Fragments in context33 
 
The events of Fragments, inside and outside the text, as well as the ‘character,’ both 
performative and actual, of Wilkimirski himself, are compelling, and it is far from 
surprising that journalists and academics have sought to explore the details of the 
case and its wider cultural ramifications.34   Clearly the existence of these works and 
the critical conversations they inspire is of benefit, not only to this chapter but to the 
ideas and themes of autobiographical ‘truth,’ identity, memory and historical 
metanarrative in general.  The majority of my references to this particular case, 
however, are owed to the Swiss historian Stefan Maechler and his excellent book, 
The Wilkomirski Affair:  A Study in Biographical Truth.  Maechler’s privileged 
position as an external adjudicator hired by Wilkomirski’s Swiss agents, Lipman AG, 
to find the definitive truth in Wilkomirski’s complicated life story and to provide a 
final ending to the uncomfortable affair, renders his text especially compelling.  A 
case study of methodical research and scholarship, Maechler judiciously investigated 
all historical document and, when possible, interviewed all relevant individuals 
surrounding Binjamin Wilkomirski /Bruno Dossekker (originally Bruno Grosjean) – 
the splintered man behind Fragments.   Why it is, though, that Wilkomirski and 
Fragments have proved the source of so much especial critical interest, far beyond 
any of the other texts explored in this thesis, is a fascinating aside and worth thinking 
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about.  Finkelstein, of course, might read it as evidence of the ‘Holocaust Industry’ 
and I’m not sure he’s wrong. 
What marks Maechler’s book out from other critical studies about Wilkomirksi, such 
as Blake Eskin’s A Life in Pieces:  The Making and Unmaking of Binjamin 
Wilkomirksi, is its quest (however impossible) for neutrality.35  Neither a barbed 
exposé of the ‘Holocaust industry’ and its relationship to literature or a complicated 
and definitive psychological study, Maechler tries instead to understand the 
significance of Wilkomirski as a European cultural product and to read his actions as 
an uncomfortable legacy of the Second World War. 
In The Wilkomirski Affair, Stefan Maechler recounts how, in 1945, an illegitimate 
boy, Bruno Grosjean, disappeared forever, remerging as Bruno Dossekker, the 
adopted son of a prominent Zurich physician and his wife.  Later this boy would 
become Binjamin Wilkomirski, author of Fragments and self-proclaimed victim of 
the Nazi Holocaust.  Binjamin Wilkomirski does not deny that Bruno Grosjean did, at 
one time, exist – just never as part of him.  According to Wilkomirski, in a recorded 
interview with Maechler, the adoption records were corrupted so that the original 
Bruno Grosjean, who had, Wilkomirski claims, been living with the Dossekkers for a 
few years before being deemed ‘unsuitable,’ perhaps too unruly for an old, easily 
fatigued couple.  This boy was handed over to a family emigrating to America; at the 
same time Wilkomirski, rescued from the camps and smuggled illegally into 
Switzerland without papers or even a name, was given the other boy’s original Swiss 
identity to facilitate the adoption process.  Maechler writes that the lack of records of 
this remarkable transaction does not trouble Wilkomirski, who insists instead that 
there was a grand conspiracy surrounding his adoption similar to the forged records 
of the hundreds of Gypsy children who were taken from their families and adopted 
by childless Swiss couples.36   Wilkomirski believes that this accounts for the age and 
time discrepancy in his own history versus those on the official records, as he claims 
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he was not smuggled into Switzerland until 1947 or 1948, two to three years after 
Bruno Grosjean’s initial adoption.   The missing years are the years of Fragments, 
when Wilkomirski claims to have been a young child hidden in the camps, and his 
entire premise rests on this story – that two young boys, one Swiss and one Eastern 
European Jewish, were switched at childhood, at an age where they weren’t expected 
to remember and encouraged to forget.  
Maechler has diligently researched this central premise of Wilkomirksi’s claim and 
can find no support for its legitimacy.  Wilkomirski tells him of a Jewish doctor, a 
man who supposedly admitted, in a private meeting with Wilkomirski, to facilitating 
the adoption transaction.  Wilkomirski insists that this doctor told him over the 
course of their conversation that the only way that the Jews would survive as a race 
was ‘by going genetically underground, by total social assimilation,’ hence the need 
for secret adoptions of Jewish children by a non-Jewish couples.37  Maechler has 
found no record of this doctor and no record of the ‘original’ Bruno 
Grosjean/Dossekker, the boy who unwittingly sacrificed his identity for a boat ride to 
America.  The weaknesses of Wilkomirski’s story are further exposed when, in 2001, 
Maechler found that the father of Bruno Grosjean, known only as ‘Rupert X’ on 
official documents, is still living and will consent to a paternity test (the mother, 
Yvonne Grosjean, died in 1981 with her documented birth son, Bruno Dossekker, 
benefiting from the estate left in her will).  Maechler writes of how he tried to 
convince Wilkomirski to undergo a DNA test in order to find the truth of who he 
really is, once and for all.  Wilkomirski refused.   
Even without the medical evidence from the paternity test, Maechler’s study 
assiduously and systematically refutes all claims made by Binjamin Wilkomirski that 
he was ever in or could ever have been a Jewish child living in occupied Latvia or a 
Nazi concentration camp, indeed that he was ever anybody but Bruno Grosjean and 
then, later, Bruno Dossekker, born illegitimate in Switzerland to non-Jewish parents.  
Wilkomirski remains steadfast in his refusal to accept this history and Maechler’s 
book ends with the frustrating impasse of Wilkomirski’s own fantasy. 
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Why is this important and why is Fragments not just another case of literary fraud, or 
even mental illness? (Although it should be clear by now that no instance of 
autobiographical metafiction is ever simply ‘another case of literary fraud’)  There 
are several reasons, of course, but two especially stand out – the first points to the 
industries of publishing and media and their potentially vicious enactments of 
revenge, and regrettably this is not without justification; the other reason is because 
Wilkomirski’s story, the real story, as presented by Maechler, is a difficult one and 
there is a clear and direct cultural element to his metafictional act.  If we leave aside 
the fact that he genuinely appears to believe that his narrative is true, what 
Wilkomirski’s story reveals is how difficult the boundaries of history are.  If Love 
and Consequences was an act of direct narcissism, Fragments appears to have been 
an act of narcissistic confusion.  Maechler’s study importantly does not discount 
some of the inherent ‘emotional truths’ of Fragments and he is acutely sensitive to, or 
even actively supportive of, the possibility that Wilkomirski has transferred much of 
the fear, alienation and loss that he felt as the young Bruno Grosjean, separated from 
his mother and carted to different foster families until he was given finally to the 
Dossekkers and made to assimilate into their rigid, bourgeois respectability.  That is 
to say, that Maechler accepts, although hardly condones, Wilkomirski’s use of the 
Holocaust as metaphorical.  Maechler writes: 
Because even the most personal memories are prestructured by 
society, Wilkomirski fell back on collective memory in order to 
articulate his own memories, and chose images that had no direct 
connection with what had happened to him but that seemed to 
express the quality of his experience.  He made use of the Shoah as 
the source of his metaphors… A fabricated narrative about a 
concentration-camp victim has the advantage of being understood 
and accepted everywhere, because the remembrance of the Shoah has 
established itself as collective knowledge….38 
 
And so, if we accept that the initial transition from a foster child who saw his mother 
regularly, to an adopted son of a new family who insisted, as Maechler believes 
likely, that he forget who he had been or to think of it as a kind of dream, it seems 
highly probable that a deep psychological schism and splintered identity developed in 
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Dossekker, and that this anxiety, authentic, materialized itself into Fragments.   The 
transference of Wilkomirski’s trauma would not have been possible without a wide 
cultural understanding of and personal identification with the Holocaust and its 
victims.  To what extent Dossekker had come to identify with his own scholastic 
research as opposed to the extent he may have been influenced by others, including a 
therapist specializing in ‘recovered memory,’ is impossible to say.39  Maechler writes 
that Wilkomirski ‘in his fantasies’ gained ‘narcissistic possession’ of ‘remembrance 
and with the grace of a sleepwalker exploited the collective ritual of remembering.’40  
Notable here is that Wilkomirski is not being charged with exploiting the event, or 
even the experience of the Holocaust but rather ‘the collective ritual of 
remembering;’ he is a ‘thief,’ remember, of memory, not of history.   
The Jewish-American academic Deborah Lipstadt, who is perhaps best known for 
winning a libel case against the Holocaust denier David Irving, has knowingly placed 
Fragments on the syllabus of a university class on Holocaust memoirs.  That the 
work is not a factual memoir ‘complicates’ the text, Lipstadt has said, but she 
remains convinced that it ‘is still powerful.’41  Thus as a metahistorical narrative, or 
piece of historiographic metafiction, Fragments is allowed to exist, at least by 
Lipstadt, as a ‘powerful’ testament to the Holocaust.  As an act of memory, however, 
or a metaphorical reenactment, Fragments crosses the boundary of most people’s 
critical acceptance.  The distinction is obvious enough, as Eaglestone writes, ‘identity 
without memory is empty, memory without identity is meaningless,’ and yet I 
disagree that Wilkomirski acted from a ‘place’ without memory, that is to say a 
wholly inauthentic past, it is rather that his ‘memory’ arrived from a mythical 
enactment of events and a mythical performance of history.42    
There is merit in considering the view of historian Tim Cole, who believes, perhaps 
controversially, that, ‘in many ways “Holocaust denial” has emerged only within the 
context of the emergence of the myth of the “Holocaust.” It was not until the 
“Holocaust” emerged as an iconic event that it was perceived to be an event which 
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was deemed to be worth denying.’43  If it is ‘worth denying,’ surely we must accept 
that it also ‘worth’ appropriating - it cannot be appropriated, however, unless it is 
already believed.  And so there is no ‘danger’ with these appropriations other than the 
danger already inherent within the myth itself.  Fragments reveals the existence of 
this myth and its limitations.  Yes, it is a parody and a pastiche; a ‘pornographic,’ 
even ‘kitsch,’ tale of brutality and suffering, not to mention, as Maechler says, an 
‘ahistorical’ narrative of history, however we must accept that there exists an 
audience for whom this resonates as authentic – who want to believe that this is 
true.44 
 
IV. ‘A dramatization that offers no illumination’:  The problem with reading 
Fragments as ‘metaphor’45 
 
It is easy to be cynical of Fragments as a literary text now, after the fact, when we 
can treat it roughly and without reverence.  As it stands today, critics and journalists 
write disdainfully about clichéd scenes, such as when the small boy is hidden in the 
laundry room, or the relentless chronicling of violence and death.  Upon initial 
publication, however, when it was believed that Fragments was a genuine 
autobiography, the reviews were rhapsodic.  For instance, a review in the American 
magazine, The Nation, reads as if the reviewer is prostrating himself before the text: 
‘this stunning and austerely written work is so profoundly moving, so morally 
important, and so free from literary artifice of any kind at all that I wonder if I even 
have the right to try and offer praise.’46   As it stands now, of course, Wilkomirski, as 
an author of a novel, can be metaphorically torn apart and in doing so the literary 
community and media can assert a small revenge on the once fêted man who 
garnered such favorable reviews.  Maechler in his study of Fragments and on 
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Binjamin Wilkomirski has resisted this, preferring instead to problematize the story, 
not obliterate it, and this is to be admired.  However, the text is so acutely marked by 
implausibility and impenetrable horror, specializing as it does in presenting new and 
unusual ways to abuse and/or kill a child, that it is difficult, as a reader, to forgive the 
man who forced such images upon us in a false context.  For readers who picked up 
Fragments to understand, rather than simply to witness, this is an important 
distinction, as Ruth Kluger, an academic, as well as survivor who has herself written 
of life in the Nazi camps argues:  ‘However valid it may be that much of this may 
have happened to other children, with the falling away of the authentic 
autobiographical aspect and without the guarantee of a living first-person narrator 
identical with the author, it merely becomes a dramatization that offers no 
illumination.’47   
Kluger’s elegantly voiced reasoning is, though, in my mind, far too simplistic.  
Although Fragments forfeited its rights to be read as authentic, I cannot accept that it 
offers ‘no illumination.’  To return briefly to the discussion concerning the use of 
fiction in respect to historical events, including the Holocaust, it is clear that often 
‘dramatization’ can be the best way into a difficult place.  The genre of ‘Holocaust 
literature’ is a vast and important body of work, and criticisms of the genre aside, 
there have been countless excellent novels about or pertaining to the Holocaust; not 
withstanding the problems, for some, of ‘identification’ and the role pleasure plays in 
the reading of novels, fictional accounts can be immensely powerful, especially in 
locating the events and effects of Holocaust within a changing world – a world that 
cannot remain historically fixed, or even fixated.  Indeed recent fictional works such 
as Anne Michael’s Fugitive Pieces and Jonathan Safran Foers’ Everything is 
Illuminated are able to sensitively address and contextualize the Holocaust as an 
historical event with contemporary repercussions in a way that autobiographical 
accounts or ‘testimonials’ are often unable to.48  
Fictional accounts have also, of course, created an ‘idealized’ vision, or version, of 
the Holocaust and occupied Europe, historically rooted or otherwise, that is instantly 
recognizable and generally accepted as ‘real’ to many readers.  That these accounts 
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have had a direct effect in creating a number of the most tenacious metafictional 
myths of the Holocaust is undeniable.   For instance, Wilkomirski has admitted to 
reading and being deeply affected by Jerry Kosinski’s wartime novel The Painted 
Bird, published in 1965, about a Jewish boy’s survival in occupied Poland, hidden by 
peasants but forced in return to witness and endure their everyday brutality.49  The 
Painted Bird is widely known for its portrayal of wartime sadism, sexual deviancy 
and graphic, prolific violence, as well as for Kosinski, its controversial author who 
committed suicide in 1991.  The Painted Bird has long been believed to be semi-
autobiographical, inspired by Kosinski’s own wartime experience as a child in 
Poland, which complicates its place within Holocaust literature, and perhaps gives 
the novel and its events more credence than it would otherwise deserve.  In an 
interview, Wilkomirski tells Maechler that Kosinski ‘was the first person ever to 
write about children and their experiences when they were little in Poland.  Very 
matter-of-fact, just as he saw it, whether he understood it or not.  It was the most 
touching and most shocking thing I had ever read.’50  According to Maechler, the fact 
that Kosinski’s own wartime origins, and hence possible source material, were of a 
dubious and oblique nature seem to inspire rather than concern Wilkomirski, as he 
says of Kosinski:  ‘he doesn’t know for sure whether his origins are Jewish or Gypsy.  
A lot of people take him for a Jew.’51   
In a 1998 article for The Journal of Historical Review, Mark Weber draws attention 
to the theory that The Painted Bird was a ‘fraudulent’ memoir and links Kosinski to 
Wilkomirski.52   Weber’s findings are not entirely accurate, as they are based merely 
on what Kosinski, a notorious fantasist, told people many years after the book’s 
initial publication.   Not a work of autobiographical metafiction, The Painted Bird 
was submitted to Houghlin Mifflin in 1965 as a novel, possibly semi-
autobiographical, but a novel none-the-less.  Unlike Fragments, The Painted Bird 
was published, reviewed and read, crucially, as a work of fiction, not presented as an 
autobiography or even as a work from the murkier genre of memoir; the fact that 
Jerry Kosinski later blurred the parameters by suggesting that it had come from, or 
been inspired by his own experience does not change the initial act of genre. 
                                               
49
 Jerry Kosinski, The Painted Bird (New York:  Grove Press, 1995). 
50
 Wilkomirski referenced in Maechler, The Wilomirski Affair, p. 59. 
51
 Wilkomirski referenced in Maechler, The Wilkomirski Affair, p. 60. 
52
 Weber, ‘Memoir Exposed as Fraud,’ p. 15. 
 191
(The history of The Painted Bird, however, may be even more surreal than that of 
Fragments, as not only has the nature and possible ‘truth’ of Kosinski’s story been 
doubted and largely discounted, but the authorship as well.53)  
As discussed, in The Painted Bird, Kosinski portrays the Polish peasant community 
as one of moral and sexual squalor, filled with violence, unrelenting cruelty and 
despair.  Brutality not withstanding, The Painted Bird has enjoyed decades of 
favorable reviews, even making the recent list of Time Magazine’s ‘100 Best 
English-Language Novels between 1923 and 2005’.54  Literary critic Lawrence 
Langer, in The Holocaust and the Literary Imagination, writes of The Painted Bird 
that it reveals ‘the descent of man from the pedestal of civilization into the mire of 
brutish endurance,’ and argues that it is this uncompromised portrayal of tireless 
bestial humanity that gave the book its emotional power.55  Clearly this is a seductive 
portrayal, as well as an historical vision that resonates with a wide reading public.  
As a novel, The Painted Bird is perhaps best read as metaphorical.  As Langer 
suggests, Kosinski uses the rural peasants to reflect the inhumanity in all people, and 
like Fragments the narrative is told from a child’s warped perspective.  The two texts 
are now linked, however, not by virtue of their literary similarities but rather because 
Wilkomirski has now replaced Kosinski as the public shorthand for literary fraud 
(although we will see in the final chapter that Wilkomirski has since been overthrown 
by the American James Frey, and Frey perhaps by Seltzer and so it goes).  Kosinski’s 
guilt, however, appears to me to be far more connected to his personality and 
complicated standing within the intellectual community than his actual literary work; 
Wilkomirski’s act is, at least, a genuine literary crime against genre - whatever 
Fragments is, it is not a Holocaust testimonial.  Nevertheless, Wilkomirski is, 
according to Maechler, happily willing to identify himself with Kosinski and uses the 
fact of Kosinski’s suicide in 1991 as emotional blackmail for many of his own 
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contemporary critics, eager to draw attention to how the public and literary 
community treated Jerry Kosinski ‘like a criminal, without sympathy or 
understanding for the confusion of a battered child.’56   
 
V.  ‘It is not the true reality, but it is my reality’:  Misha Defonseca and 
Surviving With Wolves57 
 
The very same week that the scandal of Margaret Seltzer/Jones and Love and 
Consequences broke in late winter 2008, another instance of autobiographical 
metafiction was publically ‘outed.’  This text, Surviving with Wolves, written by 
Misha Defonseca and first published in 1997, told the incredible story of a Jewish 
child who treks across occupied Europe alone in search of her lost family, helped in 
her survival by a pack of wolves.  At the time, Love and Consequences, as an un-
published new book, or perhaps because of Seltzer’s recent high profile ‘Home and 
Garden’ spread in The New York Times, garnered more headlines and media interest.  
In looking at the two texts now, however, Defonseca’s fraudulent act is probably a 
more important or culturally weighted story, especially if we consider the wider 
fallout from Fragments.   
‘I felt different.  It’s true that, since forever, I felt Jewish and later in life could come 
to terms with myself by being welcomed by part of this community.’58  Here 
Monique de Wael, otherwise known as Misha Defonseca, attempted to justify her 
forged autobiography in a press release.  The statement was issued after a website 
and running blog entitled ‘Bestseller,’ set up by her former American publisher, now 
estranged, revealed with definitive proof that her autobiographical account of a 
child’s journey alone across occupied Europe with wolves had been completely 
fabricated.59  The release continued: 
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It's true that I invented a life, a life that cut myself off from my 
family, a life far away from the people I detested. There were times 
when it was difficult for me to tell the difference between what was 
the reality and what was happening in my interior universe.  The 
book is a story, it's my story. It is not the true reality but it is my 
reality, my way of surviving.  I ask for forgiveness for all those who 
feel betrayed but I ask them to put themselves in the place of a small 
girl of four years old who has lost everything and who has to 
survive.60 
 
De Wael’s statement, issued in French to the Belgium newspaper Le Soir, came 
roughly ten years post the initial American publication of Surviving with Wolves; 
after her book had been widely translated and her story even made into a popular 
2007 French film, Survivre avec les Loups.61  The irony for many is that the truths of 
De Wael’s own history, as the orphaned daughter of two resistance fighters, is 
compelling in its own right.62  It is tempting then to read Defonseca (De Wael’s 
married name, her husband, Maurice, is Jewish and Defonseca officially underwent 
her Bat Mitzvah at the age of 50) as one would Binjamin Wilkomirski, as a 
complicated metaphorical product of post-war Europe and to believe that each of 
their respective works of autobiographical metafiction represent a legacy of fragile 
and difficult identity politics, or as attempts to reshape awkward and often turbulent 
relationships to the facts of history into a performance of memory and the modern 
culture of remembrance.  However, whilst this might be a sympathetic and even 
possibly accurate reading of Wilkomirski and Fragments, it would be far too 
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generous a response to Defonseca and her published Holocaust narrative. 
Clearly another complicated project, Surviving with Wolves is a problematic 
fabrication of survival.  Yet, the fact that Defonseca’s metafictional and peformative 
act, with a story more implausible even than Wilkomirski’s bloodied childhood 
memories, survived so long in the public sphere without undue suspicion is in many 
respects a testament to Defonseca , both as a ‘character’ and as a performer.63   It is 
also, of course, a possible indictment of the popular media and publishing industry 
that, in their love of a sensational story, seem all too willing to suspend critical 
judgment.  We know that Defonseca, like Wilkomirski, and all other authors of 
autobiographical metafiction, would not be possible without the collusion of others 
(Goffman’s ‘teams’):  publishers, editors, journalists, and, most especially, their 
audiences, who, unwittingly or otherwise, collaborate in the act.  
The central story of Surviving with Wolves is truly incredible – the reader is told that 
a young girl, age eight, was able to survive a wartime walk across occupied Belgium, 
Germany, Poland and the Ukraine, through winter, with only a compass to guide her; 
not only that, though, her miracle survival depended on wolves accepting her into 
their various packs, feeding and protecting her.  So extraordinary is this story that the 
back cover of the paperback UK edition includes a quotation from The Daily Express 
that reads:  ‘the Second World War’s most amazing story,’ whilst another from The 
Daily Mail calls it ‘astonishing … a story almost beyond belief.’64   And so the 
question again is how do we reconcile the ‘amazing’ stories of the time with those 
that are truly ‘beyond belief’?  Especially when, as Daniel Mendelsohn, writing in an 
op-ed piece on the Defonseca scandal, ‘Stolen Suffering,’ in The New York Times, 
reminds us that ‘Jews throughout Europe were being rounded up like livestock or 
hunted down like game, survival indeed depended on feats of endurance or daring so 
                                               
63
 There were a few notable voices of disbelief, however.  In an article for the Boston Globe, ‘Den of 
Lies,’ David Mehegan, writes that two academics, Lawrence Langer and Deborah Dwork, were asked 
to read the book by Jane Daniels before its initial publication by Mt. Ivy.  Dwork reveals to Mehegan 
their misgivings at the time and discusses Daniel’s responses to these concerns:  ‘ “She kept finding 
ways of getting around my objections… this is a memoir, people make mistakes on details and dates 
all the time.” ‘  Deborah Dwork, referenced by David Mehegan, in ‘Den of Lies,’ The Boston Globe, 
March 1, 2008, section Arts and Entertainment  
<http://www.boston.com/ae/books/articles/2008/03/01/den_of_lies/> [accessed March 14, 2009]. 
For a photo of Defonseca, see Appendix, image 15. 
64
 Quotations taken from back cover, Misha Defonseca, Surviving with Wolves (London: Piatkus, 
2006). 
 195
extreme, on accidents or luck so improbable, that they can seem too far-fetched to be 
true.’65   
Surviving with Wolves belied belief, yet, rationally, the entire Holocaust belies, if not 
actual belief, at the very least human expectation  – we know it is true but we cannot 
critically reason how it was possible, how it came to be.   The girl in Defonseca’s 
story escapes the camps, so there are no records of her as a ‘survivor’; Defonseca 
writes that, before they are captured from hiding and killed, her parents arranged an 
illegal fostering agreement with a Christian woman who does not like her; it is from 
this woman’s home that Defonseca says she ran away, to begin a futile search for her 
parents, whom she believed to be living in ‘the east.’  Her story’s veracity relied 
solely on the audience’s belief, or rather lack of disbelief.  The audience has been 
exploited but is it our belief or our disbelief that has been tested?  Is the 
metafictional myth of Holocaust testimony really so idealized that no text, however 
extreme, can be disbelieved? 
To return to Catherine Gallagher’s arguments from the first chapter that ‘modernity 
is fiction-friendly because it encourages disbelief, speculation and credit,’ and, ‘that 
the early novel’s thematic emphases on gullibility, innocence deceived, rash 
promises extracted, and impetuous emotional and financial investments of all kinds 
point to the habit of mind it discourages:  faith,’ we can see how different a way of 
reading this is to that which is expected from readers of history, non-fiction or, 
indeed, autobiographical metafiction.66   In our approaches to these genres ‘faith’ is 
prioritized, whilst disbelief is routinely discouraged as cynicism or, markedly worse 
in the event of these texts, denial. 
Thus far, the events of Fragments have made more headlines, perhaps because 
before the story broke in 1998 Binjamin Wilkomirski was becoming an increasingly 
respected public figure, having been awarded the National Jewish Book Award 
amongst other literary prizes, and embarking on fundraising tours for Holocaust 
survivors and Jewish Holocaust memorials.  As an active figure and increasingly part 
of the public Jewish community, Wilkomirski’s metafictional act had direct 
repercussions on a number of powerful and influential people, especially in America 
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and Israel; for many of these individuals, distancing themselves from Wilkomirski 
was not enough, it was important that they publicly denounce him and his story.  
This is not to say that there was a ‘conspiracy’ against Wilkomirski or that his 
metafictional act did not deserve public ire, and perhaps it was simply too interesting 
a story to let rest, for clearly Fragments and Binjamin Wilkomirski captured the 
attention of the public in a way that few works of autobiographical metafiction have, 
including Surviving with Wolves.  
And yet, if Surviving with Wolves had not been mired in a vicious American legal 
battle between Defonseca and her original publisher, Jane Daniel and Mt. Ivy Press, 
which resulted in the book going out of print in the US - one of the largest markets 
for European Holocaust memoirs - since the late 1990’s, then Defonseca’s story and 
her public position as a survivor would no doubt have reached a wider English 
speaking audience.  Especially as, well before the French film, Disney had purchased 
the US film rights and a human-interest segment for the influential Oprah Winfrey 
show had been filmed, but never aired.  If Surviving with Wolves had benefited from 
either of these high publicity events, then I suspect that the American/ British 
repercussions of Defonseca’s metafictional act would have been far more serious, 
much more akin to the aftermath following Fragments.  This is not, however, to say 
that it wasn’t an important media event.  It was - most notably in Europe, where the 
book had done very well; indeed the only available UK copy is a British edition 
translated from the French, not the original American English language text 
(although I suspect this has as much to do with the issue of foreign rights as anything 
else).67      
However, even without the US legal complications surrounding Surviving with 
Wolves, Defonseca’s story is a very different work to Fragments.  Whereas 
Fragments took obvious inspiration from the literary Holocaust testaments of Elie 
Wiesel and Primo Levi, with their difficult ontological questions and silences 
impossible to articulate, and Jerry Kosinski’s The Painted Bird, with its bestial, if 
highly arresting, portrayal of human nature, Surviving with Wolves is a pedestrian 
text more closely aligned to pulp paperback memoirs of child abuse victims or other 
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sensationalist testimonies that are, nevertheless, triumphant stories of survival made 
oddly accessible to a wide, popular audience.68   If we consider the near miss of the 
Disney film and human-interest segment on Oprah, the twin acmes of American 
popular culture – each withdrawn due to the book’s legal battles - then we can gauge 
the allure of a story like Defonseca’s to a mass readership, for which we can assume 
it was intended.69   
And although Defonseca’s text has none of Fragments literary or stylistic 
pretensions, it also has very little of its dramatic power, and as such failed to garner a 
similar sort of highbrow critical interest to Wilkomirski’s book.   Perhaps it is 
simply, as Erving Goffman argues, that ‘paradoxically, the more closely the 
impostor’s performance approximates the real thing [this being for critics texts such 
as Night and the works of Primo Levi] the more intensely we may be threatened.’70   
Surviving with Wolves is an unabashedly provincial or ‘lowbrow’ text, neither the 
writing nor the narrative structure is especially remarkable or innovative, and 
although there is a clear desire to prophesize and turn its author into an icon, a cross 
between Anne Frank and Mowgli from The Jungle Book, this aim is ultimately 
unsuccessful.  Surviving with Wolves truly is kitsch.  Defonseca’s heavy use of 
metaphor – she presents herself as more wolf than human – is belabored and 
excessive from the very opening page:      
Passers-by ignore me.  They don’t notice that I’m a stray wolf 
wandering through town.  A grey wolf, male or female, nameless and 
ageless, adrift in a sea of human indifference.  I’m afraid of crowds.  
Awkwardly I move away from the people I meet, my nostrils 
quivering with disgust.  I hate human skin and its stink of death. 
I was a little girl when I ran away from their world.  My name was 
Mishke, I was Jewish and I was seven years old.  They caught up 
                                               
68
 Here I am thinking of such best selling memoirs as Dave Peltzer’s A Child Called It, which are 
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with me eventually, and now they make me attend college and go to 
mass with a ridiculous hat perched on my unruly hair.  They make 
me wear ugly, shapeless clothes and shoes that cramp my bent claws, 
which are used to the damp earth in the woods.  They don’t look 
beyond my unsightly appearance, scarred by suffering.  I’m covered 
with cuts and scabs and my feet are misshapen from my long walk 
through their world at war.  I’ve seen death everywhere and I’ve 
experienced cold and hunger worse than they could ever imagine.  
I’ve lived with the wolves and become a wolf myself in body and 
spirit.71 
 
The identification offered by Surviving with Wolves between the author and the 
audience, indeed its overall performance, is presented not so much as identification 
with a Holocaust survivor as it is in identifying with a feral girl, a half-human half-
animal, an utter anomaly.  There are several ways of reading this, in one sense, of 
course, she is more than human, removed from humanity through acute animal 
senses and wholly unique ‘primal’ perceptions, another reading, however, is that she 
is less than human, a freak who can no longer engage in normal or acceptable human 
activities.  In both instances, though, the myth is that surviving the Holocaust and the 
climate of occupied Europe, even without being a victim of the camps, ‘others’ you 
as a human being, like the Polish peasants in The Painted Bird.  As always, there is 
merit and truth in this myth – experiences, especially traumatic ones, do not leave us 
unchanged - and yet Surviving with Wolves takes it to a troubling extreme.  In 
becoming a ‘wolf’, Defonseca aligns herself and her experiences to that of an 
animal, and though Defonseca adores animals - this she makes very clear - 
dehumanizing a child, especially a ‘Jewish’ child, in this way is a dubious act.   
No doubt the fantasy inspired by Surviving with Wolves is an appealing one.  The 
book suggests that when man’s humanity breaks down a pack of animals can act as 
saving guardians or rescuing angels; that animals are, in their simplicity and pure 
authenticity, incapable of the evil of man.  Surviving with Wolves wants us to 
remember that there is another world, an ‘authentic’ world of animal instinct, a 
society where the rules are set from birth, not regulated by the maniacal whims of 
one member but rather remain fixed from generation to generation for the good of 
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all.   Defonseca romanticizes the idealized Other, in this case the wolves, even 
beyond Forrest Carter’s dappled mountain idyll in The Education of Little Tree, and 
yet her metafictional act is obviously not really concerned with wolf packs, although 
as a community they might have reason to object, but rather Defonseca’s true 
motivation was defined by the decision to locate her story as a Holocaust testimony.  
Surviving with Wolves did not need to be set in occupied Europe if Defonseca simply 
wanted to tell a mythical story about a family of wolves raising a human girl.  
Clearly her desire to be read as a Survivor was at the forefront of her act and the 
wolves served as entertainment – further drama to sell the tale.  It would seem that 
even Holocaust stories need a hook.72 
As a ‘wolf’ and as a Jew, Defonseca’s predators are the German soldiers who would 
capture and kill her; just as the wolves must hide from their hunters and attack if 
provoked or in danger, the narrator must defend her life and those of her ‘pack’ by 
any means necessary.  When she witnesses the rape and murder of a peasant girl by a 
German soldier, the narrator is so overcome by blind fury that she doesn’t notice the 
soldier has seen her until he begins to move in her direction; she then attempts to 
‘play dead’ before attacking him with a stolen knife:  ‘… I felt his breath over me 
and I thought, ‘It’s now or never!’ I sat up suddenly, the blade held out in front of 
me, and drove it into his stomach with all my strength.  He tried to grab the knife, 
but I pulled it out and jumped up, my hands covered in blood.  I stabbed him again 
and again, blindly.’73  After she has killed the soldier, two of the wolves from the 
                                               
72
 Further evidence for this idea is supplied by another Holocaust memoir, Angel at the Fence, where 
it has been revealed that the author, Herman Rosenblat, invented the character of the young German 
Jewish girl, hiding as a Christian, who supplied Rosenblat apples across a barbed wire fence during 
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pack instinctively come to her: 
They conscientiously licked my face, as if to comfort me – but I 
quickly realized what they were doing.  To their mind, I’d just killed 
a prey; I was covered in its blood.  They were used to washing each 
other after tearing a carcass to pieces.  I was a wolf, like them. 
When I look back at that scene, it seems incredible.  I wasn’t even 
ten years old and I didn’t feel like myself any more, I had been out of 
my mind with hatred at the murder I’d witnessed.  I just wanted to 
cry.  Now the taste of blood was making me feel sick, even though 
the wolves liked it.  Their reaction, which made me a wolf like them, 
a wolf who had just made a kill, restored my composure.74 
 
The clear and inarguable enemy in the guise of the evil German soldier or prison 
guard is one of the most recurrent themes of Holocaust literature and one of the most 
exploited tropes in works of Holocaust metafiction - think of the sadistic guards who 
terrorize the boy’s barracks in Fragments.  The fact that such horrors did, of course, 
exist does not make this any less exploitative.   The act of killing a man is 
completely justified in Defonseca’s account of this scene because the man in 
question was a German soldier, a ‘bosch’ as the narrator says repeatedly, and a 
rapist.  This means that the narrator can present her action as instinctual and be 
secure that the reader will agree that her response was the right thing, indeed the only 
thing, to do.  We saw a similar kind of relativist pathology within Love and 
Consequences, in the scene where ‘Big Momma’ beats Margaret with an electrical 
cable, all the while crying to the girl that ‘I do it because I LOVE you.  It hurts me 
more than it hurts you, but I gotta make sure you’re a good gurl, so that it neva 
comes on someone who don’t love you to have to do this or worse.’75 
Like Fragments, Surviving with Wolves is almost totally free of grey areas or 
concessions to relativity – people are good or they are evil, like the soldier; actions 
are right or they are wrong.  For instance, even though her foster mother has done 
her parents’ a favor in taking her in and quite possibly saved a child’s life, 
Defonseca makes it clear that the woman has only done it for financial gain and will 
turn her over to the Germans at the first sign of trouble, she recounts to the reader a 
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conversation that she has overheard her foster mother engaging in:  ‘When it comes 
down to it, if the German win, we’ll hand her over to them, and if they lose, we can 
always say that we did something to help her.’76    It is on the back of this chance 
conversation that ‘Misha’ makes the decision to leave the women’s house.  She tells 
the reader matter-of-factly: ‘that women taught me all there was to know about 
hate.’77  This world-view is, of course, instant and instinctual like that of the wolves, 
but it is also a comforting fantasy for many people – that, just as there are clear 
victims and innocents, there are clear villains and predators, and that we are able, 
always, to know and see the difference. 
How important is it that both Fragments and Surviving with Wolves are stories about 
children and childhood?78  If it is true as Andrea Reiter suggests that ‘when a child 
suffers the reader sympathizes more readily,’ then this again calls into question 
Eaglestone’s reading of the role of ‘identification’ within Holocaust narratives.79  
Are these memoirs more appealing because we indentify more viscerally with the 
child’s voice?  Is it sentimentality?80  Or is just that the child’s experience is 
simpler? 
Surviving with Wolves allows us to read the Holocaust as an uncomplicated 
adventure story or even, remarkably, as a Disney classic.  By virtue of historical 
location, we are not meant to be concerned with whether to believe or to disbelieve 
but simply asked to ride along in the spectacle of narrative.  If it were not also 
demanding reverence through its truth claim this would not be such a problem.  
Defonseca preys on her readers in an unconscionable way; yet the idea that her 
readers may be held accountable for their participation in her performance has 
simply not been discussed in the wider media. 
In response to the Defonseca scandal, Lawrence Langley, critic and scholar of 
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Jewish literature, quoted in The Boston Globe, remarked that ‘what happened to the 
Jews was the worst atrocity in history, and people who exploit it for profit, by posing 
as Jews or lying about being part of the experience, insult those who went through it.  
It’s as bad as saying the Holocaust never happened.’81  This, however, is wrong.  
Whatever the intentionality, and clearly Defonseca and Wilkomirski had very 
different authorial intentions, the metafictional act is not tantamount to denial, rather 
it is stating that the memory of the Holocaust is flexible.  These works force us to 
acknowledge what many of us already know, although some may never accept it as a 
concept, that the Holocaust is not ‘unique’ or outside of history; that it is possible to 
appropriate, to create and to sell, but more than that – to re-version the representation 
of the event.  A text such as Defonseca’s is not truly about the author, she is 
incidental to the story – a girl, in this case, she could have as easily been a boy - but 
rather depends almost solely on the reader.  It is as Barthes says, that, ‘the reader is 
the space on which all the quotations that make up a writing are inscribed without 
any of them being lost; a text’s unity lies not in its origins but in its destination.’82 
Ultimately it is up to the reader to decide what to believe or disbelieve.  The 
difficulty is, of course, as these two works of autobiographical metafiction suggest, 
some areas of history and some aspects of identity do not easily lend themselves to 
critical speculation – as readers many of us cannot be trusted, there is often too much 
invested; we simply do not want to lose faith.   
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Chapter 5.  Being a ‘Bad Guy’:  James Frey’s instance of criminal deceit 
 
I.   ‘Truthiness’:  The ‘moral panic’ over James Frey1 
 
I mean we live in this word now where this is just sort of the tip of the 
iceberg, this memoir, where anyone can sort of put out something that 
sort of looks true, smells a little bit like truth but, in fact, is in some 
way fictionalized. You look at anything from Enron fooling people and 
creating this aura of a great business making huge profits when it was 
an empty shell, or people in the government telling us that mushroom 
clouds are going to come our way if we don't invade Iraq for months 
when it was on faulty and possibly suspect intelligence. Or even things 
we label "reality" in entertainment like reality television. It's cast. It's 
somewhat scripted.2 
 
Known works of contemporary autobiographical metafiction, from Fragments to 
Love and Consequences, have begun to be read, by the mainstream media at least, as 
political acts - threats against the very natures of truth and truth telling in society.  
Whilst I support - even champion - the reading of these texts as important cultural 
and political documents, I don’t support the deliberate use of them as purely 
symbolic or circumstantial products, read by critics as if they are in some way 
indicative of a larger political trend without also actively exploring what they are 
saying as texts.  In a world of increased media and political dissimulation, where 
untruths and half-truths travel around the world instantly, many feel that the idea of 
‘truth’ no longer holds the absolute position it once did, having been usurped by the 
newer, slicker, easier idea of ‘truthiness.’  In True Enough:  Learning to Live in a 
Post-Fact Society, journalist Farhad Manjoo despairs that there are now ‘various 
versions of reality’ and laments that these versions can be found anywhere from 
competing news channels to online polemics.3  For Manjoo, ‘the truth of truthiness’ 
is ‘cognitive,’ he writes:  ‘when we strung up the planet in fiber-optic cable, when 
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 Truthiness is term coined by the television comedian Stephen Colbert, on his US cable channel 
Comedy Central show The Colbert Report.  I use the idea of ‘moral panic’ from Ruthven’s reading of 
this phenomenon, which I discuss later in this chapter.  Ruthven, Faking Literature. 
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 Journalist Frank Rich on The Oprah Winfrey Show, transcript, March 2006, available online:  
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March 14, 2009]. 
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 Farhad Manjoo, True Enough:  Learning to Live in a Post-Fact Society (Hoboken:  John Wiley & 
Sons, 2008), p. 177. 
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we dissolved the mainstream media into prickly niches, and when each of us began 
to create and transmit our own pictures and sounds, we eased the path through which 
propaganda infects the culture.’4   Yet, as Erving Goffman’s The Presentation of Self 
in Everyday Life reminds us, modern ‘truthiness’ - a satiric term coined on an 
American comedy show, The Colbert Report, by the comedian Stephen Colbert in 
2005, to suggest a form of truth, or perhaps truthful instinct, that comes from the 
‘knowing heart’ or ‘gut’ and not the ‘thinking head.’5  This is the triumph of intuitive 
emotional, subjective perception over rigid ‘objective’ fact – a long-standing 
exercise of social interaction - and is not so much an insidious act of propaganda as 
an uncomfortable aspect of human nature.  ‘Truthiness’ is best read as instinctual, 
not ‘cognitive,’ and it is not to blame for the ‘infection’ of propaganda, or the events 
of a divided media splintered into niches, which, despite technological advances, is 
far from new. 6 
In many ways we have come full circle from the mimetic arguments of chapter 1:  
emotional manipulation, disdainful or even dangerous as it many be in some 
instances, is not necessarily propaganda.  The autobiographical act, for instance, has 
always been tantamount to ‘truthiness,’ as the audience or reader is selectively 
supplied only with information or narrative threads that will contribute to the effect 
of the book as a work of literature, where the ‘heart’ or emotional centre reigns; thus 
artifice is relied upon.   The autobiographical genre is not constructed differently 
from other literary forms, such as the novel or even poetry, in that it is discriminating 
and rigorously composed, preoccupied with its controlling influence, language and 
command of the reader’s perception.  The autobiographical author/subject, whilst 
motivated to facilitate the illusion of singularity, is always idealized, relying on 
collective myth and social and cultural supposition, as we have seen again and again.   
And although there will always remain a disconnect in the act between what can be 
controlled, or manipulated by the author, and what is outside the controlling 
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 Video of Stephen Colbert defining ‘Truthiness’ as his ‘word of the day’ on The Colbert Report 
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they government or ecclesial, not exploited their positions through the manipulation of their subjects 
emotional center?  Besides, how often have the ‘facts’ of a particular time been revealed in hindsight 
to be little more than specific cultural paradigms? 
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influence - the perceptions of the reader - the genre tries to hide this through a patina 
of authority.   There are, then, clear limitations of genre, but by and large we do not 
read with these limitations in mind.  Readers are asked, by economically invested 
authors and publishers, to forget that the autobiographical act is impossible and 
woefully unstable, and are instead invited to confer upon it unwavering faith by 
virtue of its category.  Yet somehow, when, as readers, we are let down, we blame 
the single trespass, not the genre.   
Not withstanding the Internet medium and proliferation of weblogs, which I will 
return to later in this chapter, there is nothing novel or particularly nefarious about 
the ambiguous truth claim of contemporary autobiographical narratives, and there is 
especially nothing original or new concerning recent acts of autobiographical 
metafiction, except perhaps increased publicity and far wider reaching cultural and 
critical profiles for the authors and texts which are actually discovered or ‘outed.’  
Why then does the opening quotation, taken from an interview with the esteemed 
American journalist Frank Rich on The Oprah Winfrey Show in 2006, sound so 
topical and so urgent, as if the world has truly changed, as if our sense of right and 
decency has truly shifted?   
Rich appeared on Oprah to discuss and to denigrate the autobiographical 
metafictional act of the American writer James Frey in his bestselling memoir A 
Million Little Pieces, but on the program Rich widened the field of discussion to 
invoke the political maneuvering of the US Government and a financial scandal that 
traded on false information.  For Rich, Frey’s act served as a convincing metaphor 
for the current American cultural and political landscape and its murky relationship 
to truth and he has been one of the most vocal commentators on the affair – before 
his guest appearance on Oprah, he had discussed Frey in a New York Times opinion 
piece entitled ‘Truthiness 101’ and then later returned to Frey’s metafictional act as 
an example in his 2007 book The Greatest Story Ever Sold:  The Decline and Fall of 
Truth in Bush’s America.7    
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 Frank Rich, ‘Truthiness 101:  From Frey to Alito,’ New York Times, January 22, 2006, section 
Opinion <http://select.nytimes.com/2006/01/22/opinion/22rich.html > [accessed March 14, 2009]. 
The article is complete with a cartoon that shows a warring stage show of truth and fiction. 
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A New Yorker, Rich opens his book with the events of 9/11 and proceeds to 
critically illustrate the ways in which, to his mind, the Bush administration cynically 
manipulated a grieving nation.  A one-time theatre critic, Rich is especially adept at 
reading the actions of the Government as an elaborately staged performance, ‘a 
brilliantly produced scenario to accomplish a variety of ends.’8  Crucially, though, 
for Rich, the Bush administration could not have acted with such impunity if the 
American people had not also been living in a kind of idealized ‘overheated’ world 
with ‘truth’ suffering unwavering blows by the hands of entertainment; as he writes, 
‘the chronicle of how a government told and sold its story is also, inevitably, a 
chronicle of an American culture that was an all-too-easy mark for the flimflam.’9 
I agree with Rich’s assessment that in a working democracy such as the United 
States, politicians do not act without the will of the people; the American people 
have much to answer for in respect to some of the actions undertaken by their 
previous government led by the George W. Bush administration.  James Frey’s act, 
however, whilst culturally important, is in no way more pernicious than any other 
metafictional act and I do not believe that his trespass against genre is indicative of a 
larger contemporary shift away from truth.  A truth as defined by rigid fact-checking 
or relentless empiricism, a ‘truth’ which, sadly, rarely existed in the first place.10  
There is much to explore critically within the James Frey affair, not the least of 
which is his central action of deceit.  However Rich, like other critics, in simply 
remaining indignant that Frey lied, failed to discuss what it was that Frey actually 
fabricated, and thus ignored a potentially illuminating aside to his discussion of 
contemporary America.  So intent on persecuting and disparaging the metafictional 
act, Rich and his colleagues were unable to extend their critical view and examine 
what it was that Frey’s narrative was truly saying and why it matters.   
In focusing as he does on the devious words of a presidential aide to George W. 
Bush, quoted in the New York Times Magazine, who boasted to the journalist Ron 
Suskind in 2004, weeks before the Republicans’ second electoral victory, that:  
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 Rich, The Greatest Story, p. 2. 
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‘we’re an empire now, and when we act, we create our own reality.  And while 
you’re studying that reality – judiciously, as you will – we’ll act again, creating other 
new realities, which you can study too, and that’s how things will sort out.  We’re 
history’s actors… and you, all of you, will be left to just study what we do,’ it is 
perhaps little wonder that Rich is so terrified about the state of America.11  And yet, 
as Goffman’s work reminds us, we are all ‘history’s actors’ subject to interpretation 
and study and judged by time.  The sentiment of the Republican aide is one of hubris 
and hyperbole, not rationale.  As this oft-quoted aphorism, usually attributed to 
Nietzsche (but sounding suspiciously like Foucault), reminds us:  ‘All things are 
subject to interpretation, whichever interpretation prevails at a given time is a 
function of power and not truth.’ The danger is in believing that things were ever 
otherwise - that the abuse of those in power is new, that the use of ideological 
dissimulation is more pronounced.  The metafictional act is a political one, yes, but it 
always has been.  Simply linking the actions of James Frey to a certain political 
administration is too easy, and, more importantly, it does not allow for his act to be 
read as a political and cultural end in itself. 
This is too bad because the brutal quasi-heroic myth presented by Frey in A Million 
Little Pieces is one of criminality, addiction and violence and, as such, is certainly 
worth exploring in respect to contemporary American culture.  That the performer/ 
author is an idealized criminal and drug addict is socially and politically important 
because it forces us to consider what some of the implications surrounding the use of 
this myth might suggest about the country and the wider Western world as a whole – 
including, certainly, ‘cowboy’ presidents and outlaw, renegade CEOs.  As we will 
see, James Frey has usurped the myth of the criminal or the ‘bad guy’ and turned 
him into a drunken hero who finds redemption - the scandal here is perhaps not so 
much that such people lie but rather that such people are so enthusiastically believed 
in the first place. 
Social circumstances might have changed somewhat since 1959, when Erving 
Goffman argued that ‘the social definitions of impersonation, however, is not itself a 
very consistent thing.  For example while it is felt to be an inexcusable crime against 
communication to impersonate someone of sacred status, such as a doctor or a priest, 
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 Unnamed political source, referenced in Rich, Greatest Story, p. 4. 
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we are often less concerned when someone impersonates a member of a 
disesteemed, non-crucial, profane status, such as a hobo or unskilled worker.’12 
Goffman’s argument remains an accurate reading of the various responses to 
performative works of autobiographical metafiction that we have seen thus far.  For 
instance, ventriloquizing the prostitute’s body is an exercise that continues to 
flourish with little real concern as to the veracity of the narrative or the ‘rights’ of the 
subject, whilst appropriating the victim status of Holocaust survivors is conversely 
read as an unforgivable trespass.  James Frey’s work, however, presents us with a 
potential deviation from this theory.  Unlike other texts we’ve explored, such as 
Fragments or The Education of Little Tree, historically mythical narratives that 
uphold the concepts of elevated or privileged identities, A Million Little Pieces, a 
brutal story of drug addiction and criminality, seemingly subverts Goffman’s ideas 
as to what might constitute and deserve the category of ‘sacred’ or ‘profane,’ and 
forces us instead to revisit Mary Evans’ ideas of ‘fantastical identities,’ those mythic 
characters so ‘beloved by children and the dispossessed.’   
 
II.   ‘I was a bad guy’:  James Frey’s criminal fantasy13 
 
 We could’ve been anything that we wanted to be 
  With all the talent we had 
 No doubt about it, we whine and we pout it 
 We’re the very best at being bad guys 
 
 We could’ve been anything that we wanted to be 
  We took the easy way out 
 With little training, we mastered complaining 
 Manners seemed unnecessary 
 We’re so rude it’s almost scary14 
 
I have faced the reality and the reality is simple.  I am an Alcoholic 
and I am a Drug Addict and I am a Criminal.  That is what I am and 
who I am and how I should be remembered.  No happy lies, no 
invented memories, no fake sentimentality, no tears.  I do not deserve 
tears.  I deserve to be portrayed honestly and I deserve nothing more 
and I start to write an honest obituary in my own mind… James Frey.  
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 Goffman, Presentation of Self, p. 67. 
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 James Frey, in a discussion with Oprah Winfrey on her daytime chat show, an episode entitled ‘The 
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Born in Cleveland, Ohio, September 12, 1969.  Started stealing sips 
from drinks at seven.  Got hammered for the first time at ten…15 
 
James Frey first appeared on The Oprah Winfrey Show in October 2005 to mark the 
selection of his memoir A Million Little Pieces as part of the show’s phenomenally 
successful ‘Book Club,’ the first non-fiction book ever chosen by Oprah Winfrey to 
feature.16  The by-line for the episode featuring Frey and his book was ‘The Man 
Who Kept Oprah Awake at Night,’ with Frey’s appearance marked by riotous 
applause and tears from not only the audience but the production team as well.17   ‘I 
was a bad guy,’ Frey confessed to Oprah and the live studio audience that day.   
It is Frey’s performance as a ‘bad guy’ that I wish to examine, this ‘very best at 
being bad’ discourse that runs throughout his narrative, exemplified by the constant 
refrain:  ‘I am an Alcoholic.  I am a Drug Addict and I am a Criminal.’  In his book, 
Frey truly is the very mythical, idealized enactment of a ‘bad guy,’ he is an addict 
who does hard drugs such as heroin, crack cocaine and crystal methamphetamine; a 
criminal who assaulted a police officer and terrorized his own family, and an all-out 
out of control wastrel, whose bitterness and arrogance and fury could only be 
expressed through violence and abuse.  And yet, remarkably, it was this same ‘bad 
guy’ whose harrowing story and gruff, clipped writing littered with expletives not 
only kept Oprah Winfrey awake at night but also inspired legions of magnificent 
reviews from such diverse audiences as the New Yorker and FHM, even prompting 
one London newspaper critic to write:  ‘Frey really can write.  Brilliantly.  And if 
you don’t think so, f**k you.’18   
As raw as A Million Little Pieces is, it is mostly, however, about the processes of 
recovery and change - the bad guy reformed - and, with the exception of the first 
seven and last eight pages, the entire length of the book is set within a drug and 
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alcohol treatment and rehabilitation facility.  Thus the true myth presented in the 
story is one of renewal – the ‘bad guy’ reformed - and it is much more of a fantasy 
than a myth, as we will see.  
Frey opens the book abruptly, on an airplane, as he is being transported by his 
parents to the clinic, Hazelden, a well-known facility in Minnesota, he writes:  ‘I 
wake up to the drone of the airplane engine… my four front teeth are gone, I have a 
hole in my cheek, my nose is broken and my eyes are swollen nearly shut...  I look at 
my clothes and my clothes are covered with a colorful mixture of spit, snot, urine, 
vomit and blood.’19  Physically he is a terrible, disgusting mess and goes to some 
lengths conveying this to the reader; it is clear he wants us to be shocked and 
repelled by his bodily circumstances.  However, by virtue of being on an airplane 
paid for by his parents, who are alongside him from the beginning to provide 
financial and emotional support, Frey’s character is already elevated beyond the 
‘regular’ persona of a common drug addict/ criminal.  Instead of being in jail, for 
instance, he is on an airplane with friendly staff who do not appear to mind his 
wretched physical state, and he is heading to a clinic where the average cost of a 
twenty eight day inpatient stay is $26, 000.20  This is the irony of A Million Little 
Pieces from which Frey either cannot, or has no real desire to, escape:  it is a middle 
class tale of a spoilt, narcissistic boy who appropriates the criminal persona to 
elevate his own cultural status, whilst retaining all the privileges of his family’s 
economic and social station.  Like Margaret/ Peggy Seltzer in Love and 
Consequences, Frey claims the language of social deprivation, filters it through the 
voice of entitlement and emerges somehow as a spokesman for the disenfranchised.  
In making the ‘bad guy’ a central character in his literature, Frey is consciously 
using a persona with deep and complicated roots in the cultural imagination, 
especially in respect to Western pop-culture.  As I have mentioned, the refrain ‘I am 
an Alcoholic and I am a Drug Addict and I am a Criminal’ echoes continuously 
throughout the book (always capitalized), but of these three designations it is the 
criminal that is prioritized.  It is telling, however, when we examine exactly what 
kind of ‘criminal’ James Frey is claiming to be - for when he lists his offenses in an 
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early conversation with a clinic employee he rattles off a litany of mainly civil 
disobediences and insignificant infractions:  ‘Possession, Possession with Intent to 
Distribute, three DUI’s, a bunch of Vandalism and Destruction of Property charges, 
Assault, Assault with a deadly weapon, Assaulting an Officer of the Law, Public 
Drunkenness, Disturbing the peace.  I’m sure there’s some other shit, but I don’t 
remember exactly what.’21  From this list the reader is able to ascertain that he is 
mostly a danger to himself, he is not a rapist or child molester, nor a murderer or a 
thief, and although the ‘Assault’ charges sound potentially ominous, the overall 
theme remains one of small, minor or petty criminality, carefully or calculatingly 
non-alienating to the average reader. 
However minor Frey’s criminal transgressions may read on the page, however, he 
goes to great lengths to assure the reader that they are, in fact, extreme.  He is eager 
to demonstrate time and again that his ‘bad guy’ credentials are real and menacing.   
For instance, a conversation with a lawyer, Randall, who works for the clinic and has 
been retained by his parents to represent his outstanding arrests, results in the news 
that he is going to Jail: 
You’re in a lot of trouble in Ohio.  It’s a small town and they don’t 
much like what they saw with you.  They say that you caused quite a 
few problems there and made a number of enemies within the Police 
Department.  They are incredibly angry, as angry as any prosecutors 
that I have ever had to deal with on a case, and they want to make an 
example out of you.  They don’t particularly care that you are here 
and that you’re trying to get your life in order.  They say they have 
an open-and-shut case and they’ll be happy to go to trial.  I believe 
them.22 
 
Here it is not only his actions, which are relatively minor, but rather his very being 
that is held up as guilty and dangerous:  ‘they don’t much like what they saw with 
you’ suggests that he is being judged subjectively over and beyond the facts of his 
crime.  It conveys to the reader a character who is especially dangerous and volatile, 
someone who has offended the very fabric and decency of small town America and 
is, as such, profoundly ‘other’ than the good citizens of the jury, if he were to stand 
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trial, or the stalwart members of the police department.  This is only one example 
where Frey portrays himself as being especially singled out or ‘made an example of,’ 
the entire book is marked with episodes where he and his actions are presented as 
being specially chosen or perceived to be unique, a threat to the moral center.  
A textbook narcissist, who supports the illusion that he was a pivotal player in the 
lives of many, Frey writes that as an adolescent ‘teachers talked about me, parents 
talked about me, the local Cops talked about me,’ and in the early pages of the book 
he recounts a story which resulted in the death of a teenage girl in a train accident, he 
tells us that he was implicated rather than her ‘football hero’ boyfriend:  ‘I got 
blamed by her parents and their friends and everyone else in that fucking hell-hole… 
I got taken down to the local police station and questioned.  That was the way it 
worked there.  Blame the fuck-up, feel sorry for the football hero.  Vilify one 
forever, forget the other had anything to do with it.’23   
However, as much as he presents aspects of his life and treatment as unfair or 
somehow unjust and rails against being ‘singled out,’ he also boasts at length about 
the extent of his addiction and deviant behavior, such as when he claims to have 
broken the county blood alcohol record on his first DUI at the age of 18, telling the 
reader that the test result has since been framed by the police station.24  Then there is 
the indulgent litany of self-abasement as he chronically revisits dark and violent 
episodes from his past:  ‘I made a Girl snort lines off my dick.  She was a cocaine 
Addict and I traded drugs for her body.  She let me do whatever I wanted and I did 
too much too often.  Drugs and her body.  I held a gun to a man’s head.  It was an 
unloaded gun but he didn’t know it was unloaded.  He was on his knees begging for 
his life.’25  These exercises in self-loathing allow Frey to expiate to the reader his 
past, whilst at the same time reminding us what a ‘bad guy’ he was and perhaps even 
alluding to what he is still potentially capable of. 
Frey is a glaringly self-conscious, highly stylized writer and his literary self often 
descends into a pastiche or fantasy of Hemingway - rough, brutal, taciturn, but with 
an inner dignity and inflexible morality.  Hyper masculine, he is an immediately 
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recognizable pulp character from the old school of Bukowski and Burroughs when 
men were men and women, like the junkie prostitute, Lilly, Frey’s girlfriend in A 
Million Little Pieces, needed saving.  The James Frey as presented in his narrative is 
not a man as men are today but as they were sixty years ago, like the figure of the 
detective in hard-boiled crime fiction.  Indeed, the personality Frey presents to the 
reader is one so full of hatred of the contemporary America he is from - the quiet, 
manicured suburbia, the hypocrisy of his parents, the manipulation of liberated 
college girls - that his whole performative persona can be read as a descent into a 
nostalgic fantasy.26    
And it is a fantasy – a refracted, ideological fantasy of class and economics where 
the barriers are not material but rather temperamental, where a man is judged by the 
extent of his addictions and anger, his choices, and not by the social circumstances 
of his birth.  This would be an admirable vision if it were not marked by Frey’s own 
hypocrisy.  As it is, within A Million Little Pieces a distinct social divide exists 
between resident groups at the rehab center and, despite his comfortable suburban 
up-bringing and his father’s highly-paid job as an international businessman, Frey is 
able to align himself firmly on the side of the working and criminal under-class 
residents who embrace him, with very little reason, as one of their own.  The only 
middle class or white-collar worker that Frey befriends in the center is a black man, 
a New Orleans Jazz musician by the improbable name of Miles Davis, who also 
happens to be, according to Frey, a federal judge.     
Thus there is in this first book a transparent race and class agenda – the fat white 
middle class men who have become alcoholics to cope with their mediocrity are all 
figures of ridicule and derision, they are judged as weak and ineffectual, while the 
working class or blue-collar laborers, the criminals, the black men, the crack-addicts 
are mostly portrayed with quiet dignity - they are the men to elicit compassion from 
the readers, as the ones who (unlike James Frey) were unable to be anything ‘that 
they wanted to be.’  It is telling that, despite his repeated insistence that he will not 
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be a victim and does not want pity, Frey deliberately positions himself amongst the 
men who are, at least in the socio-economic sense, most deserving of the reader’s 
sympathy.   Of the book’s other characters, two especially are integral to Frey’s story 
- the young, crack-addicted prostitute Lilly, whose feminine fragility does not 
survive sobriety, and Leonard, a shady Chicago mobster, who becomes a kind of 
father-figure to Frey before his death from AIDS, which is chronicled in Frey’s 
second autobiographical book, My Friend Leonard.  Of Leonard, Frey writes:  ‘He 
speaks easily of horror.  He is a Criminal of some sort.  I am comfortable with 
him.’27 
Leonard, an orphan from the streets of New York who has violently clawed up the 
ranks of the mafia to be a wealthy and feared gangster, is, like the James Frey 
character, an articulate and intelligent criminal; a lover of art and beauty, who is 
generous and loyal to his friends, despite a brutal past.  But it is only at the end of the 
second book, My Friend Leonard, published in 2006, where Leonard is even more 
heavily featured, that his true identity as a gay man dying of AIDS is revealed.   
With this revelation Leonard’s character and his criminal past takes on a new 
urgency: 
All the way through I overcompensated for what I felt, which was a 
love for men, by being the meanest, craziest, most violent 
motherfucker anybody knew that way nobody could question me or 
doubt me or even suspect me, because a person who did some of the 
things that I did could never be a fairy, even though I was, and I am.  
What happened, because of the world I lived in, was that my 
violence made me more respected, and ultimately more successful.28 
 
Considering Frey’s other fabrications, the authenticity, or even likelihood, of the 
Leonard figure within the books is improbable, especially as he is such an extreme 
character.  But, as the second most important criminal, after Frey, in a set of works 
that seek to champion the criminal man, Leonard is important.  As Frey’s own 
criminality must be kept in check - he could never, in a work purposing to be non-
fiction, have fabricated as radical an identity as Leonard’s because he would have 
been caught out, and much earlier then he eventually was - Leonard allows Frey to 
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revel in the ultimate criminal fantasy.  Compared to Leonard, Frey’s own infractions 
are two-bit, small time; through Leonard, Frey can play at the big-time – the mafia, 
gun-running, networks of illegal gambling – a world straight out of a boyhood dream 
or a Hollywood movie, a kind of apotheosis of the criminal fantasy.    
In the above passage involving Leonard, Frey uses the fact of Leonard’s violence 
and criminality as a splintered defense for his sexuality.  I am loath to apply a similar 
type of reasoning to Frey himself – it would simply be too easy – but the hyper 
masculinity that Frey presents is so practiced and performative, here in Butlerian 
sense, as to be bizarre.  And yet there are flashes of genuine psychological struggles 
within A Million Little Pieces, such as the admission by Frey that he has never, 
before Lilly, had sex sober.  In relaying a memory of failing to sexually satisfy his 
college girlfriend, Frey recalls the humiliation of impotence:  ‘when I was impotent 
with her, and I knew I had failed and it was over, I knew that I would never be 
anything but a drunk impotent embarrassing Asshole and that I might as well start 
seriously trying to kill myself with alcohol and drugs.’29  It is not difficult to read 
impotence as the underlying theme in Frey’s narrative, as everything is presented to 
make him look bigger and tougher and larger than everyone else.  Clearly he is 
overcompensating for something.   
Indeed, the evidence of Frey’s impotence and his staged performances of 
masculinity strongly call to mind Judith Butler’s theories of performativity of 
gender.  Considering Frey in this way is extremely useful, as his narrative is loaded 
with gender specific cultural signifiers, beginning with his bloodied visage on the 
airplane and ending with the jail sentence; the fact that his performance is successful 
is unsurprising, he is clearly working within the established normative framework of 
hyper or violent masculinity.  As we have seen, the myth of such masculinity is 
central to Frey’s narrative and presupposes many of the other myths at work within 
the text, not least of all the recurrent fantasy of criminality. 
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III.   ‘A Million Little Lies’:  Reading A Million Little Pieces now30 
 
Frey’s legitimacy as an author of non-fiction has been severely undermined since his 
first appearance on Oprah Winfrey in 2005; in January of 2006 he was reveled as a 
peddler of ‘A Million Little Lies’ by the online investigative journal The Smoking 
Gun, edited by the journalist William Bastone.  Since then Frey has had to face 
recriminations not only from the formidable Oprah, but from an infuriated reading 
public and a betrayed cultural community, as well.   
In limiting their investigation to tangible evidence easily verified, such as criminal 
records and statements from legal and law-enforcement professionals who have dealt 
directly with Frey, The Smoking Gun found several insistences where Frey not only 
embellished, but also plainly fabricated his criminal past.  In the book Frey reveals 
that he is wanted in three states:  Ohio, Michigan and North Caroline; all have 
outstanding warrants for his arrest, although it is the Ohio offence that is the most 
serious and carries the real threat of jail – it is in Ohio where the ‘small town’ that 
wants to ‘make an example’ out of Frey is said to reside.  Much of the drama of A 
Million Little Pieces centers around the events of this offense and the looming jail 
term that it promises, of which he writes:  ‘I know where I’m going I’m not going to 
see any beauty... I’m going to a horrible place in a horrible neighborhood run by 
horrible people providing product for the worst society has to offer… There will be 
Dealers and Addicts and Criminals and Whores and Pimps and Killers and Slaves.’31  
And at the end of the book it is to this ‘horrible place’ that James Frey tells us he is 
headed, where he will serve out a three-month sentence in a minimum security unit 
for possession, reckless endangerment, driving under the influence and disorderly 
conduct.   
As well as setting the opening of My Friend Leonard in an Ohio prison - ‘the walls 
are cement and the floor is cement and the bed is cement’ - Frey has discussed and 
alluded to his incarceration in Ohio in a number of promotional interviews and even 
referred to it on the fateful Oprah episode.32  In an interview published in a 
                                               
30
 The title of The Smoking Gun, an online investigative journal, article edited by William Bastone, 
that first outed Frey in January 2006. See note 393 
31
 Frey, A Million Little Pieces, p. 120-121. 
32
 Frey, My Friend Leonard, p. 3. 
 217
bookseller’s magazine Frey even reflected, surely with a bit of irony, on how prison 
gave him time to read:  ‘when you have literally hours and hours and hours a day to 
do nothing because you’re locked in a cell, I found the best way to pass time was to 
pick up books.’33  And yet, according to The Smoking Gun, James Frey has only ever 
spent a few hours in police custody after two drunk driving offences, the first one in 
Michigan when he was 18 and released to his mother immediately after the arrest 
because he had chicken pox (as shown on the mug shot published by The Smoking 
Gun) and the second in Ohio, where he spent five hours in the county courthouse 
before being released on bail.34   
So it is that James Frey’s mythical criminal persona has been revealed to be just that 
– mythical.  He does not have a lengthy and ominous criminal record or a history of 
incarceration; he has made no friends on the ‘inside’ or led an impromptu book 
group for murderers and psychopaths, as he writes about in My Friend Leonard; he 
has never assaulted a police officer or incurred a roadside beating with clubs.  Why it 
was, though, that Frey needed his audience to believe that he was a bad guy criminal 
capable of such offences is far more interesting than the simple act of his 
exaggeration.  In ‘a note to the reader,’ a new foreword to the paperback edition of A 
Million Little Pieces, published after the scandal, Frey addresses his readers and 
attempts to offer a reasoning for his hyperbole, fabrications and deceits:   
I altered events and details all the way through the book.  Some of 
those included my role in a train accident that killed a girl from my 
school.  While I was not, in real-life, directly involved in the 
accident, I was profoundly affected by it.  Others involved jail time I 
served, which in the book is three months, but which in reality was 
only several hours, and certain criminal events, including an arrest in 
Ohio, which was embellished… I made other alterations in my 
portrayal of myself, most of which portrayed me in ways that made 
me tougher and more daring and more aggressive than in reality I 
was, or I am.  People cope with adversity in many different ways, 
ways that are deeply personal.  I think one way people cope is by 
developing a skewed perception of themselves that allows them to 
overcome and do things they thought they couldn’t do before.  My 
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mistake, and it is one I deeply regret, is writing about the person I 
created in my mind to help me cope, and not the person who went 
through the experience.35 
 
Clearly James Frey simply wanted to be perceived as Being Bad – as ‘tougher, and 
more daring and more aggressive’ than he was ‘in reality.’  For whatever reason, and 
I believe physical impotence to be a convincing argument, he longed to be seen as a 
criminal, a gangster and an all round bad guy, perhaps it was simply, as ‘Leonard’ 
says, that his ‘violence made [him] more respected, and ultimately more successful.’   
The paradox is that, from all outward appearances at least, James Frey would have 
already been deemed to be a ‘successful’ man.  He attended Denison University in 
Ohio, a private liberal arts university, ranked 42 in the university league tables of 
private colleges, where tuition, including room and board, is currently set at $41,000 
a year.36  I have already discussed the cost of Hazelden, the clinic where A Million 
Little Pieces is set, and the support, both financial and emotional, offered by his 
family throughout his recovery; in university Frey was part of a fraternity, Sigma 
Alpha Epsilon, and from all reports had a large network of friends.  After university, 
he spent months in Europe entirely subsidized by his parents.  Indeed, Frey writes in 
A Million Little Pieces how immediately post the Ohio ‘arrest’ he jumped bail and 
hopped on a plane to Paris, which is certainly not an option for most petty criminals.  
Eventually Frey moved to Los Angeles to be a screenwriter; one of his scripts, 
Kissing a Fool, a romantic comedy, was even made into a feature film.37  In an 
interview with CNN journalist Larry King after The Smoking Gun report, however, 
Frey is indignant about the insinuations Bastion and his team have made:  ‘they say 
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that I’m a lily-white kid from the suburbs.  You know, I had a very, very troubled 
past.’38   
This is, of course, at the crux of the James Frey affair.  He is, inescapably, ‘a lily-
white kid from the suburbs’ who could truly have been, as the song goes, ‘anything 
that he wanted to be,’ and yet has desperately tried to present himself as hard-boiled.  
There has never been the suggestion that Frey was not a genuine addict and alcoholic 
or that he did not complete a treatment program at Hazelden, where it is likely he 
met a number of colorful and tragic individuals.  However the entire narrative that 
Frey offers in A Million Little Pieces and then attempts to replicate in My Friend 
Leonard is cynically designed to present him, as he himself has admitted, as 
especially tough and dangerous - the antithesis of the suburban boy.  It is a mythical 
narrative rooted in a mixture of fantasy and fear – ‘fantasy’ for a generation of ‘lily 
white suburban’ kids who have grown up listening to music chronicling, and at times 
glamorizing, lives marked by violence and drug dealing in the inner-cities, and the 
‘fear’ of their parents who believe the corrupting influence of the wider world and 
recognize that they are powerless to stop it.  The scenes where Frey confronts his 
parents and tells them the extent of his addiction and criminality are especially 
dramatic, and in one poignant family therapy session after another Frey’s mother is 
reduced to tears:  ‘My Father is holding my Mother as my Mother cries.  She is 
crying because of me… They are lost in their own sorrow.  Sorrow they do not 
deserve.  Sorrow I have dumped down upon them.’39  His story is every spoilt boy’s 
narcissistic dream and every parent’s nightmare. 
In many ways, A Million Little Pieces and James Frey do not coincide with my ideas 
as to what constitutes an autobiographical metafiction – Frey’s act is one of 
exaggeration and deceit, yes, but not necessarily one of total impossibility such as 
we have seen with the previous chapters.40  Nothing except fortunate family 
circumstance kept James Frey from becoming his metafictional fantasy, unlike the 
                                               
38
 James Frey on Larry King Live, January 11, 2006.  Online transcript available  
<http://edition.cnn.com/TRANSCRIPTS/0601/11/lkl.01.html > [accessed March 14, 2009] 
39
 Frey, A Million Little Pieces, p. 337. 
40
 In this way, Herman Rosenblat’s Angel at the Gate shares many of the same traits of Frey and A 
Million Little Pieces – both are genuine stories of survival marred by instances of exaggeration and 
deceitful fictionality.  However, I find Frey and his texts to be willfully and cynically performative in 
a way that Rosenblat is not, although it is fair to say that both men have exploited and, thus, 
trivialized their pasts. 
 220
more immovable barriers of sex, ethnicity and race that have marked out the other 
texts, and yet the total appropriation of the criminal myth, which is a powerful 
cultural and social identity, that Frey engages in is, to my mind, a legitimate claim 
on the metafictional and performative act.  A Million Little Pieces is a site of clear 
ownership of the voice and identity of the criminal under-class by a man whose 
discourse is rooted in privilege, much like de Couves Matthews and Timothy Barrus, 
Frey aped the lives of the socially disenfranchised to foster his own political project. 
As Christopher Lasch argues:  ‘every society reproduces its culture – its norms, its 
underlying assumptions, its modes of organizing experience – in the individual in the 
form of personality.’41  Frey may be an unreliable and extreme narcissist, but the 
nature of his lies reveals a troubling truth about the state of contemporary America.  
In this way, of course, Frey is best read in conjunction with Margaret Seltzer and 
Love and Consequences, the ‘gangland’ memoir, and there are striking similarities 
within the two texts and enough connections between the authors to suggest a 
potentially alarming trend.  Each text, however, continues on in the great literary 
tradition of autobiographical trespasses, as fronts and as fantasies that reveal as much 
about a culture as they do about the respective works.  The idea that being an 
educated, middle class man or woman in the United States is in some way something 
to hide or to denigrate is at the heart of these books.  These narratives are ideological 
reactions against an established ideology.42  They are cynical products that 
undermine the very mechanisms and privileges – university education, loving 
biological families, comfortable lifestyles - that have lead to their relative successes.   
Frey’s work aspires to be read as a twenty first century Bukowski or Burroughs, it 
wants desperately to be as rebellious and urgent as the Beats.  The fact that he is a 
pale imitation and pastiche of these figures has in no way hindered his success.   A 
Million Little Pieces was the second highest grossing book of 2005, second only to 
the sixth Harry Potter (yet another magical story of a special, misunderstood boy 
who finds love amongst a group of mythical misfits).  That Frey’s sales were helped 
through the high-profile selection of ‘Oprah’s Book Club’ is unarguable; indeed it 
could be said that Frey owes most of his commercial, if not critical, success to Oprah 
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Winfrey and her huge influence on the American public.   Considering the rhetoric 
and content of Frey’s books, Winfrey’s endorsement was a surprising irony, perhaps, 
but it is further proof that Frey’s narrative was rooted in the myths and fantasies of 
the mainstream and not the margins.    
 
IV.  ‘A beautiful and profoundly troubled girl’:  James Frey and the new/old 
myth of the prostitute43 
 
On its website, The Smoking Gun refers to James Frey as ‘the man who conned 
Oprah,’ I would suggest, however, that this is not entirely correct.  Frey’s narrative 
resonated and it does not serve us to deny this.  Of course the truth claims helped to 
generate the book’s dramatic power but the message, a story of redemption (for 
some) and its brutal, unflinching delivery, was as mythic as possible, a fantasy 
through and through.  Frey’s manipulation of events and fabrications of his own past 
does not begin to account for the effect that A Million Little Pieces had on the 
American imagination.  It was not, however, only the criminal persona used by Frey 
that resonated, also effective were his use of other metafictional myths such as ‘the 
whore with the heart of gold’ (Lilly) and a black man named, truly, ‘Miles Davis.’  
These are myths that rely on a country’s reading of women and African Americans 
as stock characters in a pantomime, blithe cultural references, or idealized fantasies.   
Lilly is an especially disturbing character within the book - she is described 
glowingly by Frey as ‘as beautiful a girl as I have ever seen,’ and yet she commits 
suicide at the end.44   She is never able to articulate to Frey, or the reader, exactly 
how tragic and horrific her life is, rather it is left to the male characters to speak for 
her, such as ‘Bobby,’ another patient at the clinic who tells Frey that he knows ‘Lilly 
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from home.’  Bobby is the one to tell Frey that Lilly has been violently gang-raped; 
he laughs and smokes throughout the narrative: 
Fifteen guys got in line and they put Lilly facedown on the floor and 
they started fucking her.  They fucked her mouth, fucked her pussy, 
fucked her in the ass, fucked her everywhere and in every way you 
could imagine.  All fifteen of them fucked her, a few more than once 
and not one of them wore a rubber.  They came all over her.  On her 
back and her stomach, in her hair and on her face, in every fucking 
hole she’s got… They held her down and they laughed at her and 
they fucked her.  One after another after another, and she couldn’t do 
a damn thing about it, and after they were down, and she was 
screaming and crying and going fucking crazy, she tried to gather up 
her clothes, but they wouldn’t give them to her.  They gave her a 
trash bag instead, one of those big, black plastic ones, and they cut 
two armholes in the side, and they made her put it on.  Then the 
Dealer opened the door and he grabbed her by the hair and he threw 
her out, just like a piece of fucking garbage.45 
 
After recounting this story, Bobby warns Frey that ‘I’d be careful.  That Girl’s got 
some dangerous shit floating around inside of her, and if she hasn’t already, she’ll 
probably give you something that’ll make your goddamn dick fall off.’46  Clearly 
Frey would like it to be seen by the reader as a testament to his bravery and honour 
that, after viciously attacking Bobby, he stands by Lilly and continues to love and 
view her as beautiful.  The effect of this scene is, though, deeply unsettling, 
luxuriating as it does in brutal, pornographic details of a young woman’s total 
denigration and abjection for limited benefit. 47  The lucid cinematic details, such as 
the trash bag and the description of ejaculate in Lilly’s hair and on her face, supplied 
by Frey, through Bobby, are utterly gratuitous, and the fact that this incident is 
presented by Bobby as amusing is a cynical ploy by Frey to demonstrate to the 
reader, again, how different he is from other men.  He is fearlessly not afraid to love 
a woman who may have ‘dangerous shit floating around inside her,’ he is bigger and 
better than the rest.  As such, Lilly and the events of her terrible, tragic life are used 
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by Frey as a prop, like his criminal record, to ‘other’ him from the suburban frat 
boys who he so otherwise resembles.    
Amongst all the sad cases of wasted life and stories of addiction presented within A 
Million Little Pieces Lilly is epitomized as the ultimate tragedy and as such she is the 
perfect foil for a man like Frey.  A product of a drug addicted prostitute mother who 
‘sold her virginity for a syringe full of dope,’ it is taken for granted that Lilly never 
had a chance to be anything other than who she is - a drug addict and a whore, but 
mostly a victim.  As having a physical relationship with Lilly is forbidden by the 
clinic, Frey uses their clandestine romance as yet another way to demonstrate his 
personal rebellion, as he writes: ‘I have broken one of the Cardinal Rules of this 
Institution.  I have broken it with impunity.  I have fallen in love with a Girl, a 
beautiful and profoundly troubled Girl who is alone in the world and who has said 
she cannot live without me.’48  After they are caught violating the ‘Cardinal Rule’ of 
the treatment facility, the rule that specifically prohibits romantic relationships 
forming, and separated, Lilly runs away and Frey, in a dramatic scene, leaves the 
clinic to search for her.  He finds her in an abandoned building on the outskirts of 
town ‘on her knees, her face buried in an old man’s crotch.  There is a pipe and torch 
on the floor next to her.’49  Once again he is able to enact vengeance on her behalf 
through the beating of another man.   
The fact that Lilly is the only one of the patients in the book to have a relapse and 
return to her old life is telling – she is the most fragile, its true, but also by far the 
weakest and without Frey for guidance she is clearly the most vulnerable to the 
temptations of her past.  Compared as well with the harrowing scene where Frey 
describes a root canal procedure without anesthetic - claiming as he does that the 
treatment facility will not allow for it, an allegation which has been heavily denied 
and disputed by the Hazelden center – Lilly’s relapse is especially pronounced.  If 
Frey can survive the white-hot pain of dental surgery without the numbing effect of 
drugs then Lilly’s lack of willpower when threatened with a minor and temporary 
separation can only be read as abject frailty.    
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Perhaps the worst thing about the character of Lilly as written by Frey, though, is her 
fatalism.   Utterly without agency her life is marked by a fatal inevitability - this is 
clearly demonstrated through her descent into addiction and prostitution but 
ultimately realized, cynically, with her death.  At the end of the book Frey writes 
that:  ‘Lilly committed suicide by hanging in a Halfway House in Chicago.  Her 
Grandmother had passed away two days earlier.  She was found the morning James 
was released from jail, and it was believed that she was sober until she died.’50 It is 
convenient of course that almost everybody that Frey writes of in any detail except 
for his own family are said to be dead or serving long prison sentences (a tactic also 
used by Margaret Seltzer in Love and Consequences), and yet Lilly’s death is 
especially rattling, as it was so connected to Frey and the timing of his release.  
Simply, she cannot survive life without him.   
If James Frey created for himself the ultimate criminal persona, he painted Lilly 
according to the myth of the tragic heroine:  Frey’s love is unable to save her, her 
beauty has lead to men’s worst bestial desires and, try as she might, she is unable to 
escape her tragic, intoxicating past.   All very poetic, and rightly so, the fate of 
‘Lilly’ might as well be that of La Dames aux Camelias or Violetta from La Traviata 
or any number of idealized whores named after lovely flowers.  If not exactly 
‘writing the prostitute’s body’ here, Frey nevertheless appropriates the myth of the 
prostitute as beautiful victim cynically and gratuitously.  His prostitution fantasy is 
every bit as pornographic as Derek Parker’s and is as little concerned with the actual 
voice of the prostitute as de Couves Matthew’s was with Sheila Cousins.  To write 
that Lilly is objectified by Frey is a shocking understatement; I suspect that if A 
Million Little Pieces had been presented as a work of fiction readers would have 
been outraged with the portrayal of Lilly as gross caricature, as a work of non-
fiction, however, Frey was able to freely and affectively use the cultural myth of the 
whore as narrative device.   
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V.  ‘I left the impression that truth does not matter’:  Oprah Winfrey - ‘just like 
everybody else’51 
 
This returns us to the question of how we read popular autobiographical texts.  Or, 
perhaps more accurately, the ways in which we don’t read these texts.  I have 
discussed in previous chapters how the autobiographical genre is often treated as 
critically sacrosanct but that alone does not account for the success of James Frey 
and A Million Little Pieces.  This is not to say that all reviews of the book were 
positive, they were not, but rather, like so many other works of autobiography, 
Frey’s narrative was by and large left unexamined and unquestioned by the majority 
of readers.  That the events and characters of the book were allowed to so freely exist 
in this way suggests that Frey’s performance and performative act corresponded 
directly to contemporary ideals, ideals regarding both the category of autobiography 
and also the characterizations he displayed within the text.  His metafiction reflected 
the ideological positions that these characters currently hold.  His portrayal of a 
single treatment facility in the Midwestern United States successfully mythologized 
an aspect of contemporary society:  of boys struggling to be men, men struggling to 
be honest and women struggling to survive.    
Indeed, if we consider that the initial response post The Smoking Gun report from 
Oprah Winfrey, a woman whom many deem to be the most influential in America, 
was one of unilateral support for James Frey we begin to have some idea of just how 
effective and appealing Frey’s performance truly was.  On the same episode of Larry 
King Live where James Frey appeared in an effort to defend himself against The 
Smoking Gun’s charges, Winfrey phoned in to lend her support and her statement, 
although used in the introduction, is worth quoting in full here: 
So the truth is this.  I read and recommend books based on my connection 
with the written word and its message.  And, of course, I am disappointed 
by this controversy surrounding A Million Little Pieces, because I rely on 
the publishers to define a category that a book falls within and also the 
authenticity of the work. 
So I’m just like everybody else.  I go to the bookstore.  I pick out a book I 
love.  If it says memoir, I know that – that maybe the names and dates and 
times have been compressed, because that’s what a memoir is. 
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And I feel about A Million Little Pieces that although some of the facts 
have been questioned -- and people have a right to question, because we 
live in a country that lets you do that, that the underlying message of 
redemption in James Frey's memoir still resonates with me. And I know 
that it resonates with millions of other people who have read this book and 
will continue to read this book.  
And, you know, one of the things James says in the book, for all the people 
who are going through any kind of addiction, is to hold on. And I just 
wanted to -- you know, I have been calling this number and it's been busy, 
trying to get through to say to all those people out there who have received 
hope from reading this book, keep holding on, because the essence of that, I 
don't doubt.  
Whether or not the cars' wheels rolled up on the sidewalk or whether he hit 
the police officer or didn't hit the police officer is irrelevant to me. What is 
relevant is that he was a drug addict who spent years in turmoil, from the 
time he was 10 years old, drinking and -- and tormenting himself and his 
parents.  
And, out of that, stepped out of that history to be the man that he is today, 
and to take that message to save other people and allow them to save 
themselves. That's what's important about this book and his story.52 
 
This, to be clear, was Winfrey’s initial response given less than a week after the 
Internet report first surfaced, and although she has since apologized for this 
response, citing it as rash and naïve, it is extremely important that this was her first, 
intuitive knee-jerk reaction, which is why I used it as a way into a discussion on the 
popular perception of memoir in the beginning of this thesis.  Because at that time it 
would seem that Oprah’s ‘truth’ was the acceptance that memoir is an unstable 
genre, that publishers, not authors or even readers, are to be relied upon to verify a 
work’s authenticity, that the ‘message’ trumps the medium and that autobiographical 
facts are insignificant compared to the wider ‘history’ and its possible transformative 
e/affect on others – in other words, exactly the reader response that I have been 
discussing.  And yet, hours after the Larry King broadcast, Oprah Winfrey, generally 
seen as an untouchable media presence, began to be called out and criticized for this 
view, especially for the suggestion that ‘truth,’ in the guise of autobiographical 
detail, is second to the ‘message’ or emotional response, that is to say, her apparent 
promotion of ‘truthiness,’ as defined by Colbert, over fact based, objective truth.  
The fact that Winfrey’s initial response was absolutely in keeping in line with the 
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current perception of autobiography, as a genre and as a form of cultural and social 
affect, was read as unacceptable by the wider media.     
The tide turned rapidly against Frey, but for millions of readers, including Winfrey, 
A Million Little Pieces, truly was effective; James Frey’s message ‘to hold on,’ or 
what ever else it might be, resonated, and his delivery of that message, the fast, 
pulpy, indulgent style that presented him as both an anti-hero ‘bad guy’ and a loyal, 
loving avenging knight proved popular with both critics and readers alike.  If 
everyone was ‘duped,’ as Winfrey later claimed she was, then we were all willing 
and actively participating in the process.   
The second time Frey featured on Oprah the audience did not applaud.  In an 
avenging, high-tension interview, Winfrey confronted Frey and forced him to admit 
his actions, ‘I made a mistake,’ he said.  Winfrey herself also admitted to making a 
mistake with her phone call of support to Larry King:  ‘I made a mistake and I left 
the impression that truth does not matter.  And I am deeply sorry about that because 
it is not what I believe.  To everyone who has challenged me on this issue of truth 
you are absolutely right.’53  To Frey’s publisher, Nan Talese, Winfrey’s wrath was 
especially pronounced and when Talese theoretically asked Oprah if, as an editor, 
‘you ask someone, “Are you really as bad as you are?”‘ Oprah’s unequivocal 
response was ‘yes, yes, yes, yes, yes, yes, you do.  Yes.’54 
 
VI.  ‘Trusting some people and distrusting the rest’:  Speculating on truth55 
 
Farhad Manjoo writes that ‘what’s new about today’s world is that we’ve got a 
choice about which reality to believe’ and that ‘choosing means trusting some people 
and distrusting the rest.’56  We have seen how Oprah Winfrey’s initial choice to 
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support Frey and his publishers left her open to accusations that she was choosing 
‘lies’ over ‘truth,’ and how eager she was to differentiate herself from Frey and his 
publisher, Nan Talese, in the aftermath.  Concerned with her own ‘trusted’ status, 
Winfrey’s response, like that of Frank Rich and others in the media, cemented a 
deeply unhelpful polarization that destroyed any conversation as to what it was that 
Frey’s mythical message might have represented.  This is not to suggest that Frey’s 
act should have been defended, it shouldn’t have, but the wrath directed at Frey was 
misplaced and, ultimately, unhelpful.  
Perhaps, though, it is simply easier now to read Frey’s narratives as a lie because it 
means we do not have to face the uncomfortable messages that his books reveal:  the 
troubling truths about American society, the confused state of masculinity and the 
vast internal fissures within the middle class family.  Again, the most troubling 
aspect of James Frey is not that he was or wasn’t a bad guy, but that he wanted us to 
believe that he was.  Or that being perceived as being a bad guy offered him greater 
currency than the fact that he was a privileged, educated, successful writer.  The 
irony is, however, that it is only now, when we know his performance to be an act 
and his persona to be mythical, that the interesting conversations truly begin.  To 
abandon his books at this point is to choose simplicity and ease over critical depth.  
Is the popular reading of the autobiographical genre truly so flawed that readers are 
at once unable to read critically when confronted with alleged truth and yet also 
refuse to engage with a text that breaks the rules and supplies us with untruths?   
If so, then Manjoo and Rich, and the multitude of other journalists and critics, are 
wrong to make an exception out of Frey, or even the American Government in the 
Bush administration, the people they should be confronting and berating are us, the 
readers and the audience.  Although Rich does this to an extent when he blames the 
‘overheated 24/7 infotainment culture that has trivialized the very idea of reality (and 
with it, what was once known as ‘news’),’ perhaps he does not go far enough.57   
The Frey affair set off what Ken K. Ruthven refers to as a ‘moral panic,’ a 
phenomenon, as argued by Ruthven (and others), endemic to the genre of literary 
hoaxes.58  Although the irrational frenzy surrounding Frey actually signified very 
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little, the circumstances of the event were just as Ruthven writes, that: ‘while the 
panic lasts, the offending text and its even more offensive author are treated savagely 
by the literary establishment pour encourager les autres.’59  However Ruthven sees 
the effects of the ‘moral panic’ as damaging, and he argues that ‘the serial 
scapegoating of successful literary hoaxers cannot repair the damage they do by 
exposing weaknesses in those publishing, reviewing and prize-giving practices 
which constitute the literary world.’60  Whilst this may be true inside the insular 
community of the ‘literary world’ where prizes are bestowed and festivals 
frequented, I’m just not sure that these cases have much lasting effect in the wider 
context - there is simply too much invested in the category as a commercial genre. 
Catherine Gallagher used the language of finance in ‘The Rise of Fictionality’ as an 
extended metaphor, of course this was partly in reaction to, as well as a reflection of, 
the historical moment of the early 18th century and the advent of industry, capitalism 
and the burgeoning middle class, there is, however, another effect of her language.  
Gallagher turned the act of reading fiction into a practical investment – 
demonstrating how fiction allows readers to explore potentiality and speculate on 
possible returns without taking unnecessary risk.  For instance, readers of Clarissa 
would not have to make the same rash, fatal choices of the heroine to glean the 
eventual outcome (early death), they are able to see where such personal investments 
might lead through the events of the novel.  I have purposefully emulated 
Gallagher’s financial metaphors to some extent because I find them an extremely 
useful way to consider the exchange of reading and writing, as well as the a/effect of 
fictionality as a psychological method.  In respect to autobiographical metafiction, 
however, I am struck by how often these financial terms fall short.  If novels, 
according to Gallagher, take the reader on a journey as if an investment, then 
autobiographical narratives are more akin to simply opening a bank statement and 
compulsively reading the balance even though there has been no change from last 
month.  That is to say that these texts are so often rooted in what we already have 
and know to have, and, more than that even, in the preservation of what we have, 
that there is very little growth (although certainly it is true that often the absence of 
deficit is an end in itself).  I have reflected on the conservative nature of 
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autobiography in regards to the narrative, but I hope I have also demonstrated in the 
last few chapters how conservative many readings of this genre are, how passively 
and uncritically most audiences accept these narratives as authentic - content to rely 
on category above all else. 
There is of course another way of looking at our idealized readings of 
autobiography.  Perhaps the very fact that we read these texts uncritically with faith 
in the authenticity of the narrative is a testament to our better, more charitable 
natures - an act of altruism not of gain.  A review of Herman Melville’s novel The 
Confidence Man, published in the Literary World in 1849 and referenced in a recent 
introduction to the text by Tony Tanner, reflected not on the acts of trickery or deceit 
that the book uncomfortably reveals but rather championed the trust needed and 
assured for such deceits to succeed: 
It is a good thing and speaks well for human nature, that, at this late 
day, in spite of all the hardening of civilization and all the warning of 
the newspapers, men can be swindled.  The man who is always on 
his guard, always proof against appeal, who cannot be beguiled in to 
the weakness or pity by any story – is far gone, in our opinion, 
towards being a hardened villain… He lives coldly among his 
people, he walks an iceberg in the marts of trade and social life – and 
when he dies, may Heaven have that confidence in him which he had 
not in his fellow mortals!61 
 
If fiction, according to Gallagher, ‘discourages’ faith, and the autobiographical act 
demands it, then it is absolutely possible that readers of autobiography are actively 
seeking to engage in an act of faith and trust, not only because they are already 
embroiled in cultural investments but also because to believe in the integrity of an 
author, or even genre, is a pursuit in itself, a return on our investment in humanity, as 
the above passage suggests.  Perhaps this is why readership of personal weblogs has 
been flourishing in the anonymous space of the Internet where it is virtually 
impossible to guarantee absolute veracity.  To trust these faceless Internet narratives 
and identities is to accept that we may indeed ‘be swindled’ or duped and yet we 
read them anyway, so strong is our need to exercise trust in humanity.   
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What is perhaps the most difficult to understand is the paradox of reading at once 
altruistically, or generously, accepting the industrial failures of genre and the human 
failures of memory and ego, such as most users are forced to do when considering 
the ambiguous space of the Internet, and then also righteously, as if autobiographical 
untruths are a moral trespass.  Either readers read with their eyes open or they don’t, 
but they can’t have it both ways, or blink them shut when it suits them.  If we can 
recognize fiction when we see it, it follows that we can also recognize the potential 
of fiction as well - the potential that the story is inauthentic.  It appeared as if Oprah 
Winfrey was willing to accept this and claim responsibility as a reader in her initial 
defense of James Frey on Larry King Live and yet she pulled back, abdicating her 
position.  I maintain that a careful, active reading of A Million Little Pieces reveals 
its fictionality, it alerts us to its influences, signals its references and overtly 
appropriates known cultural myths, and in doing so it prepares us for the possibility, 
no, likelihood that it is a fantasy – why and how it was that the book was not read in 
this way is a conundrum.   
A recent Vanity Fair article entitled ‘James Frey’s Morning After’ is the first 
published interview granted by Frey since 2006, in the final paragraph he reflects on 
the nature of the autobiographical genre:  ‘The enduring myth of the American 
memoir as a precise form is bullshit and needed to go away.  Although the 
experience was a nightmare, if I started the process of ending that myth, I’m 
perfectly fine with it.’62  Clearly he has done no such thing.  The memoir, ‘bullshit’ 
or otherwise, is a huge industry and is not about to disappear.  The journalist who 
interviewed Frey for Vanity Fair, Evgenia Peretz, writes that ‘it now turns out that it 
was something of an open secret in the publishing world that the industry had been 
complicit in the scandal, and that Frey, though he was not an innocent, had become a 
whipping boy;’ she quotes, as well, the publisher Jonathon Burnham, from 
HarperCollins, whose own reflections probably echoes that of the industry’s: 
‘whatever the complicated issues were in the case of A Million Little Pieces, there 
were feelings of concern and surprise that such fury was being visited on this one 
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particular case, where we all know that the genre of memoir is a uniquely strange 
one.’63   
Here an industry insider takes it for granted that ‘we all know’ how ‘strange’ memoir 
is – but do ‘we’?  I’m not so sure. 
There was already a category for A Million Little Pieces – fiction.  That it was not 
presented as such by an industry interested in promoting an authentic narrative and 
an author interested in performance is perhaps not surprising.  The fact that the 
readership’s investment to the text hinged on a spurious truth claim, is.  Modernity, 
according to Gallagher, is supposed to be ‘fiction friendly,’ and yet the James Frey 
affair appears to be anything but.  Readers did not read A Million Little Pieces with 
an eye on speculation, no, instead they luxuriated in its category of ‘authenticity,’ 
content to ignore fiction when they saw it.   
The extent of autobiographical metafictional acts within the publishing industry is 
unknown, although I suspect it is fairly widespread, if we wish to read the genre of 
autobiography we need to accept its limitations; if we wish to read it as truth, we 
need to ask why. 
 
VII.  ‘It must all be considered as if spoken by a character in a novel’:  The 
‘spectacle’ of life-writing64 
 
In ‘The Death of the Author,’ Barthes sought to destroy the critical function of 
‘explanation’ and return to the reader the act of interpretation; a decade later, Barthes 
published his own ‘third person’ ‘autobiography,’ Roland Barthes on Roland 
Barthes, which set out to destabilize and upset the discourse of the genre of 
autobiography – the confessional, the authentic and the ease of self-knowledge.  
Here he implored the reader to consider his words ‘as if spoken by a character in a 
novel – several characters.’ 65  This work by Barthes presents a life in shards and 
                                               
63
 Peretz, ‘James Frey’s Morning After.’ 
64
 Roland Barthes referring to the autobiographer’s voice and the reader’s interpretation of his or her 
words as found on the pages of autobiography. 
65
 Roland Barthes, Roland Barthes on Roland Barthes, trans. Richard Howard (Berkeley:  University 
of California Press, 1977), p. 119. 
 233
grainy, single images, impenetrable and purposefully without an easy chronology; it 
is not autobiographical writing as we have often seen, but rather chaotic sketches of 
a self struggling to define selfhood.  Surely, though, there is a danger in taking such 
a work too seriously, its aim is to destroy the culture of revelation, after all, and force 
the reader to concede that self-writing is as impossible as self-knowledge:  ‘what 
right does my present have to speak of my past?  Has my present some advantage 
over my past?  What ‘grace’ might have enlightened me?’66   With his literary 
actions, Barthes appears to be providing the very antithesis to the autobiographical 
metafictions at work within this thesis except that, of course, he is not.  Like them, 
his work is entirely mythical – the difference is that it is utterly and deliberately self-
consciously so.  We are to read his words as if they are ‘spoken by characters in a 
novel,’ after all.  Whilst on the pertinent theme of ‘theater’ in Barthes on Barthes, he 
writes that ‘there is not a single one of his texts, in fact, which fails to deal with a 
certain theater, and spectacle is the universal category in whose aspect the world is 
seen,’’ this then is the category – the ‘spectacle’ of life-writing.  
In ‘What is an author,’ Foucault asks us to consider the possibility that the author ‘is 
not an indefinite source of significations which fill a work; the author does not 
precede the works; he is a certain functional principle by which, in our culture, one 
limits, excludes, and chooses; in short, by which one impedes the free circulation, 
the free manipulation, the free composition, decomposition, and recomposition of 
fiction.’67  That is to say that the author is always, as David Truer cynically accused 
Little Tree of being, ‘a cipher,’ a constructed conduit for the utterances of 
knowledge, of myth and of ideology - an actor who recites the lines dictated from the 
back of the stage.  Again, the text is theater and the narrative act, performance.  
Works of autobiographical metafiction confirm the ideological existence of the 
‘author-function’ and the industry of life writing.  These texts are constructs that 
proliferate the culture not only of genre but also of identity.  Readers approach these 
texts because they are mythical, and yet do not seek, as Barthes does in Barthes on 
Barthes, to destroy the myth, and because, as well, they are collective, conservative 
narratives of murky identities and difficult lives.  The author here is only important 
for what he or she echoes.  The reader, on the other hand, is everything – the true 
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voice.  And yet they are all too willing to forget this.   
As Gallagher argued, the a/effect of fictionality is to offer the reader a critical 
currency, sometimes this currency is squandered, and other times it is invested and 
returned tenfold.  The a/effect of ‘authenticity,’ however, as a genre with its fields of 
history, autobiography and biography, is to seduce the reader into an empty faith 
with its discouragement of speculation.  This passive form of readership is not what 
Barthes set out to encourage when he killed the author and with it the interfering 
critic; it is not what Foucault sought when he exposed the production of discourse 
and the power of cultural/ political ideology.   
And yet perhaps their legacies - the deconstructions of stable industry, the incessant 
reading of insidious signs – have only served to make us more nervous and, with 
that, retreat into passivity, or else cynicism.  The theories of postmodernism help us 
to understand what it is these texts are doing as discursive products and how it is 
they are able to exist, as well as the industries – financial, political and otherwise – 
that are invested in their success and circulation, but they do not explain the dilemma 
that has returned again and again throughout this thesis as to why these texts are 
being read, as we have seen so often, uncritically.   
Yes, these narratives fulfill our cultural expectations but is it not worth wondering 
how it is our expectations arrived in the first place?  It is impossible to ‘know’ to the 
extent that we do what these disparate, changing and highly mythical lives are 
supposed to sound like, and yet, nevertheless, we seem all too content to believe that 
we do know - that we can recognize discourse when we see it. 
But that, perhaps, is another story. 
 235
Conclusion:  ‘What difference does it make who is speaking?’ 
 
Foucault ends his discussion on ‘What is an Author’ with the suggestion that there 
may eventually be a widening critical ‘indifference’ regarding the question, posed by 
Beckett, of ‘what difference does it make who is speaking?’  Foucault imagines 
wistfully that ‘we would no longer hear the questions that have been rehashed for so 
long:  who really spoke?  Is it really he and not someone else?  With what 
authenticity or originality?  And what part of his deepest self did he express in his 
discourse?’1  How sad it is then that these are the very questions I have been asking 
throughout this thesis; that these, indeed, are the questions still being ‘rehashed.’  
Because, of course, we cannot yet be indifferent – it does matter who is speaking if it 
means, as I have said over and over again, that someone else is not.   
Speaking autobiographically in literature is a privileged, political act.  Said’s reading 
of the ‘enterprise’ of narration still stands - not everybody is afforded ‘the capacity 
to report, portray, characterize and depict’ and even those who are afforded such a 
capacity are regulated into hierarchical orders of ‘status’ and privilege.  There is the 
matter of narrative subject or identity - why is the prostitute so much more freely 
accessible as a narrative subject than the Holocaust survivor?  Why does the subject 
of criminality only become a bestseller when it is filtered through the middle class 
references of a onetime screenwriter?  Why is the cliché-ridden memoir of a white 
woman ‘gang member’ worthy of a feature in The New York Times?  As long as 
these questions, as well as the privileges of speaking, remain, we simply cannot be 
‘indifferent.’   
I suspect, however, that Foucault would have found some relief in the proliferation 
of Internet narratives.  Certainly many people read and write differently online, an 
anonymous space where many of the regulating questions of authority or authenticity 
have been removed.  There is, though, a danger to these online narratives where 
ambiguity reigns.  It is tempting perhaps to read ‘Belle de Jour’ as only a cultural 
product, as if her true identity does not matter, to be indifferent as to who or what 
enterprise, really, is behind the author-function of her meretricious discourse.  Yet in 
doing so we are choosing to accept the absence of the material reference, happily 
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replacing it with a virtual substitute.  A purely cultural reading of the author ‘Belle 
de Jour’ suggests that there is no authenticity possible in the prostitute’s experience 
as narrated on the Internet - the most accessible and democratic space of modern 
media.  I can accept that ‘Belle de Jour’ is an especial ideological and industrial 
product (just as the prostitute is a social and economic one) created for entertainment 
value and titillation, but I cannot discount the genuine prostitute’s legitimate position 
as a subject worthy of an authentic online voice, or feign indifference as her identity 
is usurped for commercial gain by an imposter.  By not considering the question of 
‘who is speaking online’ and with it the old problems of narrative appropriation as 
important - not because the answer is always deeply illuminating but rather because 
to not know is limiting - we are fulfilling the expectation of an industry that preys on 
indifference and are cementing the dangers of an already ambiguous medium.   
Have I been unkind to that vast and faceless body of ‘readers’ mentioned throughout 
this thesis?  When I implore readers not to be swayed by the false promise of 
category or collapse into easy definitions of such terms as ‘fiction’ and ‘non-fiction,’ 
am I in fact doing them a disservice, assuming that they are not acting with complete 
agency?  Have I been underestimating the ways in which they/we/you/I read?  
Maybe.  
Barthes was right to bring the reader into the forefront; the interpretive act that he 
desires from the reader (rather than the critical process of explanation) is being 
faithfully fulfilled in the examples we have seen.  Which is to say that the reader, 
unsuspecting of a fraudulent document, interprets the category as truthful, and reads 
accordingly; the reader accepts Lejeune’s pact that the author and the subject are the 
same and grants them their status accordingly.  So the question then remains:  do we 
have to wait until the reader is worn down and made cynical for the interpretative 
process to be approached critically?   Or, knowing that the genre has resisted cynical 
affronts thus far, do we accept that the reader is content in trusting that the category 
is what it says it is, and is also content trusting that the author is who she or he says 
that they are - after all, these readers have not chosen the act of speculation as 
afforded them by the category of fiction.  Or is it actually that the reader does not 
truly care, but only acts as though they do as a fulfilment of a kind of moral exercise 
of readership?  This is a less controversial conjecture than it may initially sound.  For 
instance, Belle de Jour’s book sales were not affected by the ambiguity surrounding 
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her identity – is that because her identity as a prostitute is perceived as less ‘sacred’ 
(who gets worked up over a fake whore?) or is it simply because her entertaining 
narrative trumped moral indignation?   
I hope I have shown that a careful reading of the all the texts discussed in the 
preceding chapters alerts us to their fictionality, but the fact remains that they 
weren’t read carefully until after the event of their exposure.  Why was this the case?  
Simply, the reader didn’t have to read carefully, they trusted the category and 
producers of the genre.  Of all the tensions raised in this thesis it is the problem of 
commercial genre that I have found most frustrating.  The unrelenting expectations 
placed upon the genre of autobiography and memoir, as a category of non-fiction 
narrative, which has made it both vulnerable and desirable to misuse.  However, 
autobiography and memoir, with their categorical truth claims, are ever popular 
genres that continue to flourish despite critical unmasking, industrial fallouts, ritual 
abuse and, lest we forget, a reasonable alternative in the guise of fiction; clearly, this 
is not a category that is willing to disappear.  And so, if we cannot change the 
industry, the impetus must, again, be on the reader to read better, closer, more 
carefully.   
Yet perhaps it is enough to suspect, as I do, that the reader, consciously or otherwise, 
has chosen autobiography for its very cynicism, like Goffman’s customer at the shoe 
store who knows she is being mislead by the salesman but accedes to the exchange.  
This is why the act of autobiographical metafiction, the misuse of genre, is an 
important social act.  At its heart is a social exchange between the metafictional 
author and the reader who is culturally invested in the narrative presented.  The 
uncomfortable truth is that these fraudulent memoirs fulfil, in everything but the 
truth claim (and it is a big everything), the obligations of their genre.   
Anthony Grafton suggests that ‘it seems inevitable, then, that a culture that tolerates 
forgery will debase its own intellectual currency.’2  Surely though, worse, or more 
‘debasing,’ than ‘tolerance,’ would be to ignore these texts – to refuse to speculate. I 
have found in my studies of ‘the spurious’ a lively and passionate intellectual 
project.   However we categorize these works, ‘fakes’ or ‘forgeries,’ ‘hoaxes,’ 
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‘scandals’ or ‘appropriations,’ they reveal in their existence one unifying ‘truth’:  it 
matters who is speaking, after all.    
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Appendix 
 
 
 
1. Cora Pearl, Paris. 
 
2. Catherine Deneuve, Belle de Jour, dir. 
Luis Buñuel (Valoria Films, 1968) 
 
 
 
 
3. Billie Piper, Belle de Jour, creator 
Lucy Prebble (ITV Productions, 2007) 
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4.  Billie Piper, Belle de Jour, creator 
Lucy Prebble (ITV Productions, 2007) 
 
5.  Asa ‘Ace’ Carter 
 
 
6.  1991, ‘True Story’ cover, University 
of New Mexico Press 
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7.  2006 cover, University of New 
Mexico Press 
8.  1997 film poster, The Education of 
Little Tree, dir. Richard Friedenberg 
(Paramount Pictures, 1997) 
 
9.  Illustrated book cover ‘Josey Wales,’ 
University of New Mexico Press 
 
10.  1976 film poster The Outlaw Josey 
Wales, dir. Clint Eastwood (Warner 
Bros. Pictures, 1976) 
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11.  Timothy Barrus (Nasdijj) 
 
 
 
12.  Margaret Seltzer/Jones in The New 
York Times 
 
 
13.  Binjamin Wilkomirski signing 
Fragments 
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14.  Monique de Wael (Misha 
Defonseca), with friend 
 
15.  2006 film poster, Survivre Avec les 
Loups, dir. Vera Belmont (Bac Films, 
2007) 
 
 
 
17.  ‘The Man Who Kept Oprah Awake 
at Night’ 
16.  A young James Frey  
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